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ABSTRACT
At a time when the U.S. refugee admissions program is under serious threat
and the world’s displaced population is at its highest, this Report sets forth
extensive recommendations regarding the United States’ role in protecting vul-
nerable refugees and compliance with its commitments under domestic and
international law that together safeguard people fleeing persecution and fear-
ing return to torture. The Report also identifies key national security reasons
for supporting and enhancing the refugee program in keeping with U.S. for-
eign policy priorities. Additionally, the Report provides an in-depth discussion
of the robust, multistep security-assessment mechanisms already in place for
screening refugees; offers viable policy solutions to improve the integration of
resettled refugees through enhanced collaboration among government agen-
cies, private resettlement agencies, and sponsors involved in domestic resettle-
ment; and demonstrates the positive economic impact of refugee resettlement
in the United States. Drawing on the perspectives of longtime domestic refugee
resettlement experts, the Report also provides fresh insights into how public-
private partnerships function in refugee resettlement and the ways in which
they can be strengthened.
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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In 1968, the United States formalized its longstanding commitment
to protecting the most vulnerable among us by ratifying the 1967 Pro-
tocol to the 1951 Refugee Convention. Since then, with the successful
integration of more than three million refugees from all corners of the
world, the United States has reaped the benefits of resettling these
new Americans, from the economic boost they provide domestically
to the leverage and regional stability they create abroad.
The resettling of refugees is therefore very much in keeping with
the Executive Branch’s two major priorities in 2017: national security
and job generation. This Report and its recommendations demon-
strate how the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program assists the U.S. gov-
ernment in achieving these goals by advancing national security,
generating jobs for Americans, and bringing the administration into
compliance with its domestic and international humanitarian and legal
obligations.
The Report offers new and critical information to Congress and the
Executive Branch as they consider how to advance our domestic and
international interests, while retaining our tradition of safeguarding
refugees and ensuring equal treatment for all. The Report:
• reviews U.S. legal and moral commitments under domestic and
international law, which together safeguard people fleeing per-
secution and fearing return to torture;
• identifies key national security reasons for supporting and en-
hancing the refugee program, in keeping with U.S. foreign policy
priorities of preserving regional stability in the Middle East;
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• provides an in-depth discussion of the robust, multistep security-
assessment mechanisms already in place for screening refugees,
as well as technological enhancements to the process to make it
more efficient and effective;
• offers viable policy solutions to improve the integration of reset-
tled refugees through enhanced collaboration among govern-
ment agencies, private resettlement agencies, and sponsors
involved in domestic resettlement; and
• demonstrates the positive economic impact of refugee resettle-
ment in the United States.
This Report draws on over two dozen interviews with leading gov-
ernment officials, key nongovernmental organizations, and academics
to identify changes to the refugee admissions system that have signifi-
cantly improved the efficiency and effectiveness of refugee screening,
processing, resettlement, and integration, as well as the areas in which
the U.S. government can do more. Highlighting the perspectives of
recognized domestic refugee resettlement experts, the Report pro-
vides fresh insights into how longstanding public-private partnerships
in U.S. refugee resettlement operate and the ways in which they can
be further expanded and strengthened.
Described below are some key recommendations that form the ba-
sis of a uniform protocol to (a) strengthen an already robust security-
assessment system and (b) provide the support refugees need to suc-
cessfully integrate into and contribute to U.S. society, both as wealth
generators and as assets to their communities.
To the Executive Branch, including the Departments of State,
Homeland Security, and Health and Human Services:
Department of State
• Continue to implement new technologies to enhance and har-
monize effective security checks for refugees, building on the
technological advances put in place in 2016, which allow for
more efficient screening while still safeguarding national
security.
• Facilitate more efficient family reunification for refugees to en-
sure the stability they need to contribute fully and effectively to
U.S. society and boost the economy.
Department of Homeland Security
• Expand the deployment of permanent Refugee Affairs Division
officers for refugee screening and use of videoconferencing
when trips to the region are not possible due to security con-
cerns, in order to facilitate more efficient and effective security
and eligibility assessments.
• Maintain exemptions to the terrorism-related inadmissibility
grounds (“TRIG”) and continue to work with the United Na-
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tions High Commissioner for Refugees to identify cases for re-
settlement where TRIG issues are not present or where TRIG
exemptions are applicable.
Department of Health and Human Services
• Create systems to collect relevant data to track outcomes of ref-
ugee resettlement, including refugees’ successes and contribu-
tions to local economies and communities.
• Adjust the Office of Refugee Resettlement’s funding cycle to
states in order to account more quickly for secondary migration
and changes to local refugee populations to ensure that refugees
are better integrated and on the path to self-sufficiency and eco-
nomic prosperity.
To the U.S. Congress:
• Expand the Office of Refugee Resettlement’s mandate and in-
vest in resettlement services to facilitate refugees’ integration
and contributions to the economy.
To Nongovernmental Organizations and the Advocacy Community:
• Celebrate and recognize the United States’ success in resettling
over three million refugees,1 amplifying this message through
high-profile public-awareness campaigns.
• Build on existing public-private partnerships to marshal more
resources for resettlement.
• Identify and track refugees’ substantial contributions to local
economies and communities.
• Highlight existing security measures that safeguard national se-
curity while still promoting refugee admission and resettlement.
II. METHODOLOGY
Launched in 2016, the Syrian Refugee Resettlement Project, funded
by the Howard and Abby Milstein Foundation, analyzed U.S. policies,
laws, and regulations affecting refugee resettlement.2 The Project’s
goal was to offer recommendations related to increasing the efficiency
and effectiveness of the U.S. system in resettling refugees while pro-
tecting national security.3
This Report is based on over two dozen in-depth interviews con-
ducted between May and December 2016 with officials from key fed-
eral agencies—including the State Department’s Bureau of
1. See Refugee Admissions, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://www.state.gov/j/prm/ra/
[https://perma.cc/SJR4-V493] (last visited Apr. 3, 2017).
2. Clinical program receives grant from Milstein Foundation to launch Syrian Ref-
ugee Resettlement Project, HARVARD LAW TODAY (June 10, 2016), https://today.law
.harvard.edu/clinical-program-receives-milstein-foundation-grant-launch-syrian-refu-
gee-resettlement-project/ [https://perma.cc/9ZAJ-KKHE].
3. Id.
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Population, Refugees, and Migration (“PRM”); the Department of
Homeland Security’s (“DHS”) U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Ser-
vices (“USCIS”); and the Department of Health and Human Services’
Office of Refugee Resettlement (“ORR”)—as well as with state refu-
gee coordinators, resettlement agencies, and nongovernmental organi-
zations (“NGOs”).4
The Report also draws on and synthesizes recent reports on the
U.S. refugee resettlement process, statements by U.S. government of-
ficials, and legislative proposals in formulating recommendations to
facilitate the expeditious overseas processing of refugees and to en-
hance the integration of refugees once they arrive in the United
States.
The Report was drafted in consultation with an advisory group
comprising HIAS, Human Rights Watch, the International Refugee
Assistance Project, and the International Rescue Committee.
Since the Project’s inception in 2016, the political landscape has
shifted significantly. On January 27, 2017, President Donald J. Trump
signed an Executive Order, Protecting the Nation from Foreign Ter-
rorist Entry into the United States, which reduced the number of refu-
gees to be admitted into the United States in Fiscal Year (“FY”) 2017
from 110,000 to 50,000, suspended the U.S. Refugee Admissions Pro-
gram (“USRAP”) for 120 days, and indefinitely banned the admission
of refugees from Syria—a ban which only the President could lift.5
The order also mandated that future resettlement procedures priori-
tize refugees who were members of a religious minority in their coun-
try of origin and faced religious persecution.6
Following litigation, this Executive Order was subject to a nation-
wide restraining order and was subsequently replaced by a new Exec-
utive Order issued on March 6, which was also entitled Protecting the
Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States.7 This
March 6 Order revoked the prior January 27 order as of March 16,
2017. Like the prior order, this order set the number of refugees who
4. Interview by Deb Stein with undisclosed official, U.S. Dep’t of State Bureau of
Population, Refugees, and Migration, in Wash., D.C. (Aug. 29, 2016) [hereinafter
PRM Interview]; Interview by Deb Stein with undisclosed official, Dep’t of Homeland
Sec. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, in Wash., D.C. (Aug. 29, 2016) [here-
inafter USCIS Interview]; Interview by Deb Stein with undisclosed official, U.S. Dep’t
of Health and Human Serv., in Wash., D.C. (Sep. 21, 2016) [hereinafter ORR Inter-
view]; Telephone Interview by Deb Stein with undisclosed state refugee coordinators
(Oct. 2016) [hereinafter Refugee Coordinator Interviews]. Interviews for this Report
were conducted with the condition that they were not for attribution.
5. Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,977 (Jan. 27, 2017).
6. Id.; see also Sarah Pierce & Doris Meissner, Trump Executive Order on Refu-
gees and Travel Ban: A Brief Review, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Feb. 2017), https://
www.migrationpolicy.org/research/trump-executive-order-refugees-and-travel-ban-
brief-review [https://perma.cc/JW3G-P3MJ].
7. Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017).
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may be admitted to the United States at 50,000,8 less than half the
number previously set prior to the start of FY 2017 by President Ba-
rack Obama in consultation with Congress.9 The March 6 Order was
also the subject of litigation, and on March 15, it was enjoined from
taking effect.10
Given these new policy directives and policymakers’ heightened fo-
cus on national security concerns in refugee processing, this Report
presents a thorough overview of the robust security checks and other
procedural safeguards already in place to protect U.S. national secur-
ity interests. It also offers an in-depth analysis of avenues for in-
creased efficiency, improved outcomes, and integration of refugees,
both in the overseas admissions and the domestic resettlement
processes.
III. BACKGROUND ON SYRIAN REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT
IN THE UNITED STATES
As this Report goes to print, almost five million Syrian refugees—
mostly women and children in need of protection, medical assistance,
and other urgent aid11—have registered (or are awaiting registration)
with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(“UNHCR”).12 After six years of conflict in Syria, there is no sign of
8. Id.
9. Juliet Eilperin, White House Raises Refugee Target to 110,000, WASH. POST
(Sept. 14, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/09/14/
white-house-plans-to-accept-at-least-110000-refugees-in-2017/?utm_term=.3fcf2f2b46
a6 [http://perma.cc/44VX-2XSH].
10. For more information regarding the litigation, see Civil Rights Challenges to
Trump Refugee/Visa Order, U. OF MICH. L. SCH. C.R. LITIG. CLEARINGHOUSE, https:/
/www.clearinghouse.net/results.php?searchSpecialCollection=44 [https://perma.cc/
CYX5-XDRN] (last visited Apr. 23, 2017). Subsequent to the release of the Report,
on September 24, 2017, the President issued a new Proclamation, which is deemed by
many to be the “travel ban 3.0.” This latest Proclamation does not address the issue of
refugee resettlement and, like the January and February Orders, it is also the subject
of extensive litigation. See generally Ilya Smith, Federal court rules against Travel Ban
3.0 because it discriminates against Muslims, WASH. POST (Oct. 18, 2017), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/10/18/federal-court-rules-
against-travel-ban-3-0-because-it-discriminates-against-muslims/
?utm_term=.1e299d6f27fb [https://perma.cc/ETY4-79RG].
11. See, e.g., UNFPA, REGIONAL SITUATION REPORT FOR SYRIA CRISIS (Aug.
2013), http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/UNFPA%20regional%20
sitrep%2015%20July-%2015%20August%20%2310%20.pdf [https://perma.cc/7AQU-
SUDW]; Samira Sami et al., Responding to the Syrian Crisis: The Needs of Women
and Girls, THE LANCET (Nov. 8, 2013), https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/down
load/39300 [https://perma.cc/7Y4Q-5JQW].
12. Refugees are, by definition, individuals who are outside of their country of
origin. “This figure includes 2 million Syrians registered by UNHCR in Egypt, Iraq,
Jordan and Lebanon, 2.9 million Syrians registered by the Government of Turkey, as
well as more than 29,000 Syrian refugees registered in North Africa.” UNHCR, SYRIA
REGIONAL REFUGEE RESPONSE: REGIONAL OVERVIEW (Mar. 23, 2017), https://
data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php [https://perma.cc/RAV6-DRLF]. Many
more—approximately 6.5 million (including 2.8 million children)—were internally
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abatement and no sign that Syrian refugees are any closer to finding
more permanent solutions.
UNHCR, the principal organization that provides international pro-
tection to refugees, typically tries to assist governments in pursuing
one of three durable solutions for refugees: voluntary repatriation
when conditions in the source country improve; permanent local inte-
gration in the country of first asylum; or resettlement in a third coun-
try.13 The last—resettlement in a third country—is the focus of this
Report.
The United States has long been an international leader in reset-
tling refugees.14 Generally, resettlement in another country is an op-
tion for very few: only about one percent of all refugees in 2015.15
UNHCR refers refugees for resettlement only after the first two solu-
tions—voluntary repatriation and local integration—are assessed and
resettlement is identified as “the most appropriate solution.”16 Fur-
ther, UNHCR refers for resettlement only those refugees who are
particularly vulnerable in their host nation and who pose no threat to
the resettlement country.17 Specifically, UNHCR identifies certain
categories of refugees whom it refers for resettlement, based on the
urgency of their cases: those in need of legal and/or physical protec-
tion; survivors of torture and/or violence; those with medical needs;
women, adolescents, and girls at particular risk; those who need to
reunify with family members in other nations; and finally, those with
displaced within Syria as of July 2016. UNHCR, INTERNALLY DISPLACED PEOPLE
(July 7, 2016), http://www.unhcr.org/sy/29-internally-displaced-people.html [https://per
ma.cc/DSP2-LM7W].
13. See UNHCR, GLOBAL TRENDS: FORCED DISPLACEMENT IN 2015 24 (2016),
http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/statistics/unhcrstats/576408cd7/unhcr-global-trends-2015
.html [https://perma.cc/MU55-Q5D2]. See also UNHCR, PROTECTING REFUGEES &
THE ROLE OF UNHCR 20–22 (2014); UNHCR, UNHCR RESETTLEMENT HANDBOOK
11, 24–26 (2011); UNHCR, FRAMEWORK FOR DURABLE SOLUTIONS FOR REFUGEES
AND PERSONS OF CONCERN (2003). See also Alex Nowrasteh, Syrian Refugees Don’t
Pose a Serious Security Threat, CATO INSTITUTE (Nov. 18, 2015), http://www.cato.org/
blog/syrian-refugees-dont-pose-serious-security-threat [https://perma.cc/GW2X-
DXXE].
14. In 2014, for example, the United States resettled 48,911 refugees, Canada re-
settled 7,233, and Australia resettled 6,162. UNHCR, UNHCR GLOBAL RESETTLE-
MENT STATISTICAL REPORT 48–49 (2014), http://www.unhcr.org/52693bd09.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DHJ2-RCCT]. It is worth noting in this context that President
Trump’s plan for safe zones in the region in lieu of resettlement has been widely
discredited, including by military leaders. See, e.g., Andrew de Grandpre, Trump’s
Call for ‘Safe Zones’ in Syria Is Met with Skepticism at the Pentagon, MILITARY TIMES
(Jan.  26, 2017), http://www.militarytimes.com/articles/trump-syria-refugees-safe-zones
[https://perma.cc/SCF4-FAB2].
15. See Resettlement, UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/resettlement.html
[https://perma.cc/C4X8-EPW7] (last visited Apr. 16, 2017).
16. UNHCR Resettlement Submission Categories, UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/
558bff849.pdf [https://perma.cc/PWL2-8936] (last visited Apr. 3, 2017). See also
UNHCR, UNHCR RESETTLEMENT HANDBOOK 243–87 (2011).
17. See UNHCR Resettlement Submission Categories, UNHCR, http://www.unhcr
.org/558bff849.pdf [https://perma.cc/PWL2-8936] (last visited Apr. 3, 2017).
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no foreseeable alternative durable solutions.18 The resettlement pro-
gram aims both to provide durable protection for at-risk refugees and
to allow countries to share responsibility for refugee protection,
thereby reducing instability in overburdened countries of first
asylum.19
For Syrian refugees, resettlement generally means transfer from
Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, or Iraq to a third country—such as the
United States—that has agreed to admit them after a referral by
UNHCR and a rigorous and redundant series of screenings and
checks.20 Refugees are admitted into the United States through the
USRAP, an interagency program that identifies and admits qualified
refugees for resettlement in the United States, in coordination with a
network of international and domestic nongovernmental partners.21
Since the beginning of the Syrian conflict in 2011, approximately
18,000 Syrian refugees have been resettled in the United States, in-
cluding a total of 12,587 in FY 2016.22 Prior to FY 2016, the resettle-
ment of Syrian refugees had faced a variety of political roadblocks,
including efforts by certain state governors to block the resettlement
of these refugees in their states in the wake of the 2015 terrorist at-
tacks in Paris.23 However, litigation challenging those actions made
18. Id. See also UNHCR, UNHCR RESETTLEMENT HANDBOOK 243–87 (2011).
19. See UNHCR, UNHCR RESETTLEMENT HANDBOOK 3 (2011).
20. See Refugee Resettlement - Security Screening Information, HUMAN RIGHTS
FIRST (Apr. 2016), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/SyrianRefugees-
VettingFacts.pdf [https://perma.cc/TLZ8-WX9L]; see also UNHCR, UNHCR RESET-
TLEMENT HANDBOOK 302–80 (2011); see also U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES AND
IMMIGRANTS, Security Screening of Refugees Admitted to the U.S., http://refugees.org/
explore-the-issues/our-work-with-refugees/security-screening/ [https://perma.cc/
UKW6-9HXF] (last visited Apr. 3, 2017); see also Refugee Processing and Security
Screening, USCIS (Dec. 3, 2015), https://www.uscis.gov/refugeescreening [https://per
ma.cc/5UY3-CSXJ].
21. See U.S. Refugee Admissions Program FAQs, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Jan. 20,
2017), https://www.state.gov/j/prm/releases/factsheets/2017/266447.htm [https://perma
.cc/X9UK-GMLX]; see also Refugee Resettlement - Security Screening Information,
HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST (Apr. 2016), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/
SyrianRefugeesVettingFacts.pdf [https://perma.cc/U5WL-42LU]. The three main U.S.
government agencies involved in refugee resettlement are USCIS within the DHS;
PRM within the State Department; and ORR within the Department of Health and
Human Services. PRM is responsible for the overall coordination and management
responsibility of the USRAP and plays a lead role in proposing admissions ceilings
and processing priorities. See The United States Refugee Admissions Program (US-
RAP) Consultation & Worldwide Processing Priorities, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IM-
MIGR. SERVS. (May 5, 2016), https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/
refugees/united-states-refugee-admissions-program-usrap-consultation-worldwide-
processing-priorities [https://perma.cc/DA97-YKB5]; See also 8 U.S.C. § 1522 (2012).
22. Data as of December 31, 2016. Jie Zong & Jeanne Batalova, Syrian Refugees
in the United States, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Jan. 12, 2017), http://www.migra-
tionpolicy.org/article/syrian-refugees-united-states [https://perma.cc/P9M5-9W2U].
See also Admissions & Arrivals, REFUGEE PROCESSING CTR. (2016), http://www.wrap-
snet.org/admissions-and-arrivals [https://perma.cc/KK7L-7FT7].
23. See Patrick Healy & Julie Bosman, G.O.P. Governors Vow to Close Doors to
Syrian Refugees, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/17/us/
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clear24 that under the Refugee Act of 1980, states cannot unilaterally
politics/gop-governors-vow-to-close-doors-to-syrian-refugees.html [https://perma.cc/
YYC9-8UAR]. Governor Greg Abbott of Texas, for example, asserted that “Texas
‘will not accept any refugees from Syria’ because of security concerns,” and Vice Pres-
ident Mike Pence, then governor of Indiana, said that “while his state ‘has a long
tradition of opening our arms and homes to refugees from around the world,’ his ‘first
responsibility is to ensure the safety and security of all Hoosiers.’” Id. A directive
from then-Governor Pence to state agencies ordering them to stop helping with the
resettlement of Syrian refugees by withholding the use of federal money to provide
services such as housing and medical care resulted in at least one national resettle-
ment agency making the last-minute decision to change the placement of a Syrian
family already en route to Indianapolis. The local affiliate that was to have welcomed
this family, Exodus Refugee Immigration, expressed concern to the sponsoring na-
tional resettlement agency, Episcopal Migration Ministries, that this directive could
indefinitely block the family from accessing the vital services and financial assistance
they would normally receive, and further reported receiving several angry and threat-
ening calls from the public in opposition to Syrian refugees in reaction to the Paris
attacks, which had occurred days before. Wishing to avoid further traumatizing the
family by exposing them to potential discrimination and threats to their safety, both
agencies agreed it would be in the family’s best interest to secure a different place-
ment location. The family had been notified weeks prior that they would be destined
for Indianapolis and had spent that time learning about their future home, but upon
their arrival at New York’s JFK Airport, they learned they would instead be going to
New Haven, Connecticut, and would be assisted by Integrated Refugee and Immigra-
tion Services. In New Haven, they were warmly welcomed by staff of Integrated Ref-
ugee and Immigration Services, state officials, and residents alike. See Indiana
Governor Faces Lawsuit for Blocking Syrian Refugees, THE INDIANA LAWYER (Nov.
24, 2015), http://www.theindianalawyer.com/indiana-governor-faces-lawsuit-for-block-
ing-syrian-refugees/PARAMS/article/38809 [https://perma.cc/9AYD-T4J9]. See also
Liz Robbins, Syrian Family Diverted from Indiana Feels ‘Welcomed’ in Connecticut,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/21/nyregion/syrian-ref-
ugees-come-to-the-us-to-find-a-place-they-did-not-expect.html  [https://perma.cc/VA4
X-3LQS].
24. See Exodus Refugee Immigr., Inc. v. Pence, 838 F.3d 902 (7th Cir. 2016). The
Department of Justice filed a statement of interest in the case, arguing that the direc-
tive violated the Refugee Act of 1980 and agreements the state made to abide by
nondiscrimination terms in the Refugee Social Service Program. See Dave Stafford,
US Joins Syrian Refugee Case against Pence, THE INDIANA LAWYER (Feb. 12, 2016),
http://www.theindianalawyer.com/us-joins-syrian-refugee-case-against-pence/PARA
MS/article/39489 [https://perma.cc/B9QQ-SNMG]; Dave Stafford, 7th Circuit Affirms
Order Against Pence in Syrian Refugee Case, THE INDIANA LAWYER (Oct. 3, 2016),
http://www.theindianalawyer.com/th-circuit-affirms-order-against-pence-in-syrian-ref-
ugee-case/PARAMS/article/41610 [https://perma.cc/76R4-7ZPU]. Meanwhile, the
state of Texas tried another tactic. First, Governor Abbott sent a letter to President
Obama on November 16, 2015, stating in part, “Effective today, I am directing the
Texas Health & Human Services Commission’s Refugee Resettlement Program to not
participate in the resettlement of any Syrian refugees in the State of Texas.” Letter
from Greg Abbott, Governor Tex., to President Barack Obama (Nov. 16, 2015), http:/
/gov.texas.gov/files/pressoffice/SyrianRefugees_BarackObama11162015.pdf [https://
perma.cc/D8M8-Z97A]. Two weeks later, the state of Texas brought a lawsuit on De-
cember 3, 2015, against federal officials and one resettlement agency, the Interna-
tional Rescue Committee, asking for an immediate restraining order and a hearing for
an injunction that would have prevented the resettlement of Syrian refugees. See Jon
Herskovitz & Lisa Maria Garza, Texas Sues U.S., Relief Agency, to Block Syrian Refu-
gees, REUTERS (Dec. 2, 2015, 10:03 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-texas-syri-
ans-idUSKBN0TL2Z920151203 [https://perma.cc/S7QT-F7K7]. Ultimately, a federal
district court rejected Texas’s attempt to bar the federal government from resettling
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block resettlement, and when refugees arrive in the United States,
they have the right to move freely throughout the country.25
The presidential determination on refugee admissions for FY 2017,
in consultation with Congress, authorized the admission of 110,000
refugees, including a proposed regional ceiling of 40,000 for refugees
from the Near East and South Asia.26
Although the January 27 Executive Order attempted to halt all ref-
ugee admissions for 120 days and Syrian refugee resettlement indefi-
nitely, as well as reduce the authorized admission level to 50,000
refugees, litigation is ongoing and federal courts across the country
have enjoined various provisions of the order from taking effect.27 For
example, in February 2017, HIAS, the International Refugee Assis-
tance Project, the American Civil Liberties Union, and others filed a
motion for a preliminary injunction to stop the reduction of refugee
admissions as part of a lawsuit in Maryland. The Harvard Immigration
and Refugee Clinical Program, among others, submitted an amicus
curiae brief in support of this litigation.28
The March 6 Executive Order, which superseded the January 27 or-
der no longer included a ban on Syrian refugee resettlement. How-
ever, it still included the 120-day suspension of the USRAP and also
Syrian refugees, dismissing the lawsuit on June 16, 2016, and stating that the Texas
Health and Human Services Commission had failed to “state a plausible claim for
relief” or prove it could challenge the federal government’s actions under existing
law. Tex. Health & Human Servs. Comm’n v. United States, 193 F. Supp. 3d 733, 736
(N.D. Tex. 2016). See also Matt Ford, Texas Loses Its Syrian Refugee Lawsuit, THE
ATLANTIC (June 16, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/news/archive/2016/06/texas-
syrian-refugee-lawsuit/487424/ [https://perma.cc/39L4-GNMX].
25. See Exodus Refugee Immigr., Inc. v. Pence, 838 F.3d 902, 904 (7th Cir. 2016).
26. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. & U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., PROPOSED REFUGEE ADMISSIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2016: REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 59 (2016), https://www.state.gov/j/prm/releases/doc-
sforcongress/247770.htm [https://perma.cc/EW5F-375R]. Because regional ceilings do
not specify individual nationality quotas, it should be noted that this includes not only
vulnerable Syrians but also Iraqis, Bhutanese, Iranians, Pakistanis, and Afghans, in-
cluding individuals from various religious and ethnic groups in the Near East/South
Asia region. Since 1975, the United States has resettled over three million refugees.
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES
OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT, History, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/about/his-
tory [https://perma.cc/H8MU-B6SD] (last visited Apr. 3, 2017). See also Jens Manuel
Krogstad & Jynnah Radford, Key Facts About Refugees to the U.S., PEW RESEARCH
CTR. (Jan. 30, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/01/30/key-facts-
about-refugees-to-the-u-s/ [https://perma.cc/8L9Q-D89Y].
27. See Washington v. Trump, No. 17-35105 (9th Cir. Mar. 17, 2017); see also Aziz
v. Trump, No. 17-116 (E.D. Va. Feb. 13, 2017).
28. See Rachel Nusbaum, HIAS v. Trump - Why We’re Suing, HIAS (Feb. 7,
2017), https://www.hias.org/blog/hias-v-trump-why-were-suing [https://perma.cc/
55DK-Y7VS]; Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, Int’l Refugee Assis-
tance Project v. Trump, No. 8:17-cv-00361-TDC (D. Md. Feb. 7, 2017). See also HIAS
Files Preliminary Injunction Challenging Reduction of Refugee Admissions to 50,000,
HIAS (Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.hias.org/hias-files-preliminary-injunction-challeng-
ing-reduction-refugee-admissions-50000 [https://perma.cc/96BT-SXXJ] (describing
motion for preliminary injunction following filing of complaint).
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set the number of refugees who may be admitted to the United States
in FY 2017 at 50,000—less than half the number set by President
Obama, in consultation with Congress, prior to the start of the fiscal
year. This Executive Order was enjoined from taking effect on March
15.
As discussed further in the following Section, both the January 27
and the March 6 Executive Orders contravened U.S. obligations
under domestic and international law, including the Refugee Act of
1980 and the 1967 Protocol to the 1951 Refugee Convention. The or-
ders also violated U.S. obligations under the Convention against Tor-
ture, which Congress incorporated into U.S. law and which prevents
the United States from returning individuals to a country where they
would face torture.
Limiting refugee resettlement to the United States has not only le-
gal implications but also critical policy ramifications, given the impor-
tance of the refugee resettlement regime in advancing U.S. national
security interests worldwide. By sharing the global burden of hosting
refugees, the USRAP has proven integral to preserving and building
goodwill with U.S. allies in the Middle East, many of whom are exper-
iencing the destabilizing effects of hosting millions of refugees.29 As
U.S. government officials noted in a 2015 bipartisan letter to Congress
regarding Syrian refugees: “[R]efusing to take [refugees] only feeds
the narrative of ISIS that there is a war between Islam and the
West . . . . We must make clear that the United States rejects this
worldview by continuing to offer refuge to the world’s most vulnera-
ble people, regardless of their religion or nationality.”30
This Report begins by addressing the overseas refugee processing
and admissions process, highlighting the robust vetting and security
check procedures, and identifying recent changes to the system that
have improved efficiency and effectiveness. It then analyzes domestic
refugee resettlement mechanisms, bringing light to bear on public-pri-
vate partnerships already in place and suggesting avenues for greater
collaboration in order to expand and improve existing resettlement
structures and thereby enhance integration efforts. Finally, this Re-
port concludes with a series of recommendations for Congress, the
Executive Branch (including the President, DHS, the State Depart-
ment, and the Department of Justice), resettlement agencies, NGOs,
and the advocacy community.
29. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, AT LEAST 10,000: A SIX-MONTH PROGRESS REPORT
ON U.S. RESETTLEMENT OF SYRIAN REFUGEES 13 (2016), http://www.humanrightsfirst
.org/sites/default/files/HRFReportAtLeastTenThousand-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/
BXY3-QKN9].
30. Id. at 13–14.
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IV. LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORK
A. Legal Framework
Congress incorporated the international definition of “refugee”
from the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees into U.S. law with the Refugee Act of 1980.31
U.S. law thus defines a refugee in the following way:
any person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality
or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any coun-
try in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable
or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself
or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution
or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion . . . .32
Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention, which was incorporated
into the Refugee Act of 1980, imposes a nonrefoulement obligation on
the United States, requiring the United States not to return refugees
to circumstances in which their “life or freedom would be threatened
on account of [their] race, religion, nationality, membership of a par-
ticular social group[,] or political opinion.”33
The Refugee Act set forth “a permanent and systematic procedure
for the admission to this country of refugees of special humanitarian
concern.”34 In doing so, it brought the U.S. “definition of ‘refugee’
into conformity with the United Nations Convention and Protocol Re-
lating to the Status of Refugees and . . . g[a]ve ‘statutory meaning to
our national commitment to human rights and humanitarian con-
31. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 423–24 (1987) (“Congress used dif-
ferent, broader language to define the term ‘refugee’ . . . The [Refugee] Act’s estab-
lishment of a broad class of refugees who are eligible for a discretionary grant of
asylum, and a narrower class of aliens who are given a statutory right not to be de-
ported to the country where they are in danger, mirrors the provisions of the United
Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, which provided the motivation
for the enactment of the Refugee Act of 1980.”); see also An Overview of U.S. Refu-
gee Law and Policy, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Nov. 18, 2015), https://www.americanim-
migrationcouncil.org/research/overview-us-refugee-law-and-policy [https://perma.cc/
QC7Z-6EJP].
32. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2012).
33. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, LEGAL OBLIGATIONS OF
THE UNITED STATES UNDER ARTICLE 33 OF THE REFUGEE CONVENTION, 15 OP.
O.L.C. 86, 86–87 (1991) (quoting Article 33 of the Refugee Convention); 8 U.S.C.
§ 1253(h) (2012). See also Note on Non-Refoulement (Submitted by the High Commis-
sioner), UNHCR (Aug. 23, 1977), http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/excom/scip/3ae68ccd10/
note-non-refoulement-submitted-high-commissioner.html [https://perma.cc/G9EG-
6P9U]; U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T.
6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150; 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31,
1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577 [hereinafter together “Refugee Convention”].
34. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 101(b), 94 Stat. 102, 102 (1980).
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cerns.’”35 Prior to the Refugee Act, “geographical and ideological
preferences” governed refugee admissions to the United States.36 The
Refugee Act eliminated the ideological definition of refugee and re-
placed it with a new definition that “no longer applies only to refugees
‘from communism’ or certain areas of the Middle East; it now applies
to all who meet the test of the United Nations Convention and Proto-
col.”37 The Refugee Act’s purpose was to reform the prior ad hoc and
discriminatory approach to U.S. refugee admissions and promote a
more structured, equitable, and neutral decision-making process.38
Pursuant to the Refugee Act, the number of refugees the United
States admits annually is determined by the President in “appropriate
consultation” with Congress.39 Specifically, section 207 of the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act (“INA”), which incorporates provisions
of the Refugee Act, requires the President, in consultation with Con-
gress, to set admissions numbers prior to the beginning of the fiscal
year: “Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the number
of refugees who may be admitted under this section in any fiscal year
. . . shall be such number as the President determines, before the begin-
ning of the fiscal year and after appropriate consultation.”40 Subsection
(b), which addresses refugee admissions in emergency situations, fur-
ther states that “such admissions shall be allocated among refugees of
special humanitarian concern . . . in accordance with a determination
35. In re S-P-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 486, 492 (B.I.A. 1996) (quoting S. REP. NO. 256,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 4, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 141, 144); see also INS v.
Cardozo-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 435–38 (1987).
36. See Deborah E. Anker & Michael H. Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A Legisla-
tive History of the Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 9, 11, 17–18 (1981)
(describing the history of the 1965 amendments to the Immigration and Nationality
Act, which regarded as a refugee, persons from a communist or communist-domi-
nated country, or a country in the Middle East).
37. Edward M. Kennedy, Refugee Act of 1980, 15 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 141,
142–43 (1981) (explaining that the act “gave new statutory authority to the United
States’ longstanding commitment to human rights and its traditional humanitarian
concern for the plight of refugees around the world”). See also Refugee Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 101(b), 94 Stat. 102, 102 (1980) (establishing a “permanent and
systematic procedure for the admission to this country of refugees of special humani-
tarian concern to the United States” and providing “comprehensive and uniform pro-
visions for the effective resettlement and absorption of those refugees who are
admitted”).
38. See H.R. REP. NO. 96-781, at 1 (1980) (Conf. Rep.) (noting that the Refugee
Act aimed to “establish a more uniform basis for the provision of assistance to refu-
gees”); S. REP. NO. 96-590, at 1 (1980) (Conf. Rep.) (same); see also S. REP. NO. 96-2,
at 3757 (1979) (“Contrary to current law, the consultation process is now specifically
outlined in the statute, ending the current parole process which is merely governed by
custom and practice.”) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
39. 8 U.S.C. § 1157(e) (2012). See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, U.S. DEP’T OF HOME-
LAND SEC. & U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., PROPOSED REFUGEE AD-
MISSIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016: REPORT TO CONGRESS 6 (2016), https://www.state
.gov/j/prm/releases/docsforcongress/247770.htm [https://perma.cc/EW5F-375R].
40. 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a)(2) (2012) (emphasis added).
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made by the President after the appropriate consultation provided
under this subsection.”41
The “appropriate consultation” process is defined in section 207(e)
of the INA as in-person discussions “by designated Cabinet-level rep-
resentatives of the President with members of the Committees on the
Judiciary of the Senate and of the House of Representatives” to re-
view the refugee situation and project the level of U.S. participation in
resettlement efforts.42 At least two weeks prior to these discussions,
the President is required to provide information to Congress, to the
extent possible, regarding the current numbers and regional allocation
of refugees, conditions in refugees’ countries of origin, and plans for
resettlement and movement of refugees, along with corresponding es-
timated costs, the socioeconomic and demographic impact of resettle-
ment, the scope of refugee resettlement efforts internationally, and
the impact of U.S. resettlement efforts on U.S. foreign-policy
interests.43
Under well-established canons of statutory interpretation, the stat-
ute’s plain language must determine its meaning where, as here, the
statutory text is unambiguous.44 President Obama, in consultation
with Congress, set the admissions number at 110,000 refugees prior to
the start of FY 2017,45 and the plain language of the statute does not
allow the president to override that determination unilaterally.
The legislative history of the Refugee Act further demonstrates that
Congress took steps to ensure it had “ample control over refugee ad-
missions.”46 The conference report to the Refugee Act indicated that
the legislation granted Congress “much greater and more explicit
power than it has had before with regard to the numbers and nature of
refugees to be admitted to this country.”47 Indeed, in the discussions
leading up to the adoption of the Refugee Act, the consultative pro-
41. Id. § 1157(b) (emphasis added). This consultation requirement is reiterated in
subsection (d), entitled “Oversight reporting and consultation requirements,” which
mandates a hearing to review the President’s proposal under either subsection (a) or
(b), “unless public disclosure of the details of the proposal would jeopardize the lives
or safety of individuals.” Id. § 1157(d)(3)(B). Furthermore, subsection (e) sets forth
an extensive definition of “appropriate consultation,” including a detailed list of infor-
mation that, “to the extent possible,” “shall be provided at least two weeks in ad-
vance” of discussions “by designated representatives of the President” with members
of Congress. Id. § 1157(e).
42. 8 U.S.C. § 1157(e) (2012).
43. Id.
44. Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., Inc., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (“The [judicial] inquiry ceases ‘if the statutory language is unambigu-
ous and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent.’”).
45. Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, Presidential Determi-
nation – Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 2017 (Sept. 28, 2016), https://obama
whitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/09/28/presidential-determination-refu-
gee-admissions-fiscal-year-2017 [https://perma.cc/MX43-E5FM].
46. H.R. REP. NO. 96-2, at 4500 (1980) (statement of Rep. Holtzman).
47. Id. at 4501.
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cess between the executive and legislative branches was described as
“a give-and-take on both sides” and as “a joint decision.”48
Members of the House Subcommittee on Immigration and Border
Security also emphasized the United States’ special responsibility to
refugees from regions where the United States had a “prolonged pres-
ence,” such as, at that time, Southeast Asia.49 Committee members
recognized that the number of refugees resettled would likely be “far
in excess of 50,000”50 and noted that “Americans should not fight
against letting more people in to the extent we can accommodate
them, because it’s well known that our democracy has been replen-
ished by way of immigration.”51 President Jimmy Carter’s signing
statement similarly emphasized that the “new admissions policy . . .
will permit fair and equitable treatment of refugees in the United
States, regardless of their country of origin” and “will also ensure
thorough consideration of admissions questions by both the Congress
and the administration.”52
Any presidential policy that unilaterally attempts to suspend the
refugee program and reduce the number of refugees who may be ad-
mitted after the start of the fiscal year violates the elaborate consulta-
tion process set forth by statute, as well as longstanding practice.53
The statute does not grant the President unfettered power to reduce
48. Admission of Refugees into the United States: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Immigration, Citizenship, & Int’l Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 71
(1977) (statement of John W. DeWitt, Deputy Administrator, Bureau of Security and
Consular Aff., Dep’t of State); see also id. at 59 (statement of Rep. Joshua Eilberg)
(“I am deeply concerned that, under current law and procedures, Congress has sur-
rendered—to a great extent—its authority to regulate the flow of refugees to this
country. Our bill represents an attempt to restore this authority and, at the same time,
to establish a proper balance between the executive and the legislative branches of
Government in establishing the appropriate procedures governing their admission.”).
49. See, e.g., Admission of Refugees into the United States Part II: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, & Int’l Law of the H. Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 178 (1978) (statement of Rep. Joshua Eilberg) (“It is appar-
ent that the basic reason, apart from our traditional concern for refugees and human
rights, for our responsibility for the refugees in that area, stems from our prolonged
presence in Vietnam, and our utilization of the resources of Laos and Cambodia dur-
ing the Indochina conflict.”).
50. Refugee Act of 1979: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees,
and Int’l Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 31 (1979) (statement of
Rep. Dan Lungren).
51. Id. at 29 (statement of Att’y Gen. Bell).
52. Jimmy Carter, Refugee Act of 1980 Statement on Signing S. 643 into Law (Mar.
18, 1980), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=33154 [https://perma.cc/ZY68-
H7L7].
53. Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, Int’l Refugee Assistance Pro-
ject v. Trump, No. 8:17-cv-00361- TDC, ¶¶ 166–72 (D. Md. Feb. 7, 2017). See, e.g.,
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. & U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVS., PROPOSED REFUGEE ADMISSIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016: REPORT
TO THE CONGRESS, https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/262168.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2HT8-4T64].
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the annual number of refugees who may be admitted.54 Indeed, the
only explicit and established exception to the procedure is that after
midyear executive-congressional consultations, the government can
decide to admit more refugees when justified by “grave humanitarian
concerns” and emergency refugee situations.55
Specifically, section 207(b) of the INA grants the president, in con-
sultation with Congress, the power to “fix” a number of refugees to be
admitted separately from the predetermined number to address ur-
gent humanitarian concerns.56 The statute explains that the president
may exercise this exception only to increase the number of refugee
admissions in the case of an unforeseen humanitarian situation.57 The
statute also requires a hearing on the proposal to increase admissions,
unless public disclosure would threaten the lives or safety of
individuals.58
54. Brief of Immigration Law Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents,
Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, et al. v. Trump, 2017 WL 818255 (No. 16-1436);
Hawai’i v. Trump, 233 F. Supp. 3d 850 (No. 16-1540).
55. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1157(b), (d)(1), (e) (2012). In addition, under Article 3 of the 1951
Refugee Convention, state parties are required to apply the convention “without dis-
crimination as to race, religion or country of origin.” The January 27 Executive Or-
der’s improper prioritization of religious minorities and discrimination against
refugees from predominantly Muslim countries, however, contravenes nondiscrimina-
tion protections under both domestic and international law. See, e.g., Geoff Gilbert,
Trump’s Order Barring Refugees Flies in the Face of Logic and Humanity, THE CON-
VERSATION (Jan. 29, 2017, 8:41 AM), http://theconversation.com/trumps-order-bar-
ring-refugees-flies-in-the-face-of-logic-and-humanity-72061 [https://perma.cc/EJ2W-
AU4Y]; Jonathan Hafetz, The Important Role of International Law in Legal Chal-
lenges to Trump’s Anti-Refugee Order, OPINIO JURIS (Feb. 3, 2017, 6:45 AM), http://
opiniojuris.org/2017/02/03/the-important-role-of-international-law-in-legal-challenges-
to-trumps-anti-refugee-order/ [https://perma.cc/9PAD-C35V] (“The order contra-
venes the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol by discriminating among refu-
gees based on religion and country of origin. The ban also violates applicable human
rights treaties, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), which prohibits non-discrimination across a broad range of state action,
including entry decisions, and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination (CERD), which bars racial and religious discrimination in im-
migration decisions.”); Jay Shooster, Trump’s Immigration Policy Risks Violating In-
ternational Law—Alienates US Allies, JUST SECURITY (Jan. 27, 2017, 8:04 AM), https:/
/www.justsecurity.org/36834/trumps-immigration-restrictions-risk-violating-interna-
tional-law-cutting-foreign-allies-support/ [https://perma.cc/B52A-FE68] (“[W]hen the
administration attempts to engage in what amounts to unlawful discrimination of im-
migrants, those key allies may refuse to cooperate with the U.S. government in order
to avoid their responsibility for violations of international law . . . . Foreign intelli-
gence information that previously could have been shared with U.S. authorities may
need to be withheld, given the significant risk that the Trump Administration would
use that information to discriminate against Muslim and/or Arab immigrants. This is
just one more way that Trump’s purported tough on terror policies undercut, rather
than enhance, US national security. . . . [I]nternational human rights law (IHRL) reg-
ulates government policies that have the effect of discriminating against vulnerable
minority groups, even if in the absence of purposeful discrimination by officials.”).
56. 8 U.S.C. § 1157(b) (2012).
57. 8 U.S.C. § 1157(d)(3)(B) (2012).
58. Id.
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The statute’s silence regarding the president’s power to reduce the
number of refugees in the middle of a fiscal year reflects the fact that
Congress did not grant this power to the President. Section 207 of the
INA unambiguously affords the President, in consultation with Con-
gress, only two distinct forms of authority regarding refugee admis-
sions: (a) determining the number of refugees who may be admitted
prior to the start of the fiscal year, and (b) fixing an additional number
of refugees to be admitted during an “unforeseen emergency refugee
situation.”59 If the legislature had intended to grant the president the
additional power to reduce the cap, that power would have been in-
cluded in the text of the statute.
As described above, the Refugee Act’s legislative history supports
this reading of the statute. The conference report and statements by
members of the House and Senate repeatedly emphasized the human-
itarian purpose of the refugee admissions process, reflected in Con-
gress’s decision to provide for an emergency increase—not decrease—
in the number of refugees admitted.60 As a result of these discussions,
the final Act built in a procedure for additional admissions to respond
to “emergency refugee situations.”61 By contrast, there is no evidence
of congressional intent to authorize a midyear reduction.
B. Policy Framework
1. National Security
The refugee resettlement program advances U.S. national security
objectives and increases U.S. leverage and credibility internationally.
Indeed, 130 Republican and Democratic national security profession-
als affirmed the importance of the resettlement program in a March
2017 letter, stating that nondiscriminatory refugee resettlement pro-
motes “U.S. global leadership and national security interests.”62 By
59. 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a), (b) (2012). Where, as here, “Congress explicitly enumer-
ates certain exceptions . . . additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence
of evidence of a contrary legislative intent.” Hillman v. Maretta, 133 S. Ct. 1943, 1953
(2013) (quoting Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616–17 (1980)).
60. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 96-256, at 1 (1980) (“[The bill] reflects one of the oldest
themes in America’s history—welcoming homeless refugees to our shores. . . . [This
Act] gives statutory meaning to our national commitment to human rights and hu-
manitarian concerns, [which are] not now reflected in [our immigration laws].”)
(statement of Sen. Kennedy); Catherine McHugh, Cong. Research Serv., 1B77120,
Refugees in the United States: Laws, Programs, and Proposals 1 (1979) (“Emphasis is
placed on the development of a policy which would have a permanent statutory basis,
but which would be flexible enough to be responsive to unforeseen emergency refu-
gee situations.”).
61. S. REP. NO. 96–256, at 2 (1980) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
62. Letter from Foreign Policy Experts on Travel Ban, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/03/11/us/politics/document-letter-foreign-
policy-trump.html?mcubz-1 [https://perma.cc/V85D-4HF5]. See also AMNESTY INT’L,
THE GLOBAL REFUGEE CRISIS: A CONSPIRACY OF NEGLECT 31 (2015) (“The Refu-
gee Convention also establishes the principle of responsibility-sharing—the idea that
the international community must work together to address refugee crises so that no
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attempting to suspend refugee admissions and reduce the number of
refugees resettled through the USRAP, the January 27 and March 6
Executive Orders undermine both U.S. national security and global
stability.63
a. International Leverage and Credibility
The Syrian refugee resettlement program, in particular, increases
the United States’ leverage in the Middle East and encourages re-
gional actors to cooperate with U.S. policy and military action in the
region.64 This cooperation is especially vital in Turkey, Jordan, and
Iraq, which all host U.S. military bases used for operations against
ISIS and al Qaeda in Syria and Iraq.65 Each of these countries also
one country, or a small number of countries, has to cope alone . . . . The obligation of
individual countries to give protection and assistance to refugees, coupled with the
responsibility of the international community to act collectively in the case of large
refugee crises, is essential to refugee protection.”); UNHCR, SOLIDARITY AND BUR-
DEN-SHARING 2 (2013), http://www.unhcr.org/525fe3e59.pdf [https://perma.cc/4VWF-
NQFL] (“The burden of sheltering millions of Syrian refugees is far too heavy to be
borne by only the neighboring countries. The international community must put in
place more—and more robust—measures of sharing that burden.”); see also Nicole
Ostrand, The Syrian Refugee Crisis: A Comparison of Responses by Germany, Swe-
den, the United Kingdom, and the United States, 3 J. ON MIGRATION & HUM. SEC. 255,
267 (2015); Katy Long, Why America Could—and Should—Admit More Syrian Refu-
gees, THE CENTURY FOUNDATION (Dec. 16, 2015), https://tcf.org/content/report/why-
america-could-and-should-admit-more-syrian-refugees/ [https://perma.cc/9TKX-
5RZ3] (“Accepting more Syrian refugees gives the United States more credibility
with its rivals; the Assad regime and its foreign backers tend to dismiss Washington as
a paper tiger, so any evidence of U.S. commitment to its Syria policy helps reverse an
unfortunate trend. Furthermore, Syrian resettlement is also strategically important in
terms of wide U.S. engagement in the broader region, including with the Gulf monar-
chies and Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan; as the United States assumes a greater share
of refugee resettlement, it will have an easier time persuading U.S. allies to coordi-
nate policies toward Syria and fall in line with U.S. preferences. Strategic and humani-
tarian imperatives are mutually reinforcing. Refugee-hosting countries in the region
are overwhelmed . . . . By showing solidarity, U.S. resettlement programs can help to
check unrest in host states, offer refugees hope, and in turn the United States can
demand more of its partners and allies.”).
63. See, e.g., Bill Frelick, Refugee Resettlement Isn’t a Trojan Horse (or a Bowl of
Skittles), HUM. RTS. WATCH (Nov. 22, 2016, 12:00 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/
2016/11/22/refugee-resettlement-isnt-trojan-horse-or-bowl-skittles [https://perma.cc/
7UN5-DENU] (“[O]f the nearly 800,000 refugees resettled in the U.S. since Septem-
ber 11, 2001, three have been arrested for planning terrorist activities . . . . Resettling
refugees enhances global security. It shows support for many countries allied with the
United States that are on the front lines of refugee exoduses and have huge refugee
populations, like Jordan, Kenya, and Thailand. And it demonstrates to the world—
including the likes of ISIS—that the United States has the strength to show compas-
sion over fear.”).
64. Letter from Foreign Policy Experts on Travel Ban, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/03/11/us/politics/document-letter-foreign-
policy-trump.html?mcubz-1 [https://perma.cc/V85D-4HF5].
65. See Jeremy M. Sharp, Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations, CONG. RES.
SERV. 2 (Jan. 25, 2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/17ideast/RL33546.pdf [https://perma.cc/
DXB9-G8QY]. (“Jordan is contributing to Operation Inherent Resolve against the
Islamic State organization (IS, also known as ISIL, ISIS, or the Arabic acronym
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hosts significant refugee populations: Turkey hosts at least 2.7 million
refugees, more than any other country worldwide; Jordan hosts at
least 656,230 registered refugees (1.4 million in total, according to
King Abdullah II);66 and Iraq hosts at least 228,894 refugees, in addi-
tion to its 3.1 million internally displaced persons.67 The January 27
and March 6 Executive Orders undercut these U.S. alliances by imply-
ing to Muslim communities worldwide that “the U.S. government is at
war with them based on their religion,” as former Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright, former Secretary of the Department of Home-
land Security Janet Napolitano, and dozens of other officials ex-
plained in a recent public statement.68
Resettling refugees also strengthens the United States’ credibility
internationally. Participating in resettlement efforts increases the
United States’ political capital among European allies and interna-
tional organizations.69 The Executive Orders may discourage partners
from sharing critical intelligence with implications for national secur-
ity.70 Alternately, the United States’ withdrawal from resettlement
commitments in the midst of the greatest refugee crisis since World
War II might encourage other countries to abandon their own resettle-
ment pledges, thereby exacerbating the Syrian refugee crisis and fur-
Da’esh) in Syria and Iraq by . . . allowing the use of its bases by foreign forces.”); see
also Richard Sisk, Turkey Hints at Shuttering Incirlik to US Air Operations, MILITARY
.COM (Jan. 4, 2017), http://www.military.com/daily-news/2017/01/04/turkey-hints-shut-
tering-incirlik-us-air-operations.html [https://perma.cc/VML9-DZFX]; Liz Sly &
Karen DeYoung, Turkey Agrees to Allow U.S. Military to Use Its Base to Attack Is-
lamic State, WASH. POST (July 23, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/mid-
dle_east/turkey-agrees-to-allow-us-military-to-use-its-base-to-attack-islamic-state/
2015/07/23/317f23aa-3164-11e5-a879-213078d03dd3_story.html?utm_term=.2e05e
a4b3eae [https://perma.cc/62H9-JNE4]; Michael R. Gordon, U.S. Forces Play Crucial
Role against ISIS in Mosul, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/02/26/world/middleeast/mosul-iraq-american-military-role-islamic-state.html
[https://perma.cc/C3U6-YTSJ] (“Qayyarah West . . . is a pivotal base for the Mosul
offensive.”).
66. Lucy Westcott, Jordan at ‘Boiling Point’ over Syrian Refugees, King Says
Ahead of Donor Conference, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 2, 2016, 10:26 AM), http://www.news-
week.com/syrian-refugees-jordan-king-abdullah-422021 [https://perma.cc/ZEZ9-
J7FT].
67. UNHCR, JORDAN: UNHCR OPERATIONAL UPDATE, MARCH 2017 1 (Mar.
2017), http://www.refworld.org/docid/58c7fc844.html [https://perma.cc/PRZ9-3P2D];
Syria’s Refugee Crisis in Numbers, AMNESTY INT’L (Feb. 3, 2016, 7:02 PM), https://
www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/02/syrias-refugee-crisis-in-numbers/ [https://per
ma.cc/3L3J-PSUP].
68. Letter from Madeleine Albright et al. to Sec’y Kelly, Acting Attorney Gen.
Yates, Acting Sec’y Shannon (Jan. 30, 2017), http://www.politico.com/f/?id=00000159-
f0ef-d46b-abdf-f4efdd310001 [https://perma.cc/G92R-Y9BG].
69. Long, supra note 62.
70. Jay Shooster, Trump’s Immigration Policy Risks Violating International Law—
Alienates US Allies, JUST SECURITY (Jan. 27, 2017, 8:04 AM), https://www.justsecurity
.org/36834/trumps-immigration-restrictions-risk-violating-international-law-cutting-
foreign-allies-support/ [https://perma.cc/B52A-FE68].
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ther undermining stability in the region, which in turn has
consequences for U.S. security.
b. Regional Stability
The Syrian refugee resettlement program promotes Middle Eastern
stability and accelerates resolution of the Syrian conflict. Commenta-
tors have noted that “the United States aims to prevent the prolifera-
tion of terrorist activity in Syria’s ungoverned spaces and has sought a
multisectarian solution to the Syrian conflict.”71 Achieving these
objectives requires stable and secure partners in the Middle East. Un-
fortunately, the United States has remained reluctant to resettle refu-
gees even as its partners struggle to provide adequate security and aid
to massive refugee populations.72 A lack of adequate assistance and
protection for refugees in camps, urban areas, and other locations
where refugees live may sometimes provide recruitment opportunities
for local armed groups.73
71. Christopher M. Blanchard & Carla E. Humud, The Islamic State and U.S. Pol-
icy, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43613, 8–9 (2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/
R43612.pdf [https://perma.cc/PVP2-H549]; see Carla E. Humud et al., Armed Conflict
in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33487, 1–25
(2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33487.pdf [https://perma.cc/R6GU-UZ24].
72. See James Denselow, Syria’s Deadly Spillover, AL JAZEERA (July 15, 2016),
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/07/syria-deadly-spillover-16071006340
1547.html [https://perma.cc/38T4-22SK]; see also Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, Syrian
Refugees in Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon Face an Uncertain 2017, THE CONVERSA-
TION (Jan. 3, 2017), http://theconversation.com/syrian-refugees-in-turkey-jordan-and-
lebanon-face-an-uncertain-2017-70747 [https://perma.cc/ZSD6-WGPG]; Syria’s Refu-
gee Crisis in Numbers, AMNESTY INT’L (Feb. 3, 2016, 7:02 PM), http://www.amnesty
.org/en/latest/news/2016/02/syrias-refugee-crisis-in-numbers/ [https://perma.cc/3L3J-
PSUP]; Rawan Arar et al., The Real Refugee Crisis is in the Middle East, Not Europe,
WASH. POST (May 14, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/
2016/05/14/the-real-refugee-crisis-is-in-the-middle-east-not-europe/ [https://perma.cc/
A5EC-RRC6].
73. UNICEF, RECRUITMENT AND USE OF CHILDREN – THE NEED FOR RESPONSE
IN JORDAN, data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=7547 [https://perma.cc/
G5Y6-L6ZA]; Haras Rafiq & Nikita Malik, REFUGE: Pathways of Youth Fleeing
Extremism, QUILLIAM INT’L (Feb. 2017), https://www.quilliaminternational.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/02/refuge-pathways-of-youth-fleeing-extremism-executive-sum-
mary.pdf [https://perma.cc/UYZ4-3SFD]. Given funding gaps, refugee camps, espe-
cially those run by the UNHCR, are likely to remain under-resourced. See Kate
Bond, UNHCR Warns of Dramatic Consequences if Funding Gaps for Syrian Refu-
gees Continue, UNHCR (July 3, 2014), http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/latest/2014/7/
53b518499/unhcr-warns-dramatic-consequences-funding-gaps-syrian-refugees-con-
tinue.html [https://perma.cc/WVK5-P3UP]. As Michael Chertoff, former DHS Secre-
tary and Assistant Attorney General, DOJ Criminal Division, has noted, when
refugees “stagnat[e] in camps year in and year out . . . you’re creating essentially a
hospitable environment for people to recruit extremists and criminals.” Donald Ker-
win, How Robust Refugee Protection Policies Can Strengthen Human and National
Security, 4 J. ON MIGRATION & HUM. SEC. 83, 92 (2016) (quoting Michael Chertoff,
former DHS Sec’y and Assistant Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice Criminal Div., CENTER
FOR MIGRATION STUD. (June 9, 2016), http://cmsny.org/podcast-secretary-michael-
chertoff/ [https://perma.cc/EC98-VZAS]).
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The refugee crisis has also exacerbated sectarian tensions in coun-
tries such as Lebanon and Turkey.74 Thus, the United States’ must
facilitate refugee resettlement to prevent expansion of the Syrian con-
flict—which would threaten the United States ability to conduct
counterterrorism operations—and to ensure regional stability and na-
tional security in the long term.75
c. Countering Terrorist Recruitment
Resettling refugees of all faiths also helps undermine the recruit-
ment efforts of ISIS, al Qaeda, and other armed terrorist groups,
which claim that the United States is at war with Islam.76 ISIS has
pursued an explicit strategy of polarization: it highlights anti-Muslim
rhetoric in the United States and Europe in order to position itself as
a protector of Sunni Muslims, thereby motivating Sunnis in Syria and
74. See Sectarian Conflict in Lebanon, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL.: GLOBAL CON-
FLICT TRACKER, https://www.cfr.org/global/global-conflict-tracker/p32137#!/conflict/
sectarian-conflict-in-lebanon  [https://perma.cc/SH6Y-BVVV] (last visited May 10,
2017). (“Lebanon’s political system and security infrastructure have been deeply af-
fected by spillover from the Syrian civil war, as nearly one quarter of Lebanon’s popu-
lation is made up of refugees . . . . The country implemented restrictive visa
requirements for Syrian refugees in January 2015, aimed at stemming the influx of
Sunnis into the country and preventing the disruption of fragile religious balance . . . .
The influx of Syrian refugees, coupled with Hezbollah’s involvement in fighting Syr-
ian rebels, has resulted in cross-border skirmishes and increased weapons smug-
gling.”); see also INT’L CRISIS GROUP, TURKEY’S REFUGEE CRISIS: THE POLITICS OF
PERMANENCE 3 (Nov. 30, 2016), https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/west-
ern-europemediterranean/turkey/turkey-s-refugee-crisis-politics-permanence [https://
perma.cc/YQ46-WTKD] (“The refugees are overwhelmingly Sunni Arabs, adding an
ethnic-sectarian dimension to the issue.”).
75. Although only a small fraction of Syrian refugees in the region are resettled to
the United States or Europe, the United States can use its moral authority as a leader
in refugee resettlement to convince other nations to do the same and can take on
some responsibility for mitigating the refugee crisis by providing support to its allies
in the region who are bearing the brunt of the burden. See, e.g., Michael Ignatieff et
al., The United States and the Syrian Refugee Crisis: A Plan of Action Share, HARV.
KENNEDY SCH.: SHORENSTEIN CTR. (Jan. 27, 2016, 3:00 PM), https://shorensteincenter
.org/united-states-syrian-refugee-crisis-plan-action/ [https://perma.cc/7ZW6-DPB3]
(noting that “[i]n 2014, the UNHCR designated 130,000 Syrians in refugee camps in
need of resettlement by 2016” and that “[t]he U.S. has traditionally resettled at least
half of UNHCR-designated refugees,” in support of the argument that “the U.S.
should . . . take in 65,000 Syrian refugees” in order to “relieve the pressure on the
front line states and send a message of solidarity to the European states struggling to
cope with the refugee influx on their own”).
76. Graeme Wood, What ISIS Really Wants, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 2015), https://
www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/03/what-isis-really-wants/384980/ [https://
perma.cc/84SV-55AZ]; Robin Wright et al., The Jihadi Threat: ISIS, al Qaeda, and
Beyond, U.S. INST. OF PEACE 11 (Jan. 2017), https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/
The-Jihadi-Threat-ISIS-Al-Qaeda-and-Beyond.pdf [https://perma.cc/FM5F-TGFK]
(“ISIS seeks a war of attrition with the West in the Middle East and projects itself as
the defender of Sunni Muslim communities . . . . [I]t has sought to present itself as the
only Sunni militant group capable of fighting the government of Iraq and the only
authentic jihadi group in Syria, and indeed, the world.”).
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abroad to join in its fight.77 Al Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, Jabhat Fateh
al-Sham, echoes this message in its recruitment materials, claiming
that the United States and Europe are unwilling to protect Syrians
harmed by the war.78 Assisting Syrian refugees combats terrorist
groups’ narratives of religious and cultural animosity. Accordingly,
national security professionals in both political parties have recog-
nized that “[w]elcoming Muslim refugees and travelers . . . exposes the
lies of terrorists and counters their warped vision.”79 Resettling refu-
gees thus serves “mutually reinforcing” strategic and humanitarian
objectives.80
d. Security Screening Process for Refugees
Refugees resettled to the United States are “subject to the highest
degree of security screening and background checks for any category
of traveler to the United States.”81 Indeed, prominent former govern-
77. See Harleen Gambhir, The Islamic State’s Trap for Europe, WASH. POST (Nov.
15, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/hating-muslim-refugees-is-ex-
actly-what-the-islamic-state-wants-europe-to-do/2015/11/15/dfe0ca84- 87d1-11e5-
be39-0034bb576eee_story.html [http://perma.cc/6TBY-FTGX]; Myriam Francois-Cer-
rah, Islamic State Wants to Divide the World into Jihadists and Crusaders, THE TELE-
GRAPH (Nov. 18, 2015, 12:35 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/
islamic-state/12002726/The-grey-zone-How-Isis-wants-to-divide-the-world-into-Mus-
lims-and-crusaders.html [https://perma.cc/U7XF-FKR7].
78. ROBIN WRIGHT ET AL., U.S. INST. OF PEACE, THE JIHADI THREAT: ISIS, AL
QAEDA, AND BEYOND 24 (Jan. 2017), https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/The-
Jihadi-Threat-ISIS-Al-Qaeda-and-Beyond.pdf [https://perma.cc/FM5F-TGFK];
CHARLES LISTER, THE BROOKINGS PROJECT, PROFILING JABHAT AL-NUSRA 6, 39
(July 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/iwr_20160728_
profiling_nusra.pdf [https://perma.cc/DVV5-K6WF] (“Jabhat al-Nusra set about heav-
ily recruiting from within increasingly disenfranchised opposition communities in
Aleppo and Idlib in early 2016, exploiting widespread and seething perceptions of
abandonment by the international community . . . . That such brazen destruction and
violence could take place without any sanction from abroad played directly into
Jabhat al-Nusra’s hands.”); see also Defeating Terrorism in Syria: A New Way For-
ward: Hearing before the H. Foreign Affairs Comm. Subcomm. on Terrorism, Non-
proliferation, and Trade, 114th Cong. (Feb. 14, 2017) (statement of Melissa G. Dalton,
Senior Fellow and Deputy Dir., Int’l Sec. Program, Ctr. for Strategic & Int’l Stud.),
http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA18/20170214/105553/HHRG-115-FA18-Wstate-
DaltonM-20170214.pdf [https://perma.cc/EMT4-6STV] (noting that “generations of
Syrians will remember potential U.S. inaction, which could feed anti-U.S. narratives
and boost terrorist recruitment”).
79. Letter from Foreign Policy Experts on Travel Ban, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/03/11/us/politics/document-letter-foreign-
policy-trump.html [https://perma.cc/8JP4-XPKH].
80. Long, supra note 62.
81. The USRAP priorities are as follows:
• Priority 1: UN High Commissioner for Refugees, U.S. Embassy, or specially-
trained non-governmental organization (NGO) identified cases, including per-
sons facing compelling security concerns, women-at-risk, victims of torture or
violence and others in need of resettlement.
• Priority 2: Groups of special concern identified by the U.S. refugee program
(e.g., Bhutanese in Nepal).
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ment officials, including former Secretaries of State Kissinger and Al-
bright, have repeatedly emphasized this high degree of scrutiny, as
discussed in the next Section of the Report.82 The same experts have
also noted that the threat posed by refugees to the United States is
“minuscule.”83 Refugees are “interviewed several times over the
course of the vetting process, which takes 18–24 months and often
longer,” and national and international intelligence agencies check
refugees’ fingerprints and other biometric data against terrorist and
criminal databases.84
Multiple international intelligence and law enforcement agencies,
including the National Counterterrorism Center, the Department of
Defense, and Interpol, participate in the overseas refugee screening
process.85 Those agencies review applicants’ information against at
• Priority 3: Family reunification cases (i.e., spouses, unmarried children under 21,
and parents of persons lawfully admitted to the U.S. as refugees or asylees or
persons who are legal permanent residents or U.S. citizens who previously had
refugee or asylum status).
USCIS, FACT SHEET: REFUGEE SECURITY SCREENING (Dec. 3, 2015), https://www
.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Refugee%2C%20Asylum%2C%20and%20Int%
27l%20Ops/Refugee_Security_Screening_Fact_Sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/32HB-
F4GL].
82. See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, AT LEAST 10,000: A SIX-MONTH PROGRESS RE-
PORT ON U.S. RESETTLEMENT OF SYRIAN REFUGEES 17 (2016), http://www.human
rightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/HRFReportAtLeastTenThousand-final.pdf [https://
perma.cc/BXY3-QKN9]; See also The Syrian Refugee Crisis: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Human
Rights, (Jan. 7, 2014) (statement of Anne C. Richard, Assistant Sec’y for the Bureau
of Population, Refugees, and Migration, Dep’t of State), https://www.state.gov/j/prm/
releases/remarks/2014/219388.htm [https://perma.cc/K9JL-AK87] (“Refugee appli-
cants are subject to more security checks than any other category of traveler to the
United States.”).
83. Peter Bergen, Syrian Refugees Are Not a Threat to U.S., CNN (Nov. 21, 2015,
9:29 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/11/21/opinions/bergen-syrian-refugees-not-a-
threat-to-us/index.html [https://perma.cc/3MZA-R49K].
84. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, AT LEAST 10,000: A SIX-MONTH PROGRESS REPORT
ON U.S. RESETTLEMENT OF SYRIAN REFUGEES 17 (2016), http://www.humanrightsfirst
.org/sites/default/files/HRFReportAtLeastTenThousand-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/
BXY3-QKN9]; The Syrian Refugee Crisis and Its Impact on the Security of the U.S.
Refugee Admissions Program: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigr. and Border
Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 64, at 3 (Nov. 19, 2015) (state-
ment of Anne C. Richard, Assistant Sec’y for the Bureau of Population, Refugees,
and Migration, Dep’t of State), https://judiciary.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/
02/114-48_97632.pdf [https://perma.cc/CW8N-GAQ9]; see also History of the U.S. Ref-
ugee Resettlement Program, REFUGEE COUNCIL USA, http://www.rcusa.org/in-
dex.php?page=history [https://perma.cc/2RLS-E6DA] (last visited Mar. 17, 2017);
Eliza Griswold, Why Is It So Difficult for Syrian Refugees to Get Into the U.S.?, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 20, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/24/magazine/why-is-it-so-diffi-
cult-for-syrian-refugees-to-get-into-the-us.html [https://perma.cc/Z9EE-VHJH]; Refu-
gee Processing and Security Screening, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S.
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/refugeescreening [https://per
ma.cc/5FWM-4WM4] (last visited Mar. 17, 2017).
85. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, AT LEAST 10,000: A SIX-MONTH PROGRESS REPORT
ON U.S. RESETTLEMENT OF SYRIAN REFUGEES 7 (2016), http://www.humanrightsfirst
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least three separate databases with information on “foreign fighters,
suspected terrorists, and stolen, false, and blank passports from Syria,
Iraq, and elsewhere.”86 The Department of State uses biometric infor-
mation to check whether refugees have any criminal or prior immigra-
tion history and to check for any national security concerns by
comparing refugees’ data with biometric data collected by the Depart-
ment of Defense in conflict zones.87 Refugees who hail from Syria are
subjected to a more enhanced review process compared to refugees
from other nations.88
Furthermore, refugees are checked against watch-list information
throughout the overseas screening and admissions process. The De-
partment of State seeks Security Advisory Opinions from law enforce-
ment and intelligence agencies for refugees who meet certain criteria,
including members of a group or nationality that the U.S. government
has designated as requiring this higher level check.89 The National
.org/sites/default/files/HRFReportAtLeastTenThousand-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/
BXY3-QKN9].
86. Id.; HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, THE SYRIAN REFUGEE CRISIS AND THE NEED FOR
U.S. LEADERSHIP 17 (2016), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/HRF-
SyrianRefCrisis.pdf [https://perma.cc/VW6W-CDVJ].
87. USCIS, FACT SHEET: REFUGEE SECURITY SCREENING (Dec. 3, 2015), https://
www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Refugee%2C%20Asylum%2C%20and%20
Int%27l%20Ops/Refugee_Security_Screening_Fact_Sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/
32HB- F4GL]. Oversight of the Administration’s FY 2016 Refugee Resettlement Pro-
gram: Fiscal and Security Implications before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th
Cong. 4 (2015) (questions for the record submitted to Larry Bartlett, Dir. of Admis-
sions, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, U.S. Dep’t of State, from Sen.
Richard Blumenthal, member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary), https://www.judici-
ary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/10-01-15%20Bartlett%20Testimony.pdf [https://perma
.cc/L3LC-7PQX]. USCIS conducts a case-by-case review of all cases with negative
security check results and then makes a determination about eligibility for
resettlement.
88. See USCIS, FACT SHEET: REFUGEE SECURITY SCREENING (Dec. 3, 2015),
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Refugee%2C%20Asylum%2C%20
and%20Int%27l%20Ops/Refugee_Security_Screening_Fact_Sheet.pdf [https://perma
.cc/32HB-F4GL]. As part of that enhanced review, the USCIS Fraud Detection and
National Security Directorate works to identify fraudulent claims and “engages with
law enforcement and intelligence community members for assistance with identity
verification and acquisition of additional information.” HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, AT
LEAST 10,000: A SIX-MONTH PROGRESS REPORT ON U.S. RESETTLEMENT OF SYRIAN
REFUGEES (2016), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/HRFRe-
portAtLeastTenThousand-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/BXY3-QKN9]. See also HUMAN
RIGHTS FIRST, VETTING, SECURITY AND FRAUD SCREENING IN ASYLUM PROCESS
(Nov. 2015), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/resource/vetting-security-and-fraud-
screening-asylum-process [https://perma.cc/2BQR-R8C9]. In addition, only 2% of ad-
mitted Syrian refugees are single men of combat age. Background Briefing on Refugee
Screening and Admissions, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Nov. 17, 2015), https://2009-
2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/11/249613.htm [https://perma.cc/PFQ8-VABL].
89. See USCIS, FACT SHEET: REFUGEE SECURITY SCREENING (Dec. 3, 2015),
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Refugee%2C%20Asylum%2C%20
and%20Int%27l%20Ops/Refugee_Security_Screening_Fact_Sheet.pdf [https://perma
.cc/32HB-F4GL]. See also HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, AT LEAST 10,000: A SIX-MONTH
PROGRESS REPORT ON U.S. RESETTLEMENT OF SYRIAN REFUGEES (Apr. 2016), http:/
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Counterterrorism Center conducts interagency checks for all refugees
who fall within a certain age range, irrespective of nationality, and
additional “recurrent vetting” checks, conducted before the applicant
travels to the United States, determine whether any information has
changed since the initial check.90 Moreover, applications may be sub-
ject to the Controlled Application Review and Resolution Process
(CARRP) if USCIS has any national security concerns, “either based
on security and background checks or personal interviews or testi-
mony.”91 Prior to admission to the United States, refugees are sub-
jected to further screenings by Customs and Border Protection
officials.92
Only after undergoing all of the aforementioned processes and
checks can a refugee enter the United States. Accordingly, govern-
ment officials have repeatedly characterized the security-focused refu-
gee screening process as “extensive,” “redundant,” and “careful,” and
have affirmed the importance of the U.S. refugee resettlement pro-
gram in promoting—not undermining—U.S. security interests.93
/www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/HRFReportAtLeastTenThousand-final
.pdf [https://perma.cc/BXY3-QKN9]; The Syrian Refugee Crisis and Its Impact on the
Security of the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 114th Cong. (Nov. 19, 2015) (statement of Leon Rodriguez, Dir., U.S.
Citizenship and Immigr. Servs., Dep’t of Homeland Security), https://judiciary.house
.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/USCIS-Rodriguez-Testimony.pdf [https://perma.cc/
R8E4-T2KH]; The Syrian Refugee Crisis and Its Impact on the Security of the U.S.
Refugee Admissions Program: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th
Cong. (Nov. 19, 2015) (statement of Zoe Lofgren, member, H. Comm. on the Judici-
ary), https://judiciary.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/114-48_97632.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/R8E4-T2KH] (explaining that Security Advisory Opinions are required for
all Syrian refugees).
90. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, AT LEAST 10,000: A SIX-MONTH PROGRESS REPORT
ON U.S. RESETTLEMENT OF SYRIAN REFUGEES (2016), http://www.humanrightsfirst
.org/sites/default/files/HRFReportAtLeastTenThousand-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/
BXY3-QKN9]. See also The Syrian Refugee Crisis and Its Impact on the Security of the
U.S. Refugee Admissions Program: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
114th Cong. (Nov. 19, 2015) (statement of Leon Rodriguez, Dir., U.S. Citizenship and
Immigr. Servs., Dep’t of Homeland Security), https://judiciary.house.gov/wp-content/
uploads/2016/02/USCIS-Rodriguez-Testimony.pdf [https://perma.cc/R8E4-T2KH].
91. Refugee Process and Security Screening, USCIS, https://www.uscis.gov/refugee
screening#CARRP [https://perma.cc/4G4S-TD6Z] (last visited Apr. 3, 2017). For a
critique of CARRP, see ACLU, MUSLIMS NEED NOT APPLY (2013), https://www.ac-
lusocal.org/sites/default/files/field_documents/161849063-muslims-need-not-apply-
aclu-socal-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/KN33-EFJ9].
92. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, AT LEAST 10,000: A SIX-MONTH PROGRESS REPORT
ON U.S. RESETTLEMENT OF SYRIAN REFUGEES (2016), http://www.humanrightsfirst
.org/sites/default/files/HRFReportAtLeastTenThousand-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/
BXY3-QKN9].
93. See The Syrian Refugee Crisis and Its Impact on the Security of the U.S. Refu-
gee Admissions Program: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong.
(2015) (statement of Leon Rodriguez, Dir., U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. Servs.,
Dep’t of Homeland Security), https://judiciary.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/
114-48_97632.pdf [https://perma.cc/R8E4-T2KH]; see also USCIS, FACT SHEET: REF-
UGEE SECURITY SCREENING (Dec. 3, 2015), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/
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2. Economic Policy
In addition to furthering the nation’s foreign policy and national
security objectives, refugee resettlement also helps the United States
economically. Studies have shown that refugees in the United States
typically “integrate well into their new communities” with “similar
rates of labor force participation and business ownership.”94 Accord-
ing to the International Rescue Committee, eighty-five percent of the
refugees the organization resettles are employed within six months.95
The positive economic effects of refugees on receiving communities
are well established.96 One study, for example, found a tenfold return
on investment: $4.8 million spent on refugee services in Cleveland,
USCIS/Refugee%2C%20Asylum%2C%20and%20Int%27l%20Ops/Refugee_Securi
ty_Screening_Fact_Sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/32HB-F4GL].
94. David Dyssegaard Kallick with Silva Mathema, Refugee Integration in the
United States, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 1 (June 2016), https://cdn.americanprogress
.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/06/15112912/refugeeintegration.pdf [https://perma.cc/
7RSX-X4AC]. See also Kit Taintor & Gary Lichtenstein, The Refugee Integration Sur-
vey and Evaluation (RISE) Year Five: Final Report, COLO. OFF. OF ECON. SECURITY
(Feb. 22, 2016), https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B9dBwl5XFYdTjVnUy1DWXgxZ
DA/view [https://perma.cc/W3TL-CQZR] (finding improvement in integration met-
rics for 98% of individuals studied over a five-year period). See Economic Impact of
Refugees in the Cleveland Area, CHMURA ECON. & ANALYTICS (Oct. 2013), https://
www.hias.org/sites/default/files/clevelandrefugeeeconomic-impact.pdf [http://perma
.cc/NQU5-C333] (“[O]nce refugees have adjusted to their new life after resettlement,
they can provide substantial contributions to the workforce and economic develop-
ment in the long run at the regional level.”); US TOGETHER et al., IMPACT OF REFU-
GEES IN CENTRAL OHIO 50 (2015), http://ustogether.us/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/
IMPACT-OF-REFUGEES-ON-CENTRAL-OHIO_2015SP.pdf [http://perma.cc/
V4WK-8ZKV] (“[R]efugees in the community are more than twice as likely to start a
business as the general population . . . . Through the goods and services produced by
refugee workers, refugee-owned businesses, and refugee resettlement agencies, the
local refugee community contributes an estimated $1.6 billion to the Columbus MSA
economy. In addition, they support an estimated 21,273 jobs in the region. All of
these [figures] suggest refugees bring some positive benefits to central Ohio.”).
95. Seven Common Myths about Refugee Resettlement in the United States, INT’L
RESCUE COMM. (June 20, 2017), https://www.rescue.org/article/seven-common-myths-
about-refugee-resettlement-united-states [http://perma.cc/3JHB-LYTN]. The Interna-
tional Rescue Committee has found that for every $1 in cash given to a refugee in
Lebanon, $2.13 circulates within the economy. David Miliband, Europe: The Refugee
Crisis Does Not Need to Be a Political Crisis, INT’L RESCUE COMM. (Sept. 7, 2016),
https://www.rescue.org/press-release/david-miliband-refugee-crisis-does-not-need-be-
political-crisis [http://perma.cc/S4W4-EGV7].
96. See, e.g., PHILIPPE LEGRAIN, REFUGEES WORK: A HUMANITARIAN INVEST-
MENT THAT YIELDS ECONOMIC DIVIDENDS 9 (2016), http://www.opennetwork.net/
wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Tent-Open-Refugees-Work_V13.pdf [http://perma.cc/
489H-L9S9] (“With a suitable upfront investment and wise policies, welcoming refu-
gees can yield substantial economic dividends.”). Cf. RANDY CAPPS ET AL., MIGRA-
TION POL’Y INST., THE INTEGRATION OUTCOMES OF U.S. REFUGEES: SUCCESSES AND
CHALLENGES (June 2015), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/integration-out-
comes-us-refugees-successes-and-challenges [http://perma.cc/LK4M-SGCA]. Some
authors have explored mechanisms for maximizing the benefits of refugees for receiv-
ing communities. See ALEXANDER TEYTELBOYM ET AL., REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT 5
(Nov. 8, 2016), www.t8el.com/jmp.pdf [http://perma.cc/N7PD-LHQG]; see also Jesu´s
Ferna´ndez-Huertas Moraga & Hillel Rapoport, Tradable Refugee-Admission Quotas
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Ohio, in 2012 yielded nearly $50 million for the local economy from
refugee-owned business and household spending. This investment, in
turn, generated approximately $1.8 million in tax revenue for the state
and nearly $900,000 for the local government.97 This high economic
impact is explained in part by entrepreneurship, because refugees are
more likely to be entrepreneurial and enjoy higher rates of successful
business ventures compared to native-born residents.98 For example, a
study of refugees in nearby Columbus, Ohio, found that refugees were
more than twice as likely than the general population to start a
business.99
Refugee-owned businesses not only create jobs, but also bolster the
economy through household spending and other employment. For ex-
ample, a study of Somali, Burmese, Hmong, and Bosnian refugee men
found that they have similar rates of labor-force participation as U.S.-
born men.100 Refugee communities in the United States may also
bring additional benefits by drawing international investment, as ob-
served by the Government Accountability Office (GAO).101
These types of economic effects are illustrated through the exper-
iences of a community like Utica, New York—a Rust Belt town where
one in four residents is a refugee.102 The resettlement of refugees to
Utica reversed the city’s population and economic declines in what
Mayor Robert Palmieri described as “the rebound for our great
and EU Asylum Policy, 61 CESIFO ECON. STUD. 638 (2015), http://hdl.handle.net/
10.1093/cesifo/ifu037 [http://perma.cc/H3TH-PBEP].
97. See CHMURA ECON. & ANALYTICS, ECONOMIC IMPACT OF REFUGEES IN THE
CLEVELAND AREA 4–5 (Oct. 2013), https://www.hias.org/sites/default/files/cleveland
refugeeeconomic-impact.pdf [http://perma.cc/NQU5-C333]. The CATO Institute has
quantified this impact by estimating that each refugee increases the wages of U.S.-
born workers by $476.61 per year. Alex Nowrasteh, Huge Net Costs from Trump’s
New Executive Order Cutting Refugees, CATO AT LIBERTY (Mar. 6, 2017, 12:27 PM),
https://www.cato.org/blog/huge-net-costs-trumps-new-executive-order-cutting-refu-
gees [http://perma.cc/NCM6-C5DC].
98. See CHMURA ECON. & ANALYTICS, ECONOMIC IMPACT OF REFUGEES IN THE
CLEVELAND AREA 9 (Oct. 2013), http://rsccleveland.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/
ClevelandRefugeeEconomic-Impact.pdf [http://perma.cc/NQU5-C333].
99. See US TOGETHER ET AL., IMPACT OF REFUGEES IN CENTRAL OHIO 50 (2015),
http://ustogether.us/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/IMPACT-OF-REFUGEES-ON-
CENTRAL-OHIO_2015SP.pdf [http://perma.cc/V4WK-8ZKV].
100. David Dyssegaard Kallick with Silva Mathema, Refugee Integration in the
United States, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (June 2016), https://www.americanprogress
.org/issues/immigration/reports/2016/06/16/139551/refugee-integration-in-the-united-
states/ [https://perma.cc/7RSX-X4AC]. This study focuses on refugees from four send-
ing countries.
101. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT: GREATER
CONSULTATION WITH COMMUNITY STAKEHOLDERS COULD STRENGTHEN PROGRAM,
GAO-12-729 1, 17 (July 2012), http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592975.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/7WML-BCX8].
102. How Refugee Resettlement Became a Revival Strategy for This Struggling
Town, PBS NEWSHOUR (Apr. 7, 2016, 6:35 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/
how-refugee-resettlement-became-a-revival-strategy-for-this-struggling-town/ [http://
perma.cc/6KYH-26ZU].
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city.”103 The GAO has found that these benefits have accrued to other
areas of the country and noted that “city officials and business leaders
. . . in several communities said that refugees help stimulate economic
development by filling critical labor shortages as well as by starting
small businesses and creating jobs.”104 For example, an official in
Washington State interviewed by the GAO described how “diverse
resettlement communities with international populations attract in-
vestment from overseas businesses.”105 The GAO also found that ref-
ugee-owned businesses had revitalized a neighborhood in Chicago
that had previously been in decline.106
Outside of entrepreneurship and labor-force participation, refugees
support local economies through high rates of home ownership.
Though few refugees purchase homes soon after arrival, Bosnian and
Burmese refugees exceed the U.S.-born rate of homeownership within
ten years of arrival.107 Another stabilizing long-term investment is ed-
ucation: data suggests that refugees attend college at roughly the same
rate as that of the general population.108 Taken together, these data
reflect refugees’ sustained contributions to the U.S. economy and in-
vestments in local communities.
Indeed, refugees have enjoyed high rates of successful resettlement
and economic self-sufficiency in the United States. Through the imple-
mentation of the Refugee Act of 1980, Congress affirmed the goal of
“help[ing] refugees in this country become self-sufficient and contrib-
uting members of society.”109 ORR’s employment-services program
works toward this goal through its Matching Grant initiative, dis-
cussed in further detail later in this Report. The Matching Grant Pro-
103. Id.
104. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT: GREATER
CONSULTATION WITH COMMUNITY STAKEHOLDERS COULD STRENGTHEN PROGRAM,
GAO-12-729 1, 17 (July 2012), http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592975.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/7WML-BCX8].
105. Id.
106. Id. at 17.
107. David Dyssegaard Kallick with Silva Mathema, Refugee Integration in the
United States, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (June 16, 2016, 12:02 AM), https://www.ameri-
canprogress.org/issues/immigration/reports/2016/06/16/139551/refugee-integration-in-
the-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/7RSX-X4AC].
108. See RANDY CAPPS ET AL., MIGRATION POL’Y INST., THE INTEGRATION OUT-
COMES OF U.S. REFUGEES: SUCCESSES AND CHALLENGES 1, 19 (June 2015), http://
www.migrationpolicy.org/research/integration-outcomes-us-refugees-successes-and-
challenges [http://perma.cc/LK4M-SGCA]; COMMUNITY RES. PARTNERS, IMPACT OF
REFUGEES IN CENTRAL OHIO 1, 2 (2015), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/580e4
274e58c624696efadc6/t/583c52a09f745683d2d3caae/1480348345068/IM-
PACT+OF+REFUGEES+ON+CENTRAL+OHIO_2015SP.pdf [http://perma.cc/
V4WK-8ZKV]. Approximately 41.8% of refugees in Franklin County aged eighteen
or older are currently enrolled in college or have graduated from college, compared
to 43.0% of all Franklin County residents in this age group. Id.
109. Jimmy Carter, Refugee Act of 1980 Statement on Signing S. 643 into Law (Mar.
18, 1980), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=33154 [https://perma.cc/ZY68-
H7L7].
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gram helps refugee populations “achieve economic self-sufficiency in
four to six months after arrival in the United States . . . by providing
intensive case management and employment services.”110 These ser-
vices include housing and utilities, transportation, English-language
training, and other support services. Historically, the Matching Grant
Program has achieved high outcomes. In 2015, for example, the pro-
gram served 29,765 refugees, with sixty-seven percent of them achiev-
ing economic self-sufficiency within 120 days of arrival in the United
States. At the six-month mark, eighty-two percent of refugees served
in FY 2015 were reported as self-sufficient.111
Syrians, in particular, have settled and integrated into U.S. commu-
nities successfully. Although data regarding the integration of Syrian
refugees in the United States is limited given that significant numbers
have been resettled to the United States only since 2015, the experi-
ence of Syrian immigrants in the United States generally is informa-
tive. Many studies have found that Syrian immigrants “are learning
English, getting good jobs, owning homes, and starting businesses at
impressive rates.”112 One study found that Syrian immigrants have
higher incomes than other immigrants in the United States: in 2014,
the median annual wage for Syrian immigrants in the United States
was $52,000, compared to the $36,000 median wage for immigrants
overall and the $45,000 median wage for U.S.-born workers.113
Another report found that Syrian men (refugees and non-refugees)
participate in the labor force at a slightly higher rate than U.S.-born
men.114 Additionally, Syrians are a highly educated group of immi-
grants: in 2014, thirty-eight percent of Syrian immigrants aged twenty
five and older had a bachelor’s degree or higher, compared to twenty-
nine percent of the analogous U.S.-born population.115 Moreover,
110. ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT,
ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FOR FY 2015 20 (2016), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/
sites/default/files/orr/arc_15_final_508.pdf [https://perma.cc/RA4Q-YWSZ]. For re-
porting purposes, the Matching Grant guidelines provided to grantees define “eco-
nomic self-sufficiency” as earning a total family income that enables the family to
support itself without the need for a cash assistance grant. In practice, this means
having earnings that exceed the income eligibility level for receipt of a TANF cash
assistance grant in the state and having the ability to cover family living expenses. Id.
111. Id.
112. David Dyssegaard Kallick et al., Syrian Immigrants in the United States, CTR.
FOR AM. PROGRESS 1 (Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immi-
gration/reports/2016/12/13/294851/syrian-immigrants-in-the-united-states-a-receiving-
community-for-todays-refugees/ [http://perma.cc/R83L-2W6C].
113. Id. at 2.
114. Jie Zong, Profile of Syrian Immigrants in the United States, MIGRATION POL’Y
INST. 1, 5 (Nov. 2015), http://www.Migrationpolicy.org/research/profile-syrian-immi-
grants-united-states [http://perma.cc/BXQ6-HNNH].
115. David Dyssegaard Kallick et al., Syrian Immigrants in the United States, CTR.
FOR AM. PROGRESS 5 (Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immi-
gration/reports/2016/12/13/294851/syrian-immigrants-in-the-united-states-a-receiving-
community-for-todays-refugees/ [http://perma.cc/R83L-2W6C].
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forty-nine percent of Syrian men in the United States work in high-
skilled occupations, such as management, business, and science.116
There are approximately 4,000 Syrian doctors in the United States.117
Syrian immigrants also have extremely high rates of business own-
ership, and “[t]hese businesses provide employment, create jobs, and
help spur growth in the local economy.”118 One study found that in
2014, eleven percent of Syrian immigrants in the labor force were bus-
iness owners, compared to four percent of immigrants generally and
only three percent of the U.S.-born population.119
Overall, Syrian immigrants are succeeding in the United States,
both socially and economically, as measured by a wide range of met-
rics. While these statistics refer to all Syrian immigrants, rather than
Syrian refugees specifically, they illustrate the economic strength of
the communities into which Syrian refugees would likely be re-
ceived120 and demonstrate that Syrians in the United States are net
job makers, not job takers.121
In addition to acknowledging refugees’ economic contributions, re-
ports have noted the “untold ways [in which society benefits] from the
natural increase in cultural and ethnic diversity that accompany ac-
cepting new residents from around the world.”122 Drastically reducing
the number of refugee admissions wreaks havoc on the lives of count-
less refugees, including those already present in the United States who
are awaiting reunification with family members stranded overseas.
These actions also prevent local communities in the United States
from reaping the economic and social benefits that refugees bring to
their communities.
V. OVERSEAS REFUGEE PROCESSING AND ADMISSIONS
This Section outlines the overseas refugee screening process, which
starts with UNHCR’s screening and referral process and is followed
116. Jie Zong, supra note 114.
117. Myths & Facts: Syrian Refugees in the U.S., MULTIFAITH ALLIANCE FOR SYR-
IAN REFUGEES, http://www.multifaithalliance.org/myths-and-facts [http://perma.cc/
2RUS-48XL].
118. David Dyssegaard Kallick et al., Syrian Immigrants in the United States, CTR.
FOR AM. PROGRESS 3 (Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immi-
gration/reports/2016/12/13/294851/syrian-immigrants-in-the-united-states-a-receiving-
community-for-todays-refugees/ [http://perma.cc/R83L-2W6C].
119. Id.
120. Jie Zong, supra note 114.
121. The Multifaith Alliance for Syrian Refugees has observed that even in the
context of a refugee camp, such as Za’atari in Jordan, the main street is lined with
shops and cafes started by the Syrian refugees confined to that camp. Given this re-
sourcefulness and entrepreneurial spirit, Syrian refugees who resettle in the United
States are likely to become an engine of job generation.
122. CHMURA ECON. & ANALYTICS, ECONOMIC IMPACT OF REFUGEES IN THE
CLEVELAND AREA 34 (Oct. 2013), https://www.hias.org/sites/default/files/clevelandref
ugeeeconomic-impact.pdf [http://perma.cc/NQU5-C333].
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by rigorous screening by the State Department, DHS, and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), among other U.S. agencies. As ex-
plained below, refugees generally face a “multi-year, multi-step
screening process” before they can be resettled to the United
States.123 This Section concludes with a discussion of technological ad-
vancements and other improvements to the refugee admissions pro-
gram that have enhanced the process in recent years, allowing for
more efficient screening while still safeguarding national security.
A. The Overseas Refugee Screening Process
1. UNHCR and the Referral Process
The first step in the refugee resettlement process is selection by
UNHCR.124 UNHCR begins both by collecting identifying informa-
tion and documents, such as biographic and biometric data and in
some cases, iris scans, and by conducting interviews of candidates to
assess their eligibility for refugee status and resettlement.125 If the in-
dividual meets the refugee definition, passes the requisite security
checks, and satisfies the criteria for resettlement described above in
Part II, UNHCR then sends a referral for the individual (or for the
individual and dependent family members), along with the informa-
tion collected by UNHCR, to a potential host state—in the case of the
United States, to the USRAP.126 In most cases, refugees have little
input as to where they are ultimately resettled, except in cases involv-
ing family reunification, described further below.127
123. Letter from Sen. Cory Booker et al. to Sec’y Jeh Johnson (Oct. 6, 2015), https:/
/www.peters.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/151006_Letter_DHS_Refugees.pdf [https://
perma.cc/CA66-S2E2].
124. Refugees may also access the USRAP through referral by an NGO or a peti-
tion based on family reunification, among other avenues. The United States Refugee
Admissions (USRAP) Consultation & Worldwide Processing Priorities, U.S. CITIZEN-
SHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVS. (May 5, 2016), https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refu-
gees-asylum/refugees/united-states-refugee-admissions-program-usrap-consultation-
worldwide-processing-priorities [https://perma.cc/DA97-YKB5].
125. Devon Cone, The Process for Interviewing, Vetting, and Resettling Syrian Refu-
gees in America Is Incredibly Long and Thorough, FOREIGN POL’Y (Nov. 30, 2015),
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/11/30/the-process-for-interviewing-vetting-and-reset-
tling-syrian-refugees-in-america-is-incredibly-long-and-thorough/ [http://perma.cc/
R7TH-FPMJ]. See Amy Pope, Infographic: The Screening Process for Refugee Entry
into the United States, THE WHITE HOUSE, PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA (Nov. 20,
2015, 7:09 PM), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2015/11/20/infographic-
screening-process-refugee-entry-united-states [https://perma.cc/6V5V-JA2A]. See also
UNHCR, UNHCR RESETTLEMENT HANDBOOK 220 (2011).
126. See, e.g., UNHCR, UNHCR RESETTLEMENT HANDBOOK 228–29 (2011); U.S.
Refugee Admissions Program FAQs, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Jan. 20, 2017), https://
www.state.gov/j/prm/releases/factsheets/2017/266447.htm [https://perma.cc/X9UK-
GMLX]; Refugee Resettlement – Security Screening Information, HUMAN RIGHTS
FIRST (Apr. 2016), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/SyrianRefugees-
VettingFacts.pdf [http://perma.cc/DB7Y-NLSE].
127. See Refugee Resettlement – Security Screening Information, HUMAN RIGHTS
FIRST (Apr. 2016), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/SyrianRefugees-
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The USRAP priority system determines which individuals are “of
special humanitarian concern” to the United States for refugee reset-
tlement.128 To be resettled in the United States, a refugee must fall
within one of three designated “priority” categories:
(1) individuals and families with compelling protection needs
whose cases were referred to the United States by UNHCR, a
U.S. embassy, or a trained NGO;
(2) members of specific ethnic, political, or social groups identi-
fied by the State Department in conjunction with DHS and
UNHCR, including select groups from Cuba, Iranian religious
minorities, and ethnic minorities from Burma currently living
in camps in Thailand; or
(3) spouses, unmarried children under the age of twenty-one, and
parents of asylees and refugees already resettled in the United
States.129
Syrian refugees may also be resettled to the United States based on
their relationship to a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident,
thereby facilitating family reunification.130
Next, the security-screening process begins. The USRAP’s decisions
regarding whom to approve for resettlement are based, in part, on
exhaustive security screenings conducted by UNHCR, the State De-
partment, and DHS, among other agencies.131 A Resettlement Sup-
VettingFacts.pdf [http://perma.cc/DB7Y-NLSE]; see also Larisa Epatko, You Asked:
How Are Refugees Referred to Live in the U.S.?, PBS NEWSHOUR  (Mar. 1, 2017, 2:47
PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/asked-refugees-referred-live-u-s/ [http://
perma.cc/5HPL-LC3L].
128. The United States Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) Consultation &
Worldwide Processing Priorities, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVS. (May 5,
2016), https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/refugees/united-states-ref-
ugee-admissions-program-usrap-consultation-worldwide-processing-priorities [https://
perma.cc/DA97-YKB5].
129. Id. Those who lived in the same household as a qualifying family member, who
were part of the same economic unit, and who demonstrate compelling humanitarian
circumstances may also be considered “priority 3” on a case-by-case basis. U.S. DEP’T
OF STATE, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. & U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVS., PROPOSED REFUGEE ADMISSIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2014: REPORT TO CON-
GRESS 10–13 (2014), https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/219137.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5FK2- VB9Z]. The U.S.-based relative must file an affidavit of rela-
tionship, which is processed by the DHS, and individuals must still meet all eligibility
criteria. An Overview of U.S. Refugee Law and Policy, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Nov.
2015), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/overview-us-refugee-
law-and-policy [https://perma.cc/QC7Z-6EJP].
130. U.S. Refugee Resettlement Processing for Iraqi and Syrian Beneficiaries of an
Approved I-130 Petition—Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Mar.
11, 2016), https://www.state.gov/j/prm/releases/factsheets/2016/254649.htm [https://per
ma.cc/3R2D-HY8K]. Upon approval for resettlement, refugees under the Direct Ac-
cess Program are eligible for the same services and benefits as refugees received
through the USRAP.
131. See U.S. Refugee Admissions Program, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state
.gov/j/prm/ra/admissions/ [https://perma.cc/MX66-U5BT] (last visited Mar. 2, 2017);
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port Center, funded by the State Department’s PRM, interviews
refugees and enters their information into the Worldwide Refugee
Admissions Processing System database. The Center also compiles the
refugee’s background information and data for security screenings,
which is “a joint responsibility of the Department of State and the
Department of Homeland Security and includes the participation of
multiple U.S. Government security agencies.”132
The Refugee Access Verification Unit of USCIS “track[s] and man-
age[s] the review of Affidavits of Relationship . . . filed by immediate
family members . . . in the United States on behalf of overseas family
members who seek consideration for refugee resettlement” under the
Priority 3 category.133 Officers with this unit “conduct background and
security checks using DHS, [the State Department], and other federal
databases, as necessary, to verify the claimed relationships . . . , iden-
tify any benefit applicants who may pose a risk to national security or
public safety, and identify derogatory information that may affect eli-
gibility for the benefit sought.”134
As a result of its rigorous screening process, the United States ac-
cepts only a relatively small subset of those referred to it for resettle-
ment.135 Indeed, government officials have called the USRAP the
“toughest [immigration process] for any traveler to the United
States.”136 A successful application takes, on average, between eigh-
teen and twenty-four months to receive final approval.137
Background Briefing on Refugee Screening and Admissions, supra note 88. See also
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., & U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVS., PROPOSED REFUGEE ADMISSIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2015: RE-
PORT TO THE CONGRESS, https://www.state.gov/j/prm/releases/docsforcongress/231817
.htm [https://perma.cc/9TNY-GLDD].
132. U.S. Refugee Admissions Program, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state
.gov/j/prm/ra/admissions/ [https://perma.cc/MX66-U5BT] (last visited Mar. 2, 2017);
Security Screening of Refugees Admitted to the U.S., U.S. COMM. FOR REFUGEES AND
IMMIGRANTS, http://refugees.org/explore-the-issues/our-work-with-refugees/security-
screening/ [https://perma.cc/VK3B-Z3VW] (last visited Apr. 8, 2017).
133. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE REF-
UGEE ACCESS VERIFICATION UNIT (RAVU)), DHS/USCIS/PIA-049 1 (Aug. 16,
2013), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-pia-uscis-ravu-au-
gust2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/3P7X-7JKX].
134. Id. at 5.
135. Secretary Jeh Johnson & ATTN: Explain the Process of Screening Syrian Refu-
gees, YOUTUBE (Nov. 24, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aQUIxQ6TFZc
[https://perma.cc/4G99-3N4Y]. Of the approximately 23,000 Syrian refugees UNHCR
referred to the United States for resettlement as of November 2015, only about 2,000
were eventually admitted to the United States.
136. The Syrian Refugee Crisis and Its Impact on the Security of the U.S. Refugee
Admissions Program: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigr. and Border Security
of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 64 (Nov. 19, 2015) (statement of Anne
C. Richard, Assistant Sec’y for the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration,
Dep’t of State), https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/prm/releases/remarks/2014/219388.htm
[https://perma.cc/K9JL-AK87].
137. Id. at 3.
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2. The Security Clearance Process
The National Counterterrorism Center, FBI, DHS, and the State
Department, as well as the intelligence community, conduct security
screenings for all refugee applicants.138 Agencies look for information
indicating that the individual is a security risk or has connections to
suspected “bad” actors, outstanding warrants, or immigration or crim-
inal violations.139 These interagency security checks are repeated if
new information is discovered during the application-review process
or if any of the applicant’s information changes, such as new names or
contact information.140 The State Department prescreens and runs the
names of all potential refugees through a Consular Lookout and Sup-
port System name check.141 This system provides access to critical in-
formation regarding immigration applications, including those who
have been denied visas, have immigration violations or criminal histo-
ries, or  pose terrorism concerns.142 The system contains records from
numerous agencies and includes classified intelligence information.143
The State Department conducts the name check using the applicant’s
primary name and variations of the applicant’s name.144
The State Department also initiates an interagency check, which
screens biographic data such as the name and birthdate of applicants
within designated age ranges.145 In addition, applicants’ fingerprints
are screened against the FBI’s biometric data, the DHS’s biometric
database containing watch-list information and previous immigration
encounters in the United States, and the Department of Defense’s bi-
ometric database, which includes previously collected fingerprint
records.146 The FBI and intelligence community also issue a Security
Advisory Opinion for certain refugees who are members of a group or
nationality for which the U.S. government has required a higher-level
security screening.147 Security checks continue through every step of
the process detailed below, up to and including arrival at the U.S. port
of entry.
138. Pope, supra note 125.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Refugee Processing and Security Screening, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR.
SERVS. (Dec. 3, 2015), https://www.uscis.gov/refugeescreening [https://perma.cc/
5UY3-CSXJ]. See also Infographic: The Screening Process for Entry to the United
States for Syrian Refugees, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Nov. 18, 2015, 8:32 AM), https://
www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/news/2015/11/18/125812/infographic-
the-screening-process-for-entry-to-the-united-states-for-syrian-refugees/ [http://perma
.cc/37XV-MTMT].
142. Refugee Processing and Security Screening, supra note 141.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Pope, supra note 125. See also Infographic: The Screening Process for Entry to
the United States for Syrian Refugees, supra note 141.
147. Refugee Processing and Security Screening, supra note 141.
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3. Enhanced Review Process for Syrian Refugees
Syrian refugee applications are subject to an additional review pro-
cess148 and thus may take longer than the typical eighteen to twenty-
four months for approval.149 While details of the program remain clas-
sified, Syrian refugee applicants are afforded heightened levels of
scrutiny and additional background investigation.150 A Refugee Af-
fairs Division (RAD) officer at USCIS headquarters conducts this en-
hanced review.151 The RAD Officer reviews information regarding,
among other things, where the refugee has come from and what
caused him or her to flee,152 as well as country conditions and regional
activity, which are then used to assess the refugee’s credibility and
eligibility for protection.153 Cases are then, where necessary, referred
to the Fraud Detection and National Security Directorate of USCIS
for additional scrutiny, with open-source and classified research com-
piled for review by a USCIS officer.154 State Department officials
have stated that “Syrians tend to be a very, very heavily documented
population” compared with other refugee applicants, and these docu-
ments, or lack thereof, are carefully reviewed.155
4. In-Person Interview
A USCIS officer interviews refugees applying for resettlement in
person and is responsible for adjudicating applications for refugee sta-
tus, conducting additional security checks, and reviewing case deci-
sions.156 Within USCIS, the Refugee Corps consists of a team of
officers who go on “circuit rides,” whereby officers travel multiple
148. Background Briefing on Refugee Screening and Admissions, supra note 88. See
also Long, supra note 62.
149. See Long, supra note 62; Infographic: The Screening Process for Entry to the
United States for Syrian Refugees, supra note 141.
150. Background Briefing on Refugee Screening and Admissions, supra note 88. See
also Long, supra note 62.
151. Background Briefing on Refugee Screening and Admissions, supra note 88. See
also Infographic: The Screening Process for Entry to the United States for Syrian Refu-
gees, supra note 141.
152. Background Briefing on Refugee Screening and Admissions, supra note 88.
153. Refugee Resettlement - Security Screening Information, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST
(Apr. 2016), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/SyrianRefugeesVet
tingFacts.pdf [https://perma.cc/U5WL-42LU]. See also Security Screening of Refugees
Admitted to the U.S., U.S. COMM. FOR REFUGEES AND IMMIGRANTS, http://refugees
.org/explore-the-issues/our-work-with-refugees/security-screening/ [http://perma.cc/
D9SZ-XCF3] (last visited Mar. 3, 2017).
154. Id.
155. Long, supra note 62.
156. The United States Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) Consultation and
Worldwide Processing Priorities, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVS. (May 5,
2016), https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/refugees/united-states-ref-
ugee-admissions-program-usrap-consultation-worldwide-processing-priorities [https://
perma.cc/DA97-YKB5].
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times each year to Resettlement Support Centers to interview refu-
gees for potential resettlement.157
USCIS officers conduct these interviews to determine an applicant’s
eligibility for refugee status, including whether the applicant meets the
criteria of the refugee definition158 and is otherwise admissible under
U.S. law.159 Individuals can be excluded from refugee protection for a
variety of reasons, including where they have “ordered, incited, as-
sisted, or otherwise participated in persecution on account of race, re-
ligion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.”160 In addition, individuals who have been “‘firmly resettled’
in a third country may not be admitted as a refugee.”161 Furthermore,
applicants for refugee protection are also subject to broad terrorism-
related inadmissibility grounds (TRIG), as well as other “criminal, se-
curity, and public health [inadmissibility] grounds.”162
Certain limited exemptions are available to individuals who have
“provided insignificant or ‘certain limited’ material support (including
through routine commercial or social transactions, in the course of
providing humanitarian assistance, or under sub-duress pressure), to
undesignated terrorist organizations,” and are determined not to pose
a threat to the United States.163 But the future of these exemptions is
uncertain. The March 6 Executive Order specifically called on the Sec-
retaries of State and Homeland Security to consider rescinding this
discretionary exemption authority.164
Interviews by RAD officers are critical to the U.S. security-screen-
ing process. RAD officers undergo extensive and specialized training,
including comprehensive instruction on fraud detection and identifica-
157. Eliza Griswold, Why Is It So Difficult for Syrian Refugees to Get Into the U.S.?,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/24/magazine/why-is-it-so-
difficult-for-syrian-refugees-to-get-into-the-us.html [https://perma.cc/Z9EE-VHJH].
Officers that are permanently stationed overseas for USCIS also conduct refugee
interviews.
158. The Immigration and Nationality Act, through the Refugee Act of 1980, de-
fines a refugee as “any person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality
or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such
person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is
unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country be-
cause of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, relig-
ion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2012).
159. Refugee Processing and Security Screening, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR.
SERVS. (Dec. 3, 2015), https://www.uscis.gov/refugeescreening [https://perma.cc/PFQ
8-VABL].
160. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. & U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., PROPOSED REFUGEE ADMISSIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2017: REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 16, https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organiza-
tion/262168.pdf [https://perma.cc/2HT8-4T64].
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 16–17.
164. Exec. Order 13,780, § 7, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209, 13,216 (Mar. 6, 2017).
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tion of national security concerns.165 During the interview, the RAD
officer takes a photo of the applicant and collects fingerprints, which
will be checked against various U.S. databases for biometric screen-
ing. The officer also begins biometric checks in order to confirm the
applicant’s identity, detect possible criminal history, and identify pre-
vious immigration data.166
5. Approval and Admission to the United States
If the RAD officer determines that the refugee applicant meets the
eligibility criteria, the officer conditionally approves the refugee’s re-
settlement application and submits it to the State Department for final
processing.167 Approvals become final only once all security checks
have been cleared.168 Refugees approved for resettlement must also
undergo a medical screening conducted by the International Organi-
zation for Migration.169 Upon completion of these steps, the refugee is
granted formal approval for resettlement.170
Each refugee is then assigned to one of nine domestic resettlement
agencies, most of which are faith based.171 The sponsor agency places
the refugee with a local partner agency that will assist the refugee
upon arrival.172 The resettlement agency assesses and determines the
best location for the refugee to be resettled173 based on “the particular
165. Refugee Processing and Security Screening, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR.
SERVS. (Dec. 3, 2015), https://www.uscis.gov/refugeescreening [https://perma.cc/5UY
3-CSXJ].
166. See Security Screening of Refugees Admitted to the U.S., U.S. COMM. FOR REF-
UGEES AND IMMIGRANTS, http://refugees.org/explore-the-issues/our-work-with-refu-
gees/security-screening/ [https://perma.cc/6V5V-JA2A] (last visited Mar. 3, 2017); see
also Pope, supra note 125.
167. See Security Screening of Refugees Admitted to the U.S., U.S. COMM. FOR REF-
UGEES AND IMMIGRANTS, http://refugees.org/explore-the-issues/our-work-with-refu-
gees/security-screening/ [https://perma.cc/6V5V-JA2A] (last visited Mar. 3, 2017).
168. Id.
169. Medical Screening of U.S.-Bound Refugees: Syrian Refugee Health Profile,
CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (Jan. 10, 2017), https://www.cdc.gov/
immigrantrefugeehealth/profiles/syrian/medical-screening/index.html [https://perma
.cc/PZX3- AVQ8].
170. Security Screening of Refugees Admitted to the U.S., U.S. COMM. FOR REFU-
GEES AND IMMIGRANTS, http://refugees.org/explore-the-issues/our-work-with-refu-
gees/security-screening/ [https://perma.cc/6V5V-JA2A] (last visited Mar. 3, 2017).
171. Id. These agencies are Church World Service, Episcopal Migration Ministries,
Ethiopian Community Development Council, HIAS, International Rescue Commit-
tee, Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Services, United States Conference of Catho-
lic Bishops, World Relief Corporation, and U.S. Committee for Refugees and
Immigrants. Voluntary Agencies, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. AD-
MIN. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT (July 17,
2012), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/resource/voluntary-agencies [https://perma.cc/
N37V-3EYZ].
172. Security Screening of Refugees Admitted to the U.S., U.S. COMM. FOR REFU-
GEES AND IMMIGRANTS, http://refugees.org/explore-the-issues/our-work-with-refu-
gees/security-screening/ [https://perma.cc/6V5V-JA2A] (last visited Mar. 3, 2017).
173. Pope, supra note 125.
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needs of each incoming refugee,” if and where the refugee has rela-
tives in the United States, and “the specific resources available in a
local community.”174 The resettlement agency sponsoring the refugee
“decides on the best match between a community’s resources and the
refugee’s needs.”175 Refugees then generally complete a cultural-
orientation class to prepare for resettlement to the United States.176
Once a location is chosen, the International Organization for Mi-
gration arranges the refugee’s transportation to the United States, us-
ing a loan the refugee must begin repaying within six months of
arrival.177 The refugee remains subject to additional security checks by
U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s National Targeting Center-
Passenger, as well as the Transportation Security Administration’s Se-
cure Flight program.178
Security checks are valid only for a certain period of time.179 If the
applicant has not yet resettled in the United States and the checks
expire, the checks must be re-run to ensure that information regarding
the refugee is up to date.180
B. Obstacles to Efficient and Effective Overseas Refugee Processing
and Recent Improvements
As discussed further below, the main reasons cited for delays in ref-
ugee processing, especially with Syrians, include (a) backlogs due to
delayed security checks and (b) challenges with conducting interviews
due to staffing shortages and security concerns, among other obsta-
cles. Flaws in the interview process itself, including interpretation
174. The Reception and Placement Program, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state
.gov/j/prm/ra/receptionplacement/ [https://perma.cc/EKT6-DWHG] (last visited Mar.
10, 2017).
175. Id.
176. Security Screening of Refugees Admitted to the U.S., U.S. COMM. FOR REFU-
GEES AND IMMIGRANTS, http://refugees.org/explore-the-issues/our-work-with-refu-
gees/security-screening/ [https://perma.cc/6V5V-JA2A] (last visited Mar. 3, 2017).
177. Refugee Travel Loans Collection, U.S. CONF. OF CATH. BISHOPS, http://www
.usccb.org/issues-and-action/human-life-and-dignity/migrants-refugees-and-travelers/
refugee-travel-loans-collection/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2017). Sponsoring resettlement
agencies routinely counsel refugees on how to arrange a more flexible repayment plan
to suit their financial circumstances.
178. Pope, supra note 125.
179. Security Screening of Refugees Admitted to the United States: A Detailed, Rig-
orous Process, U.S. COMM. FOR REFUGEES AND IMMIGRANTS (2015), http://refugeer-
ights.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Refugee-resettlement-step-by-step-USCRI.pdf
[http://perma.cc/D9SZ-XCF3].
180. Oversight of the Administration’s FY 2016 Refugee Resettlement Program: Fis-
cal and Security Implications: Hearing on Refugee Admissions Fiscal Year 2016 Before
the Subcomm. on Immigr. & the Nat’l Interest of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th
Cong. (2015) (statement of Larry Bartlett, Dir. of Admissions, Bureau of Population,
Refugees, and Migration, U.S. Dep’t of State), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/
media/doc/10-01-15%20Bartlett%20Testimony.pdf [https://perma.cc/L3LC-7PQX].
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problems and lack of counsel, as well as the vulnerable nature of refu-
gees referred for resettlement, further exacerbate these problems.
In 2016, the Obama administration addressed many of these barri-
ers to efficient refugee processing through a range of new initiatives
designed to enhance the refugee admissions process.
Foremost among these new initiatives was the “surge” resettlement
program implemented in 2016 to meet the President’s goal of admit-
ting 10,000 Syrians in FY 2016.181 The “surge” aimed to decrease
processing times for Syrian refugee applicants from the average wait
of eighteen to twenty-four months by using measures such as new
technology and additional personnel.182 It reduced lag time between
each phase of processing by concentrating resources and personnel in
one location. These efforts not only allowed PRM to meet the 10,000
benchmark but also resulted in several hundred more Syrian refugees
being “travel ready” (i.e., successfully completing all security and
medical checks and being accepted or “assured” sponsorship by one
of the nine national resettlement agencies) in FY 2016.183 In the first
two months of FY 2017, a total of 2,625 Syrian refugees were admitted
to the United States.184
1. Security Checks and New Technology
Until 2016, the enhanced review process for Syrian refugees, along
with CARRP- and TRIG-related issues, among other holds, had
caused significant delays in the processing of Syrian refugee applica-
tions.185 About 3,000 to 4,000 Syrian refugees were estimated to be in
a “no decision” limbo as of January 2016.186
Between January 2016 and December 2016, however, DHS officials
reported significant progress with cases backlogged due to CARRP,
TRIG, or other holds, with roughly 1,200 “workable” cases reviewed
181. Allie Malloy, Elise Labott & Laura Koran, US Welcomes Its 10,000th Syrian
Refugee Ahead of Schedule, CNN (Aug. 29, 2016, 2:00 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/
08/28/politics/syrian-refugees-resettling-us-obama-administration/ [http://perma.cc/
2345-GPMX].
182. Corinne Segal, First Syrian Family from ‘Surge’ Resettlement Program Arrives
in U.S., PBS NEWSHOUR (Apr. 7, 2016, 11:08 AM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/run-
down/first-syrian-family-from-surge-resettlement-program-arrives-in-u-s/ [http://per
ma.cc/66WG-B4W2].
183. According to interviews with PRM officials, these refugees continued to be
resettled through FY 2016 and into FY 2017. PRM Interview, supra note 4.
184. Admissions & Arrivals, REFUGEE PROCESSING CTR., http://www.wrapsnet.org/
admissions-and-arrivals/ [https://perma.cc/ES66-2Q5J] (last visited Mar. 3, 2017).
185. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, THE SYRIAN REFUGEE CRISIS AND THE NEED FOR
U.S. LEADERSHIP 19 (2016) http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/HRF-
SyrianRefCrisis.pdf [https://perma.cc/VW6W-CDVJ] (“The factors hampering reset-
tlement, which are outlined below, include the backlogs in review of ‘hold’ cases, the
need for additional security vetting staff to timely conduct inquiries on both resettle-
ment and SIV cases and the lack of space for resettlement interviewers at the U.S.
Embassy in Beirut.”).
186. Id.
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at the time the Syrian Refugee Resettlement Project conducted inter-
views.187 DHS officials indicated that their goal for FY 2017 was to
ensure that ninety percent of interagency checks are completed within
thirty to sixty days.188
Under the Obama administration’s “surge” program, government
officials centralized processing and implemented several improve-
ments to expedite security checks while still assuring thorough secur-
ity assessments.189 In written testimony to the Senate Judiciary
Committee, PRM Director Larry Bartlett explained that the adminis-
tration was “reviewing the end-to-end processing workflow to identify
where processing can be made more efficient” and was “also working
to develop more rigorous data analytics to guide when checks should
be re-requested to try to maximize the potential for an approved,
cleared refugee to travel to the United States before another check
expires.”190
Recurrent security assessments, known as the interagency check,
helped ensure efficient processing.191 With “expanded Intelligence
Community support” and coordination among partners to “launch [in-
teragency check] recurrent vetting” in 2015, “any intervening deroga-
tory information . . . identified after the initial check . . . cleared but
before the applicant . . . traveled to the United States [was] shared
with USCIS without the need for a subsequent query, making the pro-
cess more efficient.”192
Other significant changes included modernizing the approval pro-
cess through the contributions of the U.S. Digital Service, which
helped identify choke points and prioritize cases for vetting agen-
cies.193 The U.S. Digital Service, for example, built a “digital [refugee]
187. See USCIS Interview, supra note 4.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Oversight of the Administration’s FY 2016 Refugee Resettlement Program: Fis-
cal and Security Implications: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigr. & the Na-
tional Interest of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. (Oct. 1, 2015) (response
of Larry Bartlett, Dir. of Admissions, Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration,
U.S. Dep’t of State), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/10-01-15%20
Bartlett%20Testimony.pdf [https://perma.cc/L3LC-7PQX].
191. See Pope, supra note 125. See also Aliya Sternstein, US Considers Using Porta-
ble DNA Labs, Iris Scans to Vet Syrian Refugees, NEXTGOV (Dec. 16, 2015), http://
www.nextgov.com/defense/2015/12/us-plans-speed-syrian-refugee-screenings-new-
tech/124532/ [http://perma.cc/K46K-M79U].
192. Hearing on Refugee Admission FY 2017 and Refugee Security Screening Before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on Immigr. & the National Interest (2016)
(statement of Leon Rodriguez, Dir., U.S. Citizenship and Immigrant Services, De-
partment of Homeland Security), https://www.uscis.gov/tools/resources-congress/testi-
monies-and-speeches/hearing-refugee-admission-fy-2017-and-refugee-security-screen
ing-senate-committee-judiciary-subcommittee-immigration-and-national-interest-sep-
tember-28-2016-uscis-director-leon-rodriguez [https://perma.cc/JY8J-NQEU].
193. Reducing Inefficiency in the Refugee Admission Process, U.S. DIGITAL SERV.
(2016), https://www.usds.gov/report-to-congress/2016/refugee-admissions/ [https://per
ma.cc/Z6JA-9UCK].
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approval process” to allow for automated final case stamping for refu-
gees who have already been interviewed in person and who have
cleared all security and background checks. This digital process re-
placed the in-person ink stamping, which had caused significant delays
due to challenges with travel to the region.194 This digital-stamp ap-
proval process is a significant first step toward modernizing the refu-
gee admissions process by increasing officers’ efficiency and reducing
applicants’ wait time, while upholding rigorous security standards.195
Still, challenges remain with regard to obtaining data on family
members for security and credibility assessments, which can present
obstacles to efficient and effective resettlement.196 Every refugee fam-
ily member must have his or her security check cleared at the same
time for the family to resettle. Yet clearances for family members may
not be processed simultaneously.197 As a result, families may be left
waiting for all family members’ security checks to be processed, risk-
ing the expiration of other security clearances during that period and
thus leading to further delays.198
194. Id.
195. Our Work, U.S. DIGITAL SERV., https://www.usds.gov/work [https://perma.cc/
76LA-LYPA] (last visited Mar. 3, 2017).
196. UNHCR, RESETTLEMENT HANDBOOK 338–40 (2011), http://www.unhcr.org/
46f7c0ee2.pdf [http://perma.cc/S5US-N8GP] (noting that field office staff members
must “[v]erify and cross-check bio-data carefully, including date of birth, and spellings
of names for all members of the case. Ensure consistency in the spelling of names
between linked cases. Verify that the identity of each person on the case matches their
photo . . . [which] are an important anti-fraud measure” and noting that “[e]nsuring
that the details provided in this section are complete and accurate is important for
retaining family unity, demonstrating linkages to individuals already resettled, and for
future family reunification.” The Resettlement Handbook requires that the address
and phone number of relatives be provided, if available, emphasizing that “Resettle-
ment States note that this is especially important if the applicant has relatives already
living in their country, as it helps facilitate the security screening.”).
197. Eliza Griswold, Why Is It So Difficult for Syrian Refugees to Get Into the U.S.?,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/24/magazine/why-is-it-so-
difficult-for-syrian-refugees-to-get-into-the-us.html [https://perma.cc/Z9EE-VHJH]
(“Among Syrian refugees, ‘on hold’ is the most dreaded category. It is extremely diffi-
cult to get clear answers about why the hold has been applied or when it will be
lifted. . . . It could be as simple as an applicant’s security clearance having expired
while a family member waited to be vetted.”).
198. For a discussion of security clearances expiring in the resettlement process,
see, e.g., Vermont Hopes to Receive Syrian Refugees after Trump’s Executive Order
Revision, USCRI (Mar. 2017), http://refugees.org/news/vermont-hopes-receive-syrian-
refugees-trumps-executive-order-revision/ [http://perma.cc/JJ5U-C5UN]; Rachel Nus-
baum, Refugee Ban’s Devastating Impact, HIAS (Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.hias.org/
blog/refugee-bans-devastating-impact [http://perma.cc/DQ9A-SMKW] (“‘Many refu-
gees have waited for years, even decades, to get a chance to come to the United
States,’ . . . It is incredibly rare to make it through all of the checks and security
hurdles to actually be accepted” and “‘because our security clearances are so strin-
gent, the most stringent in the world, all the clearances expire and they are only good
for a certain period of time.’”).
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2. Staffing Shortages, Security Concerns Regarding Travel to the
Region, and Alternatives to In-Person Interviews
As noted above, RAD officers travel worldwide throughout the
year to conduct interviews with refugee applicants, but until 2016 their
trips were too infrequent to meet the “mounting backlog” of refugee
applicants.199 Due to violence and security concerns, trips to countries
with populations of greatest need were often cancelled.200 For exam-
ple, DHS suspended circuit rides to Lebanon, which hosts 1 million
Syrian refugees, as well as to Iraq, which has a backlog of 57,000
cases.201 In addition, RAD officer shortages and the length of the fed-
eral hiring process (up to nine months from application to completion
of background checks and training) also caused delays, even when in-
creased hiring was possible.202 Accordingly, refugees in the most dan-
gerous areas were hindered in their efforts to be considered for
refugee processing and resettlement.203
In an effort to address these issues, the U.S. government in 2016
significantly increased the number of DHS staff in Jordan and Turkey
as part of the “surge” resettlement operation, described above, to con-
duct Syrian refugee resettlement interviews.204 This increase in staff-
ing led to an exponentially greater number of interviews and security
checks conducted than in previous years.205 The State Department de-
voted more staff in Amman, Jordan to processing Syrian refugees be-
cause the International Organization for Migration’s Resettlement
Support Center for the Middle East and North Africa—based in Am-
man—processed the majority of Syrians (eighty-seven percent) reset-
tled in the United States in 2016.206 As the State Department’s
199. Letter from Sen. Cory Booker et al. to Sec’y Jeh Johnson (Oct. 6, 2015), https:/
/www.peters.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/151006_Letter_DHS_Refugees.pdf [https://
perma.cc/CA66-S2E2].
200. Id.
201. Press Release, Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, For the Hearing “Oversight of
the Administration’s FY 2016 Refugee Resettlement Program: Fiscal and Security Im-
plications” (Oct. 1, 2015).
202. See USCIS Interview, supra note 4.
203. See Letter from Sen. Cory Booker et al. to Sec’y Jeh Johnson (Oct. 6, 2015),
https://www.peters.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/151006_Letter_DHS_Refugees.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CA66-S2E2]. See also Press Release, Int’l Refugee Assistance Pro-
ject, For the Hearing “Oversight of the Administration’s FY 2016 Refugee Resettle-
ment Program: Fiscal and Security Implications” (Oct. 1, 2015).
204. See USCIS Interview, supra note 4. See also Press Release, Human Rights
First, At Fiscal Year End, Obama Administration Meets Refugee Resettlement Goals
(Sept. 30, 2016).
205. See USCIS Interview, supra note 4.
206. U.S. Exceeds Resettlement Target of 10,000 Syrian Refugees, INT’L OFFICE OF
MIGRATION (Aug. 30, 2016), https://www.iom.int/news/us-exceeds-resettlement-tar-
get-10000-syrian-refugees [http://perma.cc/QC8P-H4ZL]; Kristina Wong, State Seeks
to Pick up Pace on Bringing Syrian Refugees to U.S., THE HILL (Apr. 16, 2016, 12:34
PM), http://thehill.com/policy/defense/276441-state-seeks-to-pick-up-pace-on-bring-
ing-syrian-refugees-to-us [https://perma.cc/7Z3A-BKZP].
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Director of the Office of Refugee Admissions Larry Bartlett noted,
“By putting more officers in one place we can conduct more
interviews.”207
With the goal of admitting 10,000 Syrian refugees prior to the end
of FY 2016, DHS personnel interviewed an additional 12,000 refugee
applicants referred by UNHCR in Jordan.208 DHS also opened a
processing center in Erbil, Iraq, to meet the needs of Syrian refugees
located there.209 The Obama administration increased the number of
DHS officers tasked with interviewing Syrian refugees in the Middle
East,210 and in February 2016, the State Department opened “a new
pathway for certain Syrians with relatives in the United States to ap-
ply for refugee resettlement.”211 This new pathway, known as the Di-
rect Access Program, mentioned above, extended access to the
USRAP to Syrian beneficiaries of approved relative petitions by U.S.
citizens and lawful permanent residents, with processing available in
Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mo-
rocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.212
U.S. Resettlement Support Centers in the Middle East also increased
207. Kristina Wong, State Seeks to Pick up Pace on Bringing Syrian Refugees to
U.S., THE HILL (Apr. 16, 2016, 12:34 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/defense/276441-
state-seeks-to-pick-up-pace-on-bringing-syrian-refugees-to-us [https://perma.cc/
7Z3A-BKZP].
208. Julie Hirschfeld Davis, U.S. Could Exceed Goal of Accepting 10,000 Syrian
Refugees, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/06/us/politics/
us-could-exceed-goal-of-accepting-10000-syrian-refugees.html [http://perma.cc/UU57-
JYGQ]. See also Transcript of USCIS-DOS-HHS Press Call on Syrian Refugee
Processing, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVS. (Aug. 5, 2016), https://www.uscis
.gov/news/news-releases/transcript-uscis-dos-hhs-press-call-syrian-refugee-processing
[https://perma.cc/98Y3-UAUM].
209. See Julia Edwards, Exclusive: U.S. to Open New Screening Centers for Syrian
Refugees – State Department, REUTERS (Nov. 6, 2015, 2:39 PM), http://www.reuters
.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-usa-idUSKCN0SV2SE20151106 [http://perma.cc/
83FR-79LZ]; Jared Goyette, It’s Now Clear That Most of the Syrian Refugees Coming
to the United States Are Women and Children, PUB. RADIO INT’L (Aug. 8, 2016, 5:45
PM), https://www.pri.org/stories/2016-08-08/it-s-now-clear-most-syrian-refugees-com-
ing-united-states-are-women-and-children [http://perma.cc/4VVG-MCLL].
210. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, AT LEAST 10,000: A SIX-MONTH PROGRESS REPORT
ON U.S. RESETTLEMENT OF SYRIAN REFUGEES 8 (2016), http://www.humanrightsfirst
.org/sites/default/files/HRFReportAtLeastTenThousand-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/
BXY3-QKN9]. See also HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, THE SYRIAN REFUGEE CRISIS AND
THE NEED FOR U.S. LEADERSHIP 19 (2016), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/de-
fault/files/HRFSyrianRefCrisis.pdf [https://perma.cc/VW6W-CDVJ].
211. Jared Goyette, Canada Is Just Better at Welcoming Syrian Refugees, but the US
Is Trying to Do More, PUB. RADIO INT’L (Apr. 5, 2016, 3:30 PM), https://www.pri.org/
stories/2016-04-05/canada-just-better-welcoming-syrian-refugees-us-trying-do-more
[http://perma.cc/S7MH-BU9Q]. See also U.S. Refugee Resettlement Processing for
Iraqi and Syrian Beneficiaries of an Approved I-130 Petition—Frequently Asked Ques-
tions, U.S. DEP’T STATE (Mar. 11, 2016), https://www.state.gov/j/prm/releases/fact-
sheets/2016/254649.htm  [https://perma.cc/3R2D-HY8K].
212. DEP’T OF STATE, PROPOSED REFUGEE ADMISSIONS FY 2017: REPORT TO THE
CONGRESS (Sept. 15, 2016), https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/prm/releases/docsforcon-
gress/261956.htm [https://perma.cc/M66Y-BZN4].
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their processing of refugee applicants and their support for expanded
circuit rides.213
Other improvements to the system included an increase in staffing
at Resettlement Support Centers, as well as an addition of U.S. Digi-
tal Service staff to PRM and USCIS, and a doubling of funding for the
International Catholic Migration Commission and the UNHCR De-
ployment Scheme.214 The Deployment Scheme is a collaboration be-
tween UNHCR and four implementing partners—International
Catholic Migration Commission, RefugePoint, Danish Refugee Coun-
cil, and International Refugee Assistance Project—which assists in
properly identifying and referring refugees for resettlement.215 The
Deployment Scheme consists of 400 qualified humanitarian aid pro-
fessionals from diverse backgrounds who have experience in refugee
protection casework and who are ready to be temporarily deployed on
short notice to UNHCR’s field offices to provide additional sup-
port.216 As a result of this Deployment Scheme and increased staffing,
NGOs increased their number of refugee referrals for resettlement,
which contributed to higher resettlement numbers and greater atten-
tion to issues of equitable access to resettlement.217 In order to further
enhance overseas processing and allow for the ongoing adjudication of
cases, DHS officials also considered the use of videoconferencing in
limited circumstances where security concerns prevent RAD officers
from traveling to certain locations.218
Despite these improvements, there continue to be obstacles in the
refugee adjudication process related to the availability of counsel and
interpreters, and sensitivity toward applicants who have survived seri-
ous trauma.219 Many refugee applicants do not speak English and
213. See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, THE SYRIAN REFUGEE CRISIS AND THE NEED FOR
U.S. LEADERSHIP 19 (2016), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/HRF-
SyrianRefCrisis.pdf [https://perma.cc/VW6W-CDVJ].
214. See USCIS Interview, supra note 4; see also PRM Interview, supra note 4.
215. Deployment Scheme, UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/resettlement-de-
ployment-scheme.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) [http://perma.cc/32FY-XQPF].
216. ICMC-UNHCR Resettlement Deployment Scheme, INT’L CATHOLIC MIGRA-
TION COMM’N, http://www.icmc.net/icmc-unhcr-resettlement-deployment-scheme
[http://perma.cc/5U7E-N9VD] (last visited Feb. 28, 2017).
217. Amy Slaughter, How NGOs Have Helped Shape Resettlement, 54 FORCED MI-
GRATION REV. 32, 33–34 (Feb. 2017), http://www.fmreview.org/resettlement/slaughter
.html [http://perma.cc/T642-BFF3]. The Multifaith Alliance for Syrian Refugees has
cited the need to “[t]rain and certify NGOs to originate referrals, including in bulk.”
Sources for Challenging Common Assumptions that Drive U.S. Policy, MULTIFAITH
ALLIANCE FOR SYRIAN REFUGEES, http://www.multifaithalliance.org/policy [http://per
ma.cc/4SYS-4L8A].
218. See USCIS Interview, supra note 4. See also Memorandum from the Int’l Refu-
gee Assistance Project on The Use of Videoconferencing to Deal with Refugee Appli-
cation Delays in Syria (Jan. 2012), https://refugeerights.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/
01/IRAP_Syria_Videoconferencing-Memo.pdf [http://perma.cc/J7W2-DRNG] (rec-
ommending video interviews for Syrian refugees).
219. 8 C.F.R. § 292.5(b) (2016); Letter from William C. Hubbard, President,
A.B.A., to Jeh Johnson, Sec’y of Homeland Sec., Alejandro Mayorkas, Deputy Sec’y
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must rely on interpreters of varying quality,220 who may, for example,
be uncomfortable discussing rape, HIV, or LGBTQI issues due to cul-
tural factors or the interpreter’s political and social views.221 Refugees
who experience post-traumatic stress disorder may face significant
challenges recounting their experiences in interviews,222 since post-
traumatic stress disorder can make retelling a story in an interview a
“painful and possibly traumatic event in itself.”223 The combination of
these factors can lead to errors in testimony and adverse outcomes for
refugees in the adjudication process.224 Moreover, without legal repre-
sentation, refugees may be confused by the bureaucratic and complex
process of resettlement, unprepared for interviews with U.S. and
United Nations officials, and unable to gather the corroborating docu-
of Homeland Sec., & Leo´n Rodrı´guez, Dir., U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. Servs. (July
24, 2015), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/GAO/2015july
24_counselrefugeeapplicants.authcheckdam.pdf [http://perma.cc/4VFS-9RMX] (Ap-
pendix B).
220. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVS., CROSS-CULTURAL COMMUNICA-
TION AND OTHER FACTORS THAT MAY IMPEDE COMMUNICATION AT AN INTERVIEW
8 (Apr. 10, 2003); U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVS., INTERVIEWING PART IV:
WORKING WITH AN INTERPRETER 12–13 (Sept. 14, 2006); Alison Parker, Hidden in
Plain View: Refugees Living without Protection in Nairobi and Kampala, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH 116 (2002).
221. Betsy Fisher, Comment, The Case for Procedural Safeguards in the U.S. Refu-
gee Admissions Program, 20 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 329, 339–44 (2013); U.S. CITIZEN-
SHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVS., INTERVIEWING PART IV: WORKING WITH AN
INTERPRETER 14–15 (Sept. 14, 2006); Laurie Berg & Jenni Millbank, Constructing the
Personal Narratives of Lesbian, Gay and Bisexual Asylum Claimants, 22 J. REFUGEE
STUD. 195, 196 (2009); U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVS., GUIDANCE FOR ADJU-
DICATING LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, AND INTERSEX REFUGEE AND
ASYLUM CLAIMS 48 (2011), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Humanita-
rian/Refugees%20%26%20Asylum/Asylum/Asylum%20Native%20Documents%20
and%20Static%20Files/RAIO-Training-March-2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/2S43-52A
G].
222. See Fisher, supra note 221, at 337–38 (noting that the prevalence of post-trau-
matic stress disorder among refugee groups ranges between 39% and 100%). See also
UNHCR, REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT: AN INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK TO GUIDE RE-
CEPTION AND INTEGRATION 194 (2002); Pilar Hernandez, Trauma in War and Political
Persecution: Expanding the Concept, 72 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 16, 16 (2002);
Claudia Maria Vargas, War Trauma in Refugees: Red Flags and Clinical Principles, 3
VISIONS J. 12, 12–13 (2007); Andres J. Pumariega et al., Mental Health of Immigrants
and Refugees, 41 COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH J. 581, 588 (2005).
223. Fisher, supra note 221, at 338. See also U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVS.,
INTERVIEWING SURVIVORS OF TORTURE AND OTHER SEVERE TRAUMA 21 (Mar. 29,
2013); UNHCR, REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT: AN INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK TO
GUIDE RECEPTION AND INTEGRATION 233 (2002) (explaining that torture survivors
may not trust individuals in power, including immigration authorities). USCIS officers
who adjudicate refugee cases receive training in working with individuals who have
undergone trauma and have PTSD and in utilizing sensitive elicitation techniques.
Nonetheless, opening up and presenting a clear, consistent, and linear narrative is
often very difficult for trauma survivors.
224. See Fisher, supra note 221, at 348–49. See also AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM: PROPOSALS TO PROMOTE INDEPENDENCE,
FAIRNESS, EFFICIENCY, AND PROFESSIONALISM IN THE ADJUDICATION OF REMOVAL
CASES 5–10 (2010).
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mentation demanded by the adjudicator.225 Thus, as discussed further
in the recommendations Section below, legal representation can im-
prove the efficiency and speed of the adjudication process.226
Beyond these obstacles, PRM officials generally pointed to barriers
after refugees were admitted to the United States as ongoing, key fac-
tors impeding robust resettlement.227 Among these barriers are
pushback from certain politicians and states proactively seeking to
limit or halt resettlement, often based on misinformation and miscon-
ceptions, as well as growing constraints on ORR funding to states and
resettlement agencies for post-arrival resettlement services.228 The
next Section examines the role of ORR and resettlement agencies, as
well as public-private partnerships in resettlement and how the private
partnership approach can build on the current USRAP model to en-
sure more effective and efficient processing.
VI. DOMESTIC RESETTLEMENT
The U.S. resettlement program provides refugees with a secure
foundation for integration into American life, supporting refugees
from the first day in their new communities until they obtain lawful
permanent resident status and, eventually, naturalize as U.S. citizens.
The domestic resettlement framework is built on a public-private part-
nership whereby federal government resources are leveraged by state
and local, private, nonprofit, faith-based, and community-based
groups to support refugees and their families. Refugees’ eventual self-
sufficiency, integration, and adaptation to their new home in the
United States is the ultimate goal of all resettlement services.
225. See Fisher, supra note 221, at 348; AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REFORMING
THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM: PROPOSALS TO PROMOTE INDEPENDENCE, FAIRNESS, EF-
FICIENCY, AND PROFESSIONALISM IN THE ADJUDICATION OF REMOVAL CASES 5–10
(2010); HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, RENEWING U.S. COMMITMENT TO REFUGEE PROTEC-
TION: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM ON THE 30TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE REFU-
GEE ACT 21 (Mar. 2010); Katherine Reisner & Catherine Crooke, Why Can’t
Refugees Get Lawyers?, N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/
28/opinion/why-cant-refugees-get-lawyers.html [http://perma.cc/VEH4-YAM8].
226. See Fisher, supra note 221, at 348; AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REFORMING
THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM: PROPOSALS TO PROMOTE INDEPENDENCE, FAIRNESS, EF-
FICIENCY, AND PROFESSIONALISM IN THE ADJUDICATION OF REMOVAL CASES 5–10
(2010); HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, RENEWING U.S. COMMITMENT TO REFUGEE PROTEC-
TION: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM ON THE 30TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE REFU-
GEE ACT 21 (Mar. 2010); Katherine Reisner & Catherine Crooke, Why Can’t
Refugees Get Lawyers?, N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/
28/opinion/why-cant-refugees-get-lawyers.html [http://perma.cc/VEH4-YAM8].
227. See PRM Interview, supra note 4.
228. Id. See also Anastasia Brown & Todd Scribner, Unfulfilled Promises, Future
Possibilities: The Refugee Resettlement System in the United States, 2 J. ON MIGRATION
& HUM. SECURITY 101, 111 (2014) (discussing funding issues); Priscilla Alvarez, What
Should the U.S. Do about Refugee Resettlement?, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 29, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/03/refugee-resettlement-united-
states/474939/ [http://perma.cc/65EJ-B3CS] (discussing political opposition to refugee
resettlement).
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In order to achieve such adaptation and integration, individual re-
settlement agencies, each with its own network of local partner orga-
nizations, collaborate with state and local officials and refugee-
focused community-service providers. In keeping with the vision of
the USRAP as a public-private partnership, local resettlement agen-
cies engage volunteers to welcome and connect newcomers to the host
communities. Previously resettled refugees play a significant role as
interpreters, caseworkers, volunteers, and community group leaders.
Housing, employment, language training, and physical and mental
health care are all critical to integration.
However, interviews conducted with government officials for this
Report highlighted often overlooked funding constraints and other
obstacles facing the domestic resettlement system, discussed further
below.229 Diminished funding from ORR negatively affects local re-
settlement agencies’ staffing, as well as a state’s ability to resource
Refugee Cash Assistance, English classes, and employment-readiness
programs to integrate refugee newcomers. Efforts to improve the ref-
ugee resettlement system and integration goals must address these
funding constraints and must build on existing public-private partner-
ships to complement and enhance the current system. These partner-
ships are described in greater detail below. This Section of the Report
first outlines the process for domestic resettlement and then describes
the main obstacles. It concludes with a series of recommendations
aimed at prompting the development of a uniform protocol for en-
hancing the efficiency and effectiveness of the resettlement process,
thereby contributing to jobs and national security.
A. The Process of Domestic Resettlement
1. PRM’s Reception and Placement Program
PRM’s Reception and Placement Program, which funds resettle-
ment agencies to prepare for the arrival of refugees, supports the US-
RAP by ensuring that refugees receive the services needed to begin
settling into their new homes. The program prepares for refugees’ re-
settlement by working with a refugee’s family or friends, local-com-
munity sponsors, and volunteers who agree to assist resettlement-
agency staff in the provision of “core services.” These “core services,”
provided through national and local resettlement agencies, include
case management and modest cash assistance for up to ninety days
after arrival; assistance in securing housing, food, and clothing; and
229. See PRM Interview, supra note 4. Specifically, government officials reported
that local resettlement agencies, state refugee coordinators, and other officials had
indicated that they could not accept more than 110% of the overall arrivals they had
projected being able to serve at the beginning of the fiscal year, due to funding con-
straints. See also FY 2017 Notice of Funding Opportunity for Reception and Placement
Program, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Mar. 21, 2016), http://www.state.gov/j/prm/funding/
fy2017/254909.htm [https://perma.cc/536R-FYVC].
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case management services to facilitate applying for Social Security
cards, registering children for school, and arranging medical appoint-
ments, along with referrals to English classes and connections with
relevant community service providers.230 As noted, through these
public-private partnerships, state, private, nonprofit, faith-based, and
community-based entities leverage federal funds to support
refugees.231
2. Department of Health and Human Services’ ORR
The Department of Health and Human Services’ ORR is tasked
with the oversight of domestic refugee resettlement initiatives and
works in collaboration with PRM.232 The primary task of ORR is to
provide for short- and long-term programs and resources, including
case management, temporary cash assistance, health care (including
mental health care), and other services such as employment readiness
and job placement, all of which are necessary to assist refugees in inte-
grating into their new communities.233 ORR programs focus on facili-
tating refugee integration and are generally structured to ensure an
uninterrupted transition from PRM’s Reception and Placement Pro-
gram services to self-sufficiency. ORR also provides data to PRM to
facilitate placement and planning decisions.234
230. The Reception and Placement Program, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://www
.state.gov/j/prm/ra/receptionplacement/index.htm [https://perma.cc/5E8F-YTCK] (last
visited Apr. 9, 2017).
231. See FY 2017 Notice of Funding Opportunity for Reception and Placement Pro-
gram, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Mar. 21, 2016), http://www.state.gov/j/prm/funding/
fy2017/254909.htm [https://perma.cc/536R-FYVC]. Prior to and upon their arrival in
the United States, local resettlement office staff provide the Reception and Placement
Program core services.
232. The U.S. Refugee Resettlement Program—An Overview, U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES OFFICE OF REF-
UGEE RESETTLEMENT (Sept. 14, 2015), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/resource/the-us-ref-
ugee-resettlement-program-an-overview [https://perma.cc/L5WQ-UHGL]. Congress
established the ORR as part of the Refugee Act of 1980 in order to standardize pro-
cedures for resettling refugees after the collapse of Vietnam. Immigration & National-
ity Act, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 411, 94 Stat. 102 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1521 (2012)). See
generally A Brief History of the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR), U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES OFFICE OF REF-
UGEE RESETTLEMENT (July 2013), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/orr/
orr_fact_sheet_brief_history_of_orr.pdf [https://perma.cc/8L2U-GQCY].
233. The U.S. Refugee Resettlement Program—An Overview, U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES OFFICE OF REF-
UGEE RESETTLEMENT (Sept. 14, 2015), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/resource/the-us-ref-
ugee-resettlement-program-an-overview [https://perma.cc/L5WQ-UHGL]. See also
Stella Burch Elias, The Perils and Possibilities of Refugee Federalism, 66 AM. U.L.
REV. 353, 372 (2016).
234. Coordinated Placement, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. ADMIN.
FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT, http://www
.acf.hhs.gov/orr/programs/coordinated-placement [https://perma.cc/PSX8-DSX3] (last
visited Mar. 6, 2017).
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The Reception and Placement Program and ORR programs differ
in their implementation. The Reception and Placement Program is
structured to be implemented uniformly by resettlement agencies in
each state, whereas ORR entrusts states with implementing programs
according to each individual state’s plans, which must be submitted to
ORR for yearly approval.235 The state plans must designate the state
resettlement agencies responsible for developing and administering
the programs, and the governor must approve the plans before the
state submits them to ORR.236
ORR’s Division of Refugee Assistance supports state agencies in
providing services to refugees, including through its Cash and Medical
Assistance Program, which reimburses states for 100% of the services
provided and for associated administrative costs.237 The Division of
Refugee Health provides resources for refugees’ physical and emo-
tional well-being,238 and the Division of Resettlement Services works
with public and private nonprofit resettlement agencies to assist refu-
gees in attaining economic and social integration.239
ORR-funded programs include the following:
235. 45 C.F.R. § 400.8 (2016). States must submit their plans no later than 30 days
after the beginning of each federal government fiscal year. 45 C.F.R. § 400.4 (2016).
Wyoming is the only state that does not formally participate in the refugee resettle-
ment program. See generally Suzan M. Pritchett, From Refugees and Asylees to Citi-
zens: Clarifying the Refugee Admissions Process, 37 WYO. LAWYER 3 (June 2014).
236. 45 C.F.R. §§ 400.50, 400.70 (2016).
237. Divisions—Refugee Assistance, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.
ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT (Oct. 3,
2012), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/resource/divisions-refugee-assistance [https://per
ma.cc/2T5U-R5MX]. The other programs run by Division of Refugee Assistance are
the Public/Private Partnership Program (allowing states to enter into partnerships
with local refugee resettlement agencies to provide refugee cash assistance), the Wil-
son-Fish Alternative Program (see infra note 247), the Refugee Social Services Pro-
gram (allocating funds to states to support recently resettled refugees), the Targeted
Assistance Program (supporting jurisdictions with high concentrations of refugees),
the Cuban Haitian Program (assisting states and programs serving Cuban and Haitian
refugees), the Refugee School Impact Program (helping school districts to provide
programming designed to integrate refugee students), the Services to Older Refugees
Program (providing support for states and programs designed for refugees aged sixty
and older), and the Targeted Assistance Discretionary Program. Id.
238. Refugee Health, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. ADMIN. FOR
CHILDREN AND FAMILIES OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT, http://www.acf.hhs
.gov/orr/programs/refugee-health [https://perma.cc/FU32-2BM4] (last visited Mar. 6,
2017).
239. Divisions—Resettlement Services, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.
ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT (Oct. 3,
2012), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/resource/divisions-community-resettlement [https://
perma.cc/2TKE-8UTD]. The Division of Resettlement Services administers eight pro-
grams: Voluntary Agencies Matching Grant Program, Preferred Communities Pro-
gram, Refugee Agriculture Partnership, Individual Development Accounts,
Microenterprise Development, Microenterprise Development—Home-Based Child
Care, Ethnic Community Self-Help Program, and Supplemental Services to Newly
Arriving Refugees. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\5-1\TWL106.txt unknown Seq: 52 29-DEC-17 8:20
206 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5
• Refugee Cash Assistance and Refugee Medical Assistance Pro-
grams, which provide funding directly to states to help refugees
during their first eight months in the United States.240
• Targeted Assistance Grants, which include formula-allocation
grants to areas with large numbers of refugees.241 The grants are
intended “primarily for the purpose of facilitating refugee em-
ployment and achievement of self-sufficiency.”242
• The Refugee Social Services Program, which funds em-
ployability services and provides information about and referral
to other community services that can help individuals both ob-
tain and maintain employment.243
• The Matching Grant Program, which similarly provides funding
for services to help ORR-eligible refugees become economically
self-sufficient within 120 to 180 days of becoming eligible for the
program.244 Grant recipients must provide in-house case man-
agement; employment services; and assistance with basic needs,
such as vouchers for food, housing, and transportation, when
needed.245 Other services, such as English-language training,
health care, and job training, must be provided either in house
or via referral.246
• Wilson-Fish programs, which are alternatives to traditional
state-administered refugee resettlement programs that provide
cash and medical assistance, as well as social services, directly to
refugees.247
240. About Cash & Medical Assistance, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVS. ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT,
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/programs/cma/about [https://perma.cc/36WL-HXFB] (last
visited Mar. 6, 2017).
241. See Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 412(a)(4)(B)(iii), 412(c)(2)(A) (codi-
fied at 8 U.S.C. § 1522 (2012)).
242. Id. at § 412(c)(2)(B)(i).
243. About Refugee Social Services, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.
ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT, https://
www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/programs/refugee-social-services/about [https://perma.cc/8PGH-
VHY9] (last visited Mar. 6, 2017).
244. About the Voluntary Agencies Matching Grant Program, U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES OFFICE OF REF-
UGEE RESETTLEMENT, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/orr/programs/matching-
grants/about [https://perma.cc/U92X-4MFP] (Dec. 29, 2016).
245. See OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT, VOLUNTARY AGENCIES MATCHING
GRANT PROGRAM: FY 2014 PROGRAM GUIDELINES 5–9, https://www.acf.hhs.gov/
sites/default/files/orr/fy_2014_matching_grant_mg_program_guidelines_for_grantees
.pdf [https://perma.cc/73ZQ- UTZY] (last visited Mar. 6, 2017).
246. See id. at 11–12.
247. About Wilson/Fish, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. ADMIN. FOR
CHILDREN AND FAMILIES OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT (Jan. 23, 2017), http://
www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/orr/programs/wilson-fish/about [https://perma.cc/J8DL-
T9T4]. ORR currently funds thirteen Wilson-Fish programs in Alabama, Alaska, Col-
orado, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nevada, North Dakota, South Da-
kota, Tennessee, Vermont, and San Diego County, California. Wilson-Fish Chart, U.S.
DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES OF-
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• The Ethnic Community Self-Help Program, which awards grants
to support local ethnicity-based organizations that assist refu-
gees in becoming well-integrated members of American
society.248
• The Preferred Communities Program, which provides support to
voluntary agencies that resettle over 100 refugees each year or
are specifically qualified to assist refugees with special needs.249
• The Unaccompanied Refugee Minors Program, which facilitates
foster-care placement for unaccompanied minor refugees and
helps them “develop appropriate skills to enter adulthood and
to achieve social self-sufficiency.”250
3. Role of NGOs and Private Organizations
PRM and ORR partner with nine domestic NGOs to resettle refu-
gees: Church World Service, Episcopal Migration Ministries, Ethio-
pian Community Development Council, HIAS, International Rescue
Committee, Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service, United
States Conference of Catholic Bishops, U.S. Committee for Refugees
and Immigrants, and World Relief.251 These resettlement agencies as-
sist refugees in their short- and long-term integration, providing ser-
vices through a network of about 350 affiliated offices across the
FICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT (Jan. 25, 2013), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/re-
source/wilson-fish-chart [https://perma.cc/66XC-YEQK].
248. About Ethnic Community Self-Help, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVS. ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT
(Dec. 29, 2016), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/orr/programs/ethnic-community-
self-help/about [https://perma.cc/GQ2V-EYAY]. In FY 2015, one and two-year grants
ranging from $125,000 to $200,000 were awarded to twenty-seven organizations in
seventeen states. Ethnic Community Self-Help Grants: Fiscal Year 2014/2015, U.S.
DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES OF-
FICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT (Nov. 10, 2015), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/re-
source/ethnic-community-self-help-grants [https://perma.cc/8H3F-7EGM].
249. About Preferred Communities, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.
ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT (Nov. 8,
2016), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/orr/orr/programs/rph/about [https://perma.cc/
U339-6FQL].
250. About Unaccompanied Refugee Minors, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVS. ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT
(Dec. 16, 2015), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/orr/programs/urm/about [https://per
ma.cc/NFY9-ZH9G].
251. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND
FAMILIES OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY
2014 1, A-1 (2016), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/orr/orr_annual_report_
to_congress_fy_2014_signed.pdf [https://perma.cc/NS7T-GYQS]. The exact identity of
each refugee to be resettled in a given state is not known until the case is assigned to a
local resettlement affiliate by its national agency, usually about a month in advance of
when the local agency accepts the case. In the cases of refugees joining family mem-
bers already in the United States, the local resettlement office already has a relation-
ship with the U.S. “tie” relatives, as the family member’s affidavit of relationship is
filed through the resettlement agency to the State Department.
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United States.252 Local resettlement agency staff are responsible for
securing and furnishing appropriate housing prior to refugees’ arrival
in a new city. As noted above, they also provide food and clothing,
cultural orientation, school registration for children, arrangement of
medical appointments, referrals to English classes, and connections to
other appropriate and relevant community service providers, among
other services.253 A critical aspect of local resettlement is consultation
and collaboration with state refugee coordinators and other relevant
support networks to ensure that refugees are welcomed into their new
communities.254
B. Contributions of Refugees, Obstacles Facing Domestic Refugee
Resettlement, and Proposals for Reform
Refugees contribute substantially to their new communities. They
revitalize cities and towns with dwindling populations, provide labor,
help build local economies, and create jobs both through demand for
resettlement services and through establishing their own businesses.
As the mayor of Buffalo, New York, recently stated, “One of the rea-
sons that Buffalo is growing, that Buffalo is getting stronger, that Buf-
falo is getting better, is because of the presence of our immigrant and
our refugee community.”255 Economists have noted that upfront re-
settlement costs are generally mitigated by refugees’ contributions to
communities.256 Cities in Vermont and Michigan have, for example,
lobbied to bring in Syrian refugees to help them repopulate their
towns and revitalize their economies.257
252. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT:
GREATER CONSULTATION WITH COMMUNITY STAKEHOLDERS COULD STRENGTHEN
PROGRAM, GAO-12-729 1, 4–5 (July 2012); Refugee Admissions, U.S. DEP’T OF
STATE, https://www.state.gov/j/prm/ra/index.htm [https://perma.cc/M3E9-LJUF] (last
visited Mar. 3, 2017).
253. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT:
GREATER CONSULTATION WITH COMMUNITY STAKEHOLDERS COULD STRENGTHEN
PROGRAM, GAO-12-729 1, 32 (July 2012); INTEGRATED REFUGEE AND IMMIGRANT
SERVS., COMMUNITY CO-SPONSORSHIP PROGRAM MANUAL FOR REFUGEE RESETTLE-
MENT 10–11 (2016), http://www.irisct.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/CO-SPON-
SORSHIP-MANUAL-Nov-2016.pdf [http://perma.cc/4HVV-6SVC].
254. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT:
GREATER CONSULTATION WITH COMMUNITY STAKEHOLDERS COULD STRENGTHEN
PROGRAM, GAO-12-729 1, 43 (July 2012); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, U.S. DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SEC. & U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., PROPOSED REFU-
GEE ADMISSIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2017: REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 1, http://www
.wrapsnet.org/s/Report-to-Congress-for-FY-2017-USRAP.pdf [https://perma.cc/
6FGS-U7ZJ].
255. Jesse McKinley, A Surprising Salve for New York’s Beleaguered Cities: Refu-
gees, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/20/nyregion/a-sur-
prising-salve-for-new-yorks-beleaguered-cities-refugees.html [http://perma.cc/D2J3-
N6VF].
256. Id.
257. See, e.g., Nina Keck, Vermont Mayor Seeks Syrian Refugees to Help Boost
Small Town’s Economy, NPR (Jan. 25, 2017, 4:27 PM), http://www.npr.org/2017/01/25/
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However, challenges remain, including budgetary constraints, a lack
of robust data regarding refugee integration, and coordination gaps
between federal and state resettlement agencies. This Section outlines
the main obstacles to resettlement and provides proposals for reform.
Updating the budgeting process to include a timeline for state reim-
bursements, closer tracking of secondary migration, and adjustments
for cost of living, as well as improving data collection, are just a few
examples of proposed changes to the domestic resettlement system
that could help improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the reset-
tlement process.
1. Budget Constraints
When the Refugee Act of 1980 established ORR, ORR’s sole pur-
pose was to assist refugees. Its mandate, however, has grown signifi-
cantly over the past three decades: the populations it serves have
become more varied, with their needs more complex and numbers
more difficult to predict. In addition to refugees, ORR now serves
Cuban and Haitian entrants, asylees, unaccompanied children, survi-
vors of torture, special immigrant visa holders, and trafficking vic-
tims.258 As ORR noted in its FY 2014 Report to Congress, ORR-
funded programs provided services to 97,530 people, a ten percent in-
crease from the year before.259
511655853/vermont-mayor-seeks-syrian-refugees-to-help-boost-small-towns-economy
[http://perma.cc/H33B-E7V3]; Dustin Walsh, Local Biz Worries over Order’s Effect,
CRAIN’S DETROIT BUSINESS (Feb. 6–12, 2017); Sherri Welch, Resettlement Agencies
Face Uncertain Future, CRAIN’S DETROIT BUSINESS (Feb. 5, 2017, 7:00 AM), http://
www.crainsdetroit.com/article/20170205/NEWS/170209888/resettlement-agencies-
face-uncertain-future [https://perma.cc/BC6M-7VRS]
258. Resources, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. ADMIN. FOR CHIL-
DREN AND FAMILIES OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT, https://www.acf.hhs.gov/
orr/resource-library [https://perma.cc/W4XT-Z4EB] (last visited Mar. 3, 2017). An-
other prime example of ORR’s expanded mandate is its responsibility to care for
unaccompanied children. By law, the Department of Health and Human Services,
through ORR, must provide for the custody and care of these children. In the Traf-
ficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, which expanded and rede-
fined the department’s statutory responsibilities, Congress directed that each child
must “be promptly placed in the least restrictive setting that is in the best interest of
the child.” 8 U.S.C. § 1232 (2012). An average of 7,000 to 8,000 children were served
annually in ORR’s Unaccompanied Children Program during its first nine years at
ORR. Since FY 2012, this number has jumped dramatically. The Department of
Health and Human Services referred a total of 13,625 children to ORR in FY 2012.
The program then received 24,668 referrals in FY 2013, 57,496 referrals in FY 2014,
and 33,726 referrals in FY 2015. The majority of unaccompanied children come from
Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. Fact Sheet, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVS. ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESET-
TLEMENT (Jan. 2016), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/orr/orr_uc_updated_
fact_sheet_1416.pdf  [https://perma.cc/AK79-TJT9].
259. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND
FAMILIES OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY
2014 1, 3 (2016), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/orr/orr_annual_report_to_
congress_fy_2014_signed.pdf [https://perma.cc/NS7T-GYQS].
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Nonetheless, ORR’s budget has not kept pace with its expanded
responsibilities, its evolving challenges, the increased cost of living, or
inflation.260 ORR has not experienced a budget increase equal to that
of PRM’s Reception and Placement Program, whose budget doubled
in FY 2010.261 In addition, regulations for Refugee Cash Assistance
payment levels, which are tied to a state’s Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families (“TANF”) program, were written without considering
cost-of-living increases or the poverty-level index.262 As a result, ORR
has been forced to redirect funds away from refugee resettlement ser-
vices to address unanticipated needs.263
260. Liza Lieberman, What Does the President’s Budget Mean for Refugees?, HIAS
(Feb. 9, 2016), http://www.hias.org/blog/what-does-presidents-budget-mean-refugees
[http://perma.cc/MMQ2-26BR].
261. Office of the Spokesman, Increase to the Refugee Reception and Placement Per
Capita Grant, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Jan. 25, 2010), https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/
prs/ps/2010/01/135800.htm  [https://perma.cc/S35M-5Y7G].
262. 45 C.F.R. § 400.66 (2015). See Wilson-Fish Alternative Program Guidelines for
Fiscal Year 2015–2016, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. ADMIN. FOR
CHILDREN AND FAMILIES OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT (June 30, 2015),
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/resource/wilson-fish-alternative-program-guidelines-for-
fiscal-year-2015-2016 [https://perma.cc/4FYT-8S2F]; Megan Stanley, Ife Floyd &
Misha Hill, TANF Cash Benefits Have Fallen by More Than 20 Percent in Most States
and Continue to Erode, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POL’Y PRIORITIES (Oct. 17, 2016),
http://www.cbpp.org/research/family-income-support/tanf-cash-benefits-have-fallen-
by-more-than-20-percent-in-most-states [http://perma.cc/S2EH-8A8F].
263. Hearing on Review of the President’s Emergency Supplemental Request for Un-
accompanied Children and Related Matters before the S. Appropriations Comm., 113th
Cong. (2014) (statement for the Record of Refugee Council USA), https://www.ap-
propriations.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/hearings/RCUSA%20Senate%20Appropria
tions%20Supplemental%20Hearing%20Statement%20Final,%207-9-14.pdf [https://
perma.cc/W3NN-X78W]. An analysis of ORR appropriations from FY 2007 to FY
2016 demonstrates that the largest increase in ORR’s budget has gone to meeting the
needs of unaccompanied children, including $94 million which had originally been
allocated to assist newly arrived refugees. In its FY 2016 budget, the Obama adminis-
tration requested contingency funding and base funding for several agencies in the
event of another surge of unaccompanied children. For the Department of Health and
Human Services, the administration requested $948 million for base funding (the
same as FY 2015) and $19 million for contingency funding for ORR’s Unaccompanied
Children Program (within the Refugee and Entrant Assistance Program). Congress
met the base funding request but appropriated no monies for contingency funding.
See WILLIAM A. KANDEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., UNACCOMPANIED ALIEN CHIL-
DREN: AN OVERVIEW 1, 16 (Jan. 18, 2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43599.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JY38-4CFP]; ANDORRA BRUNO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., REFU-
GEE ADMISSIONS AND RESETTLEMENT POLICY 1, 10 (Nov. 30, 2016), https://www.fas
.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL31269.pdf [https://perma.cc/4DPB- GPTU]. At the time inter-
views were conducted for this Report, ORR officials reported experiencing their big-
gest arrivals of unaccompanied children thus far, as well as significant increases in
referrals from the Department of Health and Human Services. See U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES OFFICE OF REF-
UGEE RESETTLEMENT, JUSTIFICATION OF ESTIMATES FOR APPROPRIATIONS COMMIT-
TEES 239–43 (2017), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/olab/final_cj_2017_
print.pdf [https://perma.cc/MEQ5-F9D6]. See also ORR Interview, supra note 4.
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Government officials are well aware of the pressures on ORR’s
budget.264 Congress passed a short-term continuing resolution to
avoid a government shutdown and to continue funding for federal
programs and services until April 28, 2017. It authorized an increase in
ORR funding, including “a provision allowing additional funding, if
needed, for the housing and care of [unaccompanied children] after
February 1, 2017.”265 To ensure that ORR has the requisite budget to
provide the services needed by the increasingly diverse population of
refugees, asylees, Special Immigrant Visa recipients, unaccompanied
children, and others in its care, Congress should stabilize ORR’s
budget by funding a contingency account, as recommended in the FY
2017 budget.
ORR’s budget constraints, paired with the funding and defunding
of public and private resettlement efforts, result in a cycle of job crea-
tion and job loss. As noted above, resettlement agencies receive fund-
ing from the government based on the number of refugees they
resettle. When the two Executive Orders were issued, these agencies
started laying off employees. Given the Trump administration’s goal
of preserving and creating jobs, the role of refugee resettlement and
integration in job creation is a factor that should be considered in pol-
icy decisions, along with the administrative costs of hiring, training,
firing, and rehiring of staff and the loss of knowledge due to layoffs.
2. Tracking Secondary Migration and Improving the Timing
and Flexibility of Funding
Government officials interviewed for this Report repeatedly cited
the need to update funding-allocation calculations to account for sec-
ondary migration, which is the movement of refugees from their city
of resettlement placement to another city.266 Counties that see a sig-
264. See ORR Interview, supra note 4; see also Refugee Coordinator Interviews,
supra note 4. Several interviewees noted that ORR’s budget has not experienced an
increase commensurate with that of PRM’s Reception and Placement Program, which
doubled in FY 2010. Indeed, PRM’s per capita funding for the Reception and Place-
ment Program is now $2,025 for a three-month service period. In comparison, the per
capita for ORR’s Matching Grant Program is currently $2,200 for a six-month service
period and must, as its name implies, be matched in a $2 to $1 ratio by private re-
sources. See FY 2017 Notice of Funding Opportunity for Reception and Placement
Program, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Mar. 21, 2016), https://www.state.gov/j/prm/funding/
fy2017/254909.htm [https://perma.cc/TC3G- SXAF]; About the Voluntary Agencies
Matching Grant Program, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. ADMIN. FOR
CHILDREN AND FAMILIES OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT (Dec. 29, 2016),
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/programs/matching-grants/about [https://perma.cc/VXK4-
FA7V].
265. Short-Term Continuing Resolution to Maintain Government Operations Re-
leased, H.R. COMM. ON APPROPRIATIONS (Dec. 6, 2016), http://appropriations.house
.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=394665  [https://perma.cc/M8M9-NBK
3].
266. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT: GREATER
CONSULTATION WITH COMMUNITY STAKEHOLDERS COULD STRENGTHEN PROGRAM
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nificant uptick in secondary migrants267 may not receive the Targeted
Assistance Grants and Refugee Social Service grants they need, as
secondary migration is difficult to track and therefore not counted in
the formulas for these grants.
ORR’s grant-cycle timeline also needs to be updated. Currently, the
government allocates grants and contracts to states every fiscal year
based on the number of refugees who arrived within the previous
thirty-six months and who continue to reside in the state at the begin-
ning of that Fiscal Year.268 This approach fails to account for areas
that experience significant increases in refugee arrivals via secondary
migration in short periods of time.269
Realigning the timeline of the resettlement-planning process could
help address some of these challenges. Typically, the President pro-
duces a federal budget proposal in February or March, requesting al-
locations for the resettlement program for the following fiscal year.
Meanwhile, resettlement agencies are generally required to submit
their proposal requests to the State Department for the Reception
and Placement Program for the following fiscal year between May and
June.270 These proposals include a projected placement plan for each
resettlement site, whose drafting requires each local resettlement of-
fice to consult with its state refugee coordinator and other stakehold-
23 (July 2012), http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592975.pdf [https://perma.cc/7WML-
BCX8].
267. There may be many reasons why refugees choose to move, just as is true for
the general population, but most often secondary migration is due to the presence of
relatives whose location was not known to the refugee during the Resettlement Sup-
port Center interview in overseas processing. See Jeffrey Bloem & Scott Loveridge,
The Secondary Migration of Refugees Resettled in the US, 54 FORCED MIGRATION
REV.  26–28 (Feb. 2017), http://www.fmreview.org/en/resettlement/bloem-loveridge
.pdf [http://perma.cc/8E3L-ZS3A].
268. Anastasia Brown & Todd Scribner, Unfulfilled Promises, Future Possibilities:
The Refugee Resettlement System in the United States, 2 J. ON MIGRATION & HUM.
SEC. 101, 115 (2014).
269. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT:
GREATER CONSULTATION WITH COMMUNITY STAKEHOLDERS COULD STRENGTHEN
PROGRAM 20–21 (July 2012), http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592975.pdf [https://perma
.cc/7WML-BCX8] (“Migration from one community to another after initial resettle-
ment—referred to as secondary migration—can unexpectedly increase the refugee
population in a community, and communities that attract large numbers of secondary
migrants may not have adequate, timely funding to provide resettlement services to
the migrants who need them. According to ORR, refugees relocate for a variety of
reasons: better employment opportunities, the pull of an established ethnic commu-
nity, more welfare benefits, better training opportunities, reunification with relatives,
or a more congenial climate.”).
270. This projection process occurs each year as part of the annual Notice of Fund-
ing Opportunities for PRM’s Reception and Placement Program in the form of the
Proposed Consolidated Placement Plan that each applicant must submit, and which is
created in consultation with local resettlement officials and stakeholders. See FY 2017
Notice of Funding Opportunity for Reception and Replacement Program, U.S. DEP’T
OF STATE (Mar. 21, 2016), http://www.state.gov/j/prm/funding/fy2017/254909.htm
[https://perma.cc/536R-FYVC].
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ers regarding the projected number and nationality of refugees to be
resettled in the coming year. However, the President’s consultation
with Congress to determine the number of refugees who may be ad-
mitted during the following fiscal year does not generally take place
until September or October.271 Resettlement agencies must therefore
make a calculated guess as to the overall number of refugees who will
arrive in a given locale, in turn making it difficult for states to plan
appropriately. A more effective timeline would schedule the congres-
sional consultation for February or March, concurrent with the budg-
etary proposal that the President submits to Congress. Resettlement
agencies would then be required to submit their proposals to the State
Department sometime thereafter.272 This timeline would also ensure
that states have better information when planning their ORR budget
requests.
Furthermore, increasing flexibility in grant allocation would help
address budgetary constraints and allow ORR to be more proactive
than reactive. Many state refugee coordinators cited Refugee Social
Service grants as an example of a funding stream where changing the
scope of eligibility would allow states to reprogram those dollars for
other necessary services or underserved refugee groups.273 Currently,
these ORR grants are limited to funding employment services for ref-
ugees in their first year of arrival in the United States. Reprogram-
ming these funds would allow states to better meet the receiving
communities’ needs by both tailoring the allocation of resources and
providing funding on a more appropriate timeline.
State refugee coordinators also cited the need for more regularity in
ORR’s payments to the states, because states currently have no guar-
271. Andorra Bruno, Refugee Admissions and Resettlement Policy, CONG. RE-
SEARCH SERV. (Nov. 30, 2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL31269.pdf [https://perma
.cc/4DPB-GPTU].
272. Brown & Scribner, supra note 268.
273. See Refugee Coordinator Interviews, supra note 4. Interviewees suggested
other needs that could be met by reprogramming Refugee Social Services grants:
• services for older high school students who have aged out of high school at the
time of their arrival or are forced to go to work instead of finishing school;
• creation of housing subsidies to increase availability of and access to affordable
and sustainable lower- and middle-income housing;
• school grants geared toward serving refugee children beyond their first year of
enrollment; and
• funding for community development or receiving communities to help build
support for welcoming refugees.
Id. See also 45 C.F.R. § 400.146 (2015) (“The State must use its social service grants
primarily for employability services designed to enable refugees to obtain jobs within
one year of becoming enrolled in services in order to achieve economic self-suffi-
ciency as soon as possible. Social services may continue to be provided after a refugee
has entered a job to help the refugee retain employment or move to a better job.
Social service funds may not be used for long-term training programs such as voca-
tional training that last for more than a year or educational programs that are not
intended to lead to employment within a year.”).
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antee that they will receive the estimate in their budget requests to
ORR.274 Moreover, if a state needs to exceed its projected budget (for
example, in the case of increased refugee arrivals), there is no written
guarantee from ORR to authorize that spending. This uncertainty re-
garding reimbursement contributes to the perceived problem that
states do not have the “capacity” to accept more refugees, when, in
fact, states cannot rely on regular reimbursements from ORR.275
3. Data Tracking and Outcomes
Refugee advocates (including ORR itself), as well as detractors,
have noted the lack of data regarding integration and the successes
and challenges faced by refugees in the United States.276 The lack of
data-tracking mechanisms hinders ORR’s ability to integrate metrics
and develop new and responsive programs. For example, Refugee
Cash Assistance payment levels are tied to what states pay for non-
refugee specific cash assistance, but those systems, such as TANF, do
not track refugees as a separate data point, so that data is unavaila-
ble.277 Some interviewees suggested that TANF and Refugee Cash
274. See Refugee Coordinator Interviews, supra note 4.
275. Id. These hurdles with reimbursements are particularly acute for states that
operate Wilson-Fish programs—in other words, states that have opted out of adminis-
tering the resettlement program and where ORR contracts directly with a designated
service provider to carry out the functions of a state refugee coordinator and state-
funded refugee cash and medical assistance programs. In Wilson-Fish states, ORR
previously provided the service provider with 100% of the funding up front. Now,
ORR disburses only 20% of the grant at the beginning of the fiscal year, mostly as a
hedge against the likelihood that ORR will need to reallocate dollars. One state refu-
gee coordinator confirmed, for example, that ORR was late in remitting a Wilson-Fish
reimbursement for the fourth quarter of the fiscal year. These delays make it difficult
to plan for contingencies. Accordingly, ORR should take steps to better align its fund-
ing mechanisms with the needs of the service providers tasked with refugee resettle-
ment and integration.
276. See ORR Interview, supra note 4. See also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OF-
FICE, REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT: GREATER CONSULTATION WITH COMMUNITY STAKE-
HOLDERS COULD STRENGTHEN PROGRAM 23 (2012) (“Without comprehensive
secondary migration data, ORR cannot target supplemental assistance to communi-
ties and refugees in a timely way. Currently, the data that PRM and ORR collect on
secondary migration are limited and little is known about secondary migration pat-
terns. PRM collects data from local voluntary agencies regarding the number of refu-
gees who move away from a community within the first 90 days after arrival, but does
not collect data on the estimated number of refugees who enter the community during
the same time period. PRM officials said that they use these out-migration data to
assess the success of refugee placement decisions. In contrast, ORR collects secon-
dary migration data annually from each state, but does not collect community-level
data. Specifically, ORR collects information on the number of refugees who move
into and out of each state every year. However, ORR officials explained that they can
only collect these data when secondary migrants access services. As a result, refugees
who move into or out of a state but do not use refugee services in their new communi-
ties are not counted. Even so, these refugees access other community services and
their communities may need additional assistance to meet their needs.”).
277. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS. OFFICE OF FAMILY ASSIS-
TANCE, CHARACTERISTICS AND FINANCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF TANF RECIPIENTS
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Assistance could be decoupled in order to eliminate competing Refu-
gee Cash Assistance and TANF administrative systems and thereby
potentially solve data-gathering issues.278
New data-tracking mechanisms could also help address this infor-
mation gap. The Department of Health and Human Services should
perform more individualized data collection in order to better identify
programmatic outcomes for refugees. Indeed, ORR officials have
noted that integrating metrics and creating an academic partnership to
capture and quantify outcomes and show long-term successes would
be a “game-changing” improvement to the domestic resettlement
system.279
4. Cross-Cultural Challenges and Language Issues in Health Care
ORR has taken important steps in recent years to strengthen refu-
gee integration through initiatives that support refugees’ health and
wellness.280 Improvements include health-related outreach and educa-
tion, mental health videos, suicide prevention efforts, and the
strengthening of existing resources within communities.281 However,
these improvements may be limited in their effectiveness due to lan-
guage barriers that can diminish a refugee’s ability to navigate the
complex health care system.282  ORR needs to pay greater attention to
language access and cultural sensitivity, especially in the health care
system, to ensure that refugees are receiving the necessary health care
and mental health services.
5. Coordination Among Stakeholders and the Need
for Great Collaboration
In recent years, ORR has worked to expand collaboration at the
local, state, and federal levels, including through joint stakeholder
meetings with PRM, city and state officials, and local resettlement
agencies.283 Despite these strides, interviews with stakeholders re-
FY 2015 (Aug. 18, 2015), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ofa/characteristics
_and_financial_circumstances_of_tanf_recipients.pdf [http://perma.cc/W5KB-4CSV];
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS. OFFICE OF FAMILY ASSISTANCE, CHARAC-
TERISTICS AND FINANCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF TANF RECIPIENTS, FY 2015, https://
www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ofa/characteristics_and_financial_circumstances_
tanf_recipients_fy_2015.xlsx [https://perma.cc/4EB2-ME8J]. The statistics collected
refer broadly to “immigrants,” which includes refugees, asylees, noncitizens who are
legal permanent residents, individuals paroled in the United States for at least one
year, individuals whose deportations are being withheld, individuals granted condi-
tional entry, Cuban or Haitian entrants, and certain abused individuals. Id.
278. See Refugee Coordinator Interviews, supra note 4.
279. See ORR Interview, supra note 4.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Brown & Scribner, supra note 268.
283. Additionally, ORR has expanded its regional representatives, adding four new
offices in Boston, Chicago, Dallas, and San Francisco. These offices allow regional
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flected the need for better coordination between federal, state, and
local agencies with receiving communities.284
Statutory provisions require that the ORR director consult “with
State and local governments and private nonprofit voluntary agencies
concerning the sponsorship process and the intended distribution of
refugees among the States and localities,” as well as regarding “poli-
cies and strategies for the placement and resettlement of refugees
within the United States.”285
However, the annual ORR National Consultation has not convened
since 2012 due to budget cuts.286 These consultations were historically
the only opportunity for all sectors of the USRAP—including federal
agencies, state refugee coordinators, national and local resettlement
staff, and refugees themselves—to gather nationally as a community
to strategize and collaborate. As one state refugee coordinator noted,
“Consultations matter and messaging matters, and we need to fortify
representatives to “conduct broad local outreach and engagement with refugees and
resettlement stakeholders, and work with federal, state, and local partners to align
services and ensure that services are being provided with the best interests of refugees
in mind.” U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND
FAMILIES OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY
2014 4–5 (2016), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/resource/office-of-refugee-resettlement-
annual-report-to-congress-2014 [https://perma.cc/WK6Y-SMPB].
284. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT:
GREATER CONSULTATION WITH COMMUNITY STAKEHOLDERS COULD STRENGTHEN
PROGRAM (2012), http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592975.pdf [https://perma.cc/7WML-
BCX8] (“Voluntary agencies consider various factors when determining where refu-
gees will be placed, but few agencies we visited consulted relevant local stakeholders,
which posed challenges for service providers. When deciding how many refugees to
place in each community, some voluntary agencies prioritize local agency capacity,
such as staffing levels, while others emphasize community capacity, such as housing
availability. Although the Immigration and Nationality Act states that it is the intent
of Congress for voluntary agencies to work closely with state and local stakeholders
when making these decisions, the Department of State’s Bureau of Population, Refu-
gees, and Migration (PRM) offers limited guidance on how this should occur. Some
communities GAO visited had developed formal processes for obtaining stakeholder
input after receiving an overwhelming number of refugees, but most had not, which
made it difficult for health care providers and school systems to prepare for and prop-
erly serve refugees.”). For example, U.S. law provided for the presidential appoint-
ment of a U.S. coordinator for refugee affairs, 8 U.S.C. § 1525 (repealed 1994), but
the statute was repealed and the role was shifted to the Secretary of State in 1994, so
the coordination role never materialized. 8 U.S.C. § 1521 (1994).  Footnote 1 of para-
graph (1) of § 162(n) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994
and 1995 (Pub. L. 103-236, 108 Stat. 409, Apr. 30, 1994), substituted a reference to the
secretary of state with a reference to the U.S. coordinator for refugee affairs;
paragraphs (2) and (3) of that section deleted subsequent references to the coordina-
tor in § 412 and § 413. Authorization for Programs for Domestic Resettlement of and
Assistance to Refugees, § 412 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1522(a)(2)(B) (2012)).
285. 8 U.S.C. § 1522(a)(2)(B) (2012).
286. Memorandum from Jeffrey D. Zients to the Heads of Exec. Dep’t & Agencies
on Promoting Efficient Spending to Support Agency Operations (May 11, 2012),
https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1412/ML14128A234.pdf [https://perma.cc/LL8H-9YJ2].
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these efforts. How do we give credit to communities and stakeholders
to continue building goodwill?”287
In addition to greater consultation and collaboration, a structural
status change for ORR may be necessary to increase its leverage in
interagency discussions and in the Executive Branch, given that its
place within the hierarchy of the Department of Health and Human
Services is not the same as PRM’s position within the State
Department.288
6. Building on Existing Public-Private Partnerships and Expanding
the Role of Private Organizations in Resettlement
The contributions of private actors, including faith communities,
businesses, civic groups, individual volunteers, local organizations, and
philanthropic organizations, are highly visible representations of the
support that Americans offer to welcome refugees as they rebuild
their lives in communities across the United States. These individuals
and institutions have served as vital partners in refugee resettlement,
both formally and informally, working alongside national and local re-
settlement agencies as mentors, friends, and advocates for newly ar-
rived refugees.289
In recent years, the private sector, NGOs, and government officials
have shown a great deal of interest in expanding public-private part-
nerships to address the plight of Syrian refugees.290 These proposals,
287. See Refugee Coordinator Interviews, supra note 4.
288. ORR is one of twenty-one offices within the Administration for Children and
Families, whereas PRM falls under the purview of the Assistant Secretary of State.
Legislation introduced previously in Congress attempted to address this difference in
hierarchy by elevating the director of ORR to the level of assistant secretary of the
Department of Health and Human Services. See Domestic Refugee Resettlement Re-
form and Modernization Act of 2013, S.883, 113th Cong. (2013–14), https://www.con-
gress.gov/bill/113th-congress/senate-bill/883/text [https://perma.cc/C29S-CAM9]; see
also World Refugee Day: Advocacy Toolkit, REFUGEE COUNCIL USA 17 (2015), http:/
/www.interfaithimmigration.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/RCUSA-2015-World-
Refugee-Day- Advocacy-Toolkit_04.28.15.pdf [http://perma.cc/6NLZ-ZTTC].
289. The United States has a long history of public-private partnerships in refugee
resettlement, beginning with the coordination of the federal government and volun-
tary organizations around refugees during the late 1930s and in the post-war period.
These early efforts laid the groundwork for the public-private partnerships that devel-
oped in later decades, often on the heels of newly emergent refugee crises, such as
with the assistance provided to hundreds of thousands of Southeast Asian refugees in
the 1970s by private ethnic and religious organizations. Brown & Scribner, supra note
268.
290. This interest includes the commitments pledged by fifty-one businesses as an-
nounced in President Obama’s September 2016 call to action to the private sector to
take action on the global refugee crisis, as well as a pledge by the State Department in
conjunction with Refugee Council USA to pilot a private resettlement project. Fact
Sheet: White House Announces Commitments to the Call to Action for Private Sector
Engagement on the Global Refugee Crisis, THE WHITE HOUSE, PRESIDENT BARACK
OBAMA (Sept. 20, 2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/09/20/fact-
sheet-white-house-announces-commitments-call-action-private-sector [https://perma
.cc/6DD9-CJJE]; Anne Richard et al., Becca Heller Pushes for Private Sponsorship at
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\5-1\TWL106.txt unknown Seq: 64 29-DEC-17 8:20
218 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5
however, should be considered carefully in light of the problems that
arose during the discontinued Private Sector Initiative launched under
President Ronald Reagan, including unpredictable medical costs,
steep financial requirements, difficulties with job placement, and sig-
nificant bureaucracy.291
Any efforts to further incorporate the involvement of the private
sector should build on, rather than duplicate, the current practice of
co-sponsorship already embedded within PRM’s cooperative agree-
ment for the Reception and Placement Program. In this co-sponsor-
ship model, resettlement agencies work with “an established
community group, such as a church congregation or service organiza-
tion,”292 which “co-sponsors” a refugee family, with the resettlement
agency as the sponsor. The cooperative agreement between PRM and
resettlement agencies serves as the guideline for implementation of
the Reception and Placement Program and outlines very specifically
the roles and responsibilities of co-sponsors, as well as those of the
refugee’s U.S. relatives, in relation to the role of the resettlement
agency.293
Traditionally utilized mostly by faith-based resettlement agencies,
co-sponsors, as defined under the agreement, “differ from volunteers
in that they agree in writing to accept responsibility for performing
certain services.”294 These services can include assisting the resettle-
Concordia Summit, URBAN JUSTICE CTR. (Sept. 27, 2016), https://refugeerights.org/
becca-heller-pushes-for-private-sponsorship-at-concordia-summit/ [http://perma.cc/
TW9K-97MC]. It should be further noted that despite recent comments by the State
Department regarding a pilot private resettlement project, subsequent interviews with
key stakeholders indicated that this had not moved past the preliminary discussion
stage. See INT’L REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT, URBAN JUSTICE CTR., & HUMAN
RIGHTS FIRST, PRIVATE SPONSORSHIP OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES: GUIDING PRINCIPLES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 17 (2016), https://www
.refugeerights.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Private-Sponsorship-of-Refugees-in-
the-United-States_White-Paper.pdf [http://perma.cc/98MV-SLNW]; see also David
Bier & Matthew La Corte, Privately Funded Refugee Resettlement: How to Leverage
American Charity to Resettle Refugees, NISKANEN CTR. 5 (Mar. 22, 2016), https://nis-
kanencenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/NiskanenPrivateRefugee.pdf [http://per
ma.cc/X74E-YRQC].
291. David Bier & Matthew La Corte, Private Refugee Resettlement in U.S. History:
America’s Private Sector Has Shown It Can Support Refugees, NISKANEN CTR. 13
(Apr. 26, 2016), https://niskanencenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/PrivateRefu
geeHistory.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZRE9-6B8K].
292. FY 2008 Reception and Placement Basic Terms of the Cooperative Agreement
Between the Government of the United States of America and the (Name of Organiza-
tion), U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Jan. 17, 2008), https://2001-2009.state.gov/g/prm/rls/2008/
99438.htm [https://perma.cc/E5VG-WQ2A].
293. FY 2011 Reception and Placement Basic Terms of the Cooperative Agreement
Between the Government of the United States of America and the (Name of Organiza-
tion), U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Jan. 6, 2011),  http://www.state.gov/j/prm/releases/sample/
181172.htm [https://perma.cc/WZ5A-K4M9].
294. FY 2008 Reception and Placement Basic Terms of the Cooperative Agreement
Between the Government of the United States of America and the (Name of Organiza-
tion), U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Jan. 17, 2008), https://2001-2009.state.gov/g/prm/rls/2008/
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ment agency (the sponsor) in providing refugees with basic necessities,
including housing, school enrollment, and financial support; specific
core services, including orientation to community and health services,
during their initial resettlement period; job training and placement;
and assistance in achieving economic self-sufficiency.295 A common
function of co-sponsors is to act as a “welcome wagon” for newly ar-
riving refugees, offering an early opportunity to connect with Ameri-
can friends and mentors. These co-sponsorships are usually arranged
for one to six months, but the relationships that form often outlast the
initial welcoming phase.
The private sector has shown a great deal of interest in assisting
Syrian refugees in particular, reflected in commitments pledged by
fifty-one businesses, as announced in President Obama’s call to action
to the private sector to address the global refugee crisis in September
2016.296 Proposals put forth by Human Rights First, the Urban Justice
Center’s International Refugee Assistance Project, and the Niskanen
Center have also called for the creation of a private resettlement pro-
gram; and the State Department, in conjunction with Refugee Council
USA, had, under the Obama administration, pledged to pilot a private
resettlement project.297
99438.htm [https://perma.cc/E5VG-WQ2A]. The agreement states that the responsi-
bilities of the resettlement agency can be delegated only to an affiliate specified in the
approved proposal, “who may re-delegate such responsibilities to a local co-sponsor,
provided such co-sponsor is identified on the applicable assurance form.” Id. Further,
despite any delegation, the resettlement agency remains responsible for the service.
Id. If there is an agreement between the affiliate of a resettlement agency and a co-
sponsor regarding the provision of basic support or core services, the affiliate retains
responsibility for ensuring that the services are provided. Id. The agreement requires
that the resettlement agency train the co-sponsor prior to the arrival of the sponsored
refugees, ensuring that the co-sponsor understands the overall sponsorship process,
the resettlement agency’s role, and the responsibilities of the co-sponsor. Id. The
agreement states that “training must be provided in person by a representative of the
Recipient or its affiliate to any local co-sponsor that has not resettled a refugee who
arrived in the United States within the past two years.” Id.
295. Id. See also FY 2017 Notice of Funding Opportunity for Reception and Place-
ment Program, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Mar. 21, 2016), http://www.state.gov/j/prm/
funding/fy2017/254909.htm [https://perma.cc/536R-FYVC].
296. Fact Sheet: White House Announces Commitments to the Call to Action for
Private Sector Engagement on the Global Refugee Crisis, THE WHITE HOUSE, PRESI-
DENT BARACK OBAMA (Sept. 20, 2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/
2016/09/20/fact-sheet-white-house-announces- commitments-call-action-private-sector
[https://perma.cc/6DD9-CJJE].
297. See Anne Richard et al., Becca Heller Pushes for Private Sponsorship at Con-
cordia Summit, URBAN JUSTICE CTR. (Sept. 27, 2016), https://refugeerights.org/becca-
heller-pushes-for-private-sponsorship-at-concordia-summit/ [http://perma.cc/TW9K-
97MC]; RCUSA Statement on Increasing the Role of Private Actors in Refugee Reset-
tlement, REFUGEE  COUNCIL USA (Sept. 20, 2016), http://www.rcusa.org/blog/rcusa-
statement-on-increasing-the-role-of-private-actors-in-refugee-resettlement [http://per
ma.cc/47FH-BE7R]; INT’L REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT, URBAN JUSTICE CTR., &
HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, PRIVATE SPONSORSHIP OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES: GUIDING PRINCIPLES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 2–4 (2016), https://
www.refugeerights.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Private-Sponsorship-of-Refugees-
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Unfortunately, discussions about the need for a private resettlement
program often fail to account for the strong role that private partner-
ships already play in the current system.298 In interviews conducted
for this Report, state refugee coordinators, resettlement agency staff,
and federal partners alike expressed concern that creating a new pri-
vate resettlement program would undermine the existing refugee re-
settlement structure and potentially duplicate efforts.299 They
advocated instead for the expansion of the current co-sponsorship
model and highlighted the need to harness the support of individuals
and the private sector to expand support for long-term refugee-inte-
gration efforts.300 As one state refugee coordinator noted, “[P]ublic-
private partnership already exists. . . . [W]hy aren’t we already tapping
into that to put the private resources [in]to the current system?”301
Indeed, all state refugee coordinators agreed that private sponsorship
should be implemented as a supplement to, not a substitute for, gov-
ernment action.
The current public-private partnership embedded in the USRAP
should be expanded to build further on existing refugee integration
efforts, with private sponsors’ services complementing resettlement
agencies’ services by welcoming refugees, acting as conduits to em-
ployment opportunities, and generally serving as guides and mentors
“while the refugees adjust to their new communities.”302 In addition,
sponsors could cover refugee travel costs and reimburse the Interna-
tional Organization for Migration and PRM directly instead of having
refugees repay their travel loan.
Drawing on private individuals, companies, and philanthropies in
cities that are building an infrastructure to properly welcome and as-
sist refugees on their path to integration could be a useful innovation:
in-the-United-States_White-Paper.pdf [http://perma.cc/98MV-SLNW]; see also David
Bier & Matthew La Corte, Privately Funded Refugee Resettlement: How to Leverage
American Charity to Resettle Refugees, NISKANEN CTR. (Mar. 22, 2016), https://nis-
kanencenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/NiskanenPrivateRefugee.pdf [http://per
ma.cc/X74E-YRQC].
298. See FY 2011 Reception and Placement Basic Terms of the Cooperative Agree-
ment Between the Government of the United States of America and the (Name of Or-
ganization), U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Jan. 6, 2011), http://www.state.gov/j/prm/releases/
sample/181172.htm [http://perma.cc/B5HB-DTP2]; FY 2017 Notice of Funding Oppor-
tunity for Reception and Placement Program, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Mar. 21, 2016),
http://www.state.gov/j/prm/funding/fy2017/254909.htm [http://perma.cc/P28J-FPMZ]
(supporting the proposition that federal funding is meant to “augment” or “supple-
ment” private resources).
299. PRM Interview, supra note 4; USCIS Interview, supra note 4; ORR Interview,
supra note 4; Refugee Coordinator Interviews, supra note 4.
300. PRM Interview, supra note 4; USCIS Interview, supra note 4; ORR Interview,
supra note 4; Refugee Coordinator Interviews, supra note 4.
301. See Refugee Coordinator Interviews, supra note 4.
302. RCUSA Statement on Increasing the Role of Private Actors in Refugee Resettle-
ment, REFUGEE COUNCIL USA (Sept. 20, 2016), http://www.rcusa.org/blog/rcusa-
statement-on-increasing-the-role-of-private-actors-in-refugee-resettlement [http://per
ma.cc/47FH-BE7R].
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“Municipalities and the private sector could establish group resettle-
ment programs to fund the resettlement of groups of refugees in a
particular area, with the possibility of special job opportunities. Edu-
cational institutions could sponsor resettlement for qualified refugees
to continue their studies.”303
Enlisting community ambassadors to serve as private sponsors
could go a long way toward mobilizing wider community support for
Syrian refugees in particular, and refugee resettlement in general.
Rather than focusing on private resettlement as a way to augment the
number of refugees processed for resettlement, it could instead be
leveraged to increase the capacity of receiving communities to wel-
come larger numbers of refugees.
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS
The United States has, as described above, implemented a series of
critical improvements to the refugee resettlement process in recent
years to facilitate better coordination among stakeholders and better
screening of refugees. This Section provides further recommendations
for improvements to the refugee resettlement process in order to ad-
vance the dual goals of protecting national security while also enhanc-
ing job creation. Our hope is that these recommendations will lead to
the development of a uniform protocol that can be adopted to facili-
tate greater efficiency and effectiveness in refugee processing over-
seas, as well as better adaptation and integration of refugees in the
United States.
Refugees still face significant hurdles in resettling,304 and continued
improvements are needed to further enhance the resettlement pro-
cess’s efficiency and effectiveness. These improvements include in-
creased staffing and training, better coordination and data gathering,
advancements in technology, and budgetary reallocations and flexibil-
ity. These improvements will be critical to ensuring the creation of an
infrastructure that welcomes refugees into local communities, resolv-
ing backlogs in processing, and implementing new procedures and
supports to improve and expedite the security assessment process.
303. INT’L REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT, URBAN JUSTICE CTR., & HUMAN
RIGHTS FIRST, PRIVATE SPONSORSHIP OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES: GUIDING PRINCIPLES AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2016), https://www.refugeer-
ights.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Private-Sponsorship-of-Refugees-in-the-
United-States_White-Paper.pdf [http://perma.cc/98MV-SLNW]; see also David Bier
& Matthew La Corte, Privately Funded Refugee Resettlement: How to Leverage Amer-
ican Charity to Resettle Refugees, NISKANEN CTR. (Mar. 22, 2016), https://nis-
kanencenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/NiskanenPrivateRefugee.pdf [http://per
ma.cc/X74E-YRQC].
304. Bill Frelick, Refugee Resettlement Isn’t a Trojan Horse (or a bowl of Skittles),
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Nov. 22, 2016, 12:00 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/
11/22/refugee-resettlement-isnt-trojan-horse-or-bowl-skittles [https://perma.cc/7UN5-
DENU].
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A. To the Department of Homeland Security
1. Increase RAD Staffing
Ideally, Refugee Corps officers would be responsible for most of
the workload of USCIS’s RAD, and temporarily deployed asylum of-
ficers would manage the rest.305 Building on RAD’s recent hiring by
increasing the number of refugee officers and circuit rides completed
per year would contribute to more rapid screening and resettlement.
Likewise, increasing U.S. refugee processing capacity in Lebanon, Jor-
dan, and Turkey would allow for the screening of 40,000 additional
refugees deemed vulnerable and in need of resettlement by
UNHCR.306 Maintaining U.S. assistance to UNHCR could also “sta-
bilize and improve conditions in refugee camps in front line states,”
where refugees are in the most danger.307
2. Utilize Videoconferencing Where There Is
No Other Alternative
The use of videoconferencing for refugee interviews should be con-
sidered as an alternative to or in conjunction with in-person interviews
where circuit rides have been suspended due to dangerous condi-
tions.308 Interviews conducted via videoconference in these limited
circumstances would provide a commonsense alternative where “se-
curity concerns most inhibit circuit rides and endanger refugees.”309
Current U.S. practice prevents interviewers from using videoconfer-
encing in initial interviews with resettlement applicants.310 As a result,
305. See OMBUDSMAN, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. OFFICE OF THE CITIZEN-
SHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVS., ANNUAL REPORT 2016 14 (June 29, 2016), https://www.dhs
.gov/sites/default/files/publications/DHS%20Annual%20Report%202016.pdf [https://
perma.cc/726U-WTJV]; Fisher, supra note 221, at 336.
306. See Michael Ignatieff et al., The United States and the Syrian Refugee Crisis: A
Plan of Action, HARV. KENNEDY SCH. SHORENSTEIN CTR. ON MEDIA, POLITICS AND
PUB. POL’Y (Jan. 27, 2016, 3:00 PM),  http://shorensteincenter.org/united-states-syr-
ian-refugee-crisis-plan-action/ [https://perma.cc/7ZW6-DPB3].
307. Id.
308. U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, OPERATIONAL GUIDANCE NOTE ON
CONDUCTING RESETTLEMENT INTERVIEWS THROUGH VIDEO CONFERENCING 2
(2013), http://www.unhcr.org/51de6e1c9.pdf [http://perma.cc/HGX8-GXM4]; Memo-
randum from the Int’l Refugee Assistance Project on The Use of Videoconferencing
to Deal with Refugee Application Delays in Syria (Jan. 2012), https://refugeerights
.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/IRAP_Syria_Videoconferencing-Memo.pdf [http://
perma.cc/J7W2-DRNG].
309. Letter from U.S. Sens. Tammy Baldwin (D-WI), Richard Blumenthal (D-
Conn.), Cory Booker (D-N.J.), Chris Coons (D- DE), Barbara Mikulski (D-MD),
Chris Murphy (D-Conn.), and Gary Peters (D-MI) to Jeh Johnson, Sec’y of Home-
land Sec. (Oct. 6, 2015), https://www.peters.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/151006_Let-
ter_DHS_Refugees.pdf [https://perma.cc/CA66-S2E2].
310. Memorandum from the Int’l Refugee Assistance Project on The Use of Vide-
oconferencing to Deal with Refugee Application Delays in Syria (Jan. 2012), https://
refugeerights.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/IRAP_Syria_Videoconferencing-Memo
.pdf [http://perma.cc/J7W2-DRNG].
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many refugees awaiting resettlement face processing delays due to the
inability of RAD officers to conduct an interview.311
Resettlement is especially pressing due to the risks inherent in refu-
gees’ current conditions, and videoconferencing would allow the
United States to screen applicants in particularly vulnerable circum-
stances without placing RAD officers at risk. This capability already
exists. The U.S. Embassy in Damascus, for example, had the resources
to conduct four to five videoconference interviews of Iraqis per day in
2012.312 While videoconferencing generally presents serious due pro-
cess challenges, in these limited circumstances government officials
should consider it a feasible option for refugees in dire need of reset-
tlement from the most dangerous regions.313
3. Expand Access to Counsel
Another obstacle in the resettlement program is the limitation on
access to counsel for refugees seeking resettlement in the United
States, which the American Bar Association has asked DHS to review
and reverse.314 Currently, the United States recognizes refugees’ right
to have counsel at their adjudication interviews only in highly limited
circumstances.315 The assistance of counsel would enhance U.S. offi-
311. Id. See also George Packer, Powerful Gestures, NEW YORKER (Nov. 9, 2015),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/11/09/powerful-gestures [http://perma.cc/
Q4WZ-2HE6]; Somini Sengupta & Anne Barnard, Refugees, Stuck in Grinding U.S.
Process, Wait and Hope, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/
10/11/world/middleeast/refugees-stuck-in-grinding-us-process-wait-and-hope.html
[http://perma.cc/U6P4-49L6]; Natasha Hall, Refugees Are Already Vigorously Vetted. I
Know Because I Vetted Them, WASH. POST (Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.washington
post.com/posteverything/wp/2017/02/01/refugees-are-already-vigorously-vetted-i-
know-because-i-vetted-them/?utm_term=.6089aae2b023 [http://perma.cc/B6J8-
E3FW].
312. Memorandum from the Int’l Refugee Assistance Project on The Use of Vide-
oconferencing to Deal with Refugee Application Delays in Syria (Jan. 2012), https://
refugeerights.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/IRAP_Syria_Videoconferencing-Memo
.pdf [http://perma.cc/J7W2-DRNG].
313. See U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES NOTE ON
CONDUCTING RESETTLEMENT INTERVIEWS THROUGH VIDEO CONFERENCING 2 (Feb.
2013), http://www.unhcr.org/51de6e1c9.pdf [http://perma.cc/HGX8-GXM4]; IMMIGR.
AND REFUGEE BD. OF CAN., IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE BOARD RESPONSE TO THE
REPORT ON VIDEOCONFERENCING IN REFUGEE HEARINGS (2016), http://www.irb-
cisr.gc.ca/Eng/transp/ReviewEval/Pages/VideoRespRep.aspx [http://perma.cc/E2PK-
HDA5].
314. Letter from William C. Hubbard, president, ABA, to Jeh Johnson, Sec’y of
Homeland Sec., Alejandro Mayorkas, Deputy Sec’y of Homeland Sec., & Leo´n Rod-
rı´guez, Dir., U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. Servs. (July 24, 2015), http://www.american
bar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/GAO/2015july24_counselrefugeeapplicants
.authcheckdam.pdf [http://perma.cc/4VFS-9RMX].
315. Legislation allows for Iraqi P-2 applicants to have counsel at their interviews.
U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, ADJU-
DICATOR’S FIELD MANUAL § 12.1 n.2 (2012), https://www.uscis.gov/ilink/docView/
AFM/HTML/AFM/0-0-0-1/0-0-0-2201/Chptr12_1.html [https://perma.cc/9SC3-3SHK];
Michelle Mangan & Dana Montalto, US Must Honor Its Commitment to Iraqi and
Other Refugees, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Dec. 21, 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/
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cials’ ability to properly screen refugees, since many eligible refugees
may not otherwise succeed in effectively presenting their claims due
to their unfamiliarity with foreign legal standards, difficulties in ma-
neuvering English-language applications, and lack of guidance on the
legal complexities they must navigate.316 Allowing refugees to have
representation would also improve the fairness of the process and lead
to a more efficient and accurate admissions process.317 Representation
can also help with “bridging linguistic, cultural, and psychological
gaps” in the resettlement process;318 “orient[ing] applicants to the re-
settlement process[;] advis[ing] them of the expected timeline[;]
aid[ing] them in obtaining proper documentation[;] and prepar[ing]
them to answer sensitive questions during interviews.”319
4. Limit the Application of TRIG and Maintain Exemptions to
Provide Protection to Bona Fide Refugees
The bars to refugee protection should be interpreted in a manner
consistent with U.S. obligations under the 1980 Refugee Act and the
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. DHS, working to-
gether with other relevant agencies and government officials, should
issue new interpretative statements or policies to limit the designation
of groups as terrorist organizations—for example, by removing from
the list organizations that are defunct or have given up violence—and
should exclude activities conducted under duress from the definition
of “terrorist activity.”
Commentary/Opinion/2011/1221/US-must-honor-its-commitment-to-Iraqi-and-other-
refugees [http://perma.cc/PP7W-XSC5]; 8 C.F.R. § 292.5(b) (excluding “applicant[s]
for admission” from right to representation). See also Emily Creighton & Robert
Pauw, Right to Counsel before DHS, AM. IMMIGR. LAWYER’S ASS’N 7–8 (2011).
316. Michelle Mangan & Dana Montalto, US Must Honor Its Commitment to Iraqi
and Other Refugees, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Dec. 21, 2011), http://www.csmonitor
.com/Commentary/Opinion/2011/1221/US-must-honor-its-commitment-to-Iraqi-and-
other-refugees [http://perma.cc/PP7W-XSC5]; Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee
Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 340 (2007); John
R. Mills et al., “Death is Different” and a Refugee’s Right to Counsel, 42 CORNELL
INT’L L.J. 361, 375–76 (2009); HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, RENEWING U.S. COMMITMENT
TO REFUGEE PROTECTION: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM ON THE 30TH ANNI-
VERSARY OF THE REFUGEE ACT 21 (2010), https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-con-
tent/uploads/pdf/30th-AnnRep-3-12-10.pdf [http://perma.cc/343B-DUCL].
317. Fisher, supra note 221, at 348.
318. Letter from William C. Hubbard, President, ABA to Jeh Johnson, Sec’y of
Homeland Sec., Alejandro Mayorkas, Deputy Sec’y of Homeland Sec., & Leo´n Rod-
rı´guez, Dir., U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. Servs. (July 24, 2015), http://www.american
bar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/GAO/2015july24_counselrefugeeapplicants
.authcheckdam.pdf [http://perma.cc/4VFS-9RMX].
319. Michelle Mangan & Dana Montalto, US Must Honor Its Commitment to Iraqi
and Other Refugees, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Dec. 21, 2011), http://www.csmonitor
.com/Commentary/Opinion/2011/1221/US-must-honor-its-commitment-to-Iraqi-and-
other-refugees [http://perma.cc/PP7W-XSC5].
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\5-1\TWL106.txt unknown Seq: 71 29-DEC-17 8:20
2017] REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT 225
TRIG exemptions protect refugees for actions taken under duress,
as well as for humanitarian reasons, and should not be rescinded.320
These exemptions provide one of the only protections for a refugee
who was, for example, forced at gunpoint to give a cigarette, a sand-
wich, emergency medical assistance, or money to a Free Syrian Army
soldier.321
In order to facilitate refugee resettlement, DHS and the State De-
partment should continue to work with UNHCR, as they have done in
recent years, to “best address potential TRIG issues” and to identify
cases “most suitable for referral to the United States.”322 This includes
continued application of the referral framework, which prioritizes
“cases of particularly vulnerable refugees who do not appear to pre-
sent TRIG issues” and “cases where existing TRIG exemption author-
ity may apply (e.g., material support provided under duress, medical
services),” and also allows for consideration of “sympathetic cases
where new TRIG exemption authority might be required.”323
B. To the Department of State
1. Continue Technological Advancement
The State Department should continue to work with other agencies,
including DHS and the FBI, to implement new technologies to en-
hance refugee security checks, building on the 2016 technological ad-
vances, which allow for more efficient screening while still
safeguarding national security. Greater biometric sharing and inter-
operability between the United States and UNHCR, subject to U.S.
compliance with UNHCR’s data-protection policies, could also facili-
tate more efficient and effective security assessments.324
320. In his January 27 and March 6 Executive Orders, President Trump called on
the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security to consider rescinding
any discretionary authority relating to the terrorism grounds of inadmissibility. Exec.
Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,977 (Jan. 27, 2017); Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed.
Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017).
321. Teresa Pham Messer, Barred from Justice: The Duress Waiver to the Material
Support Bar, 6 HOUS. L. REV. 63, 72 (2015).
322. Written testimony of PLCY Office of Immigration and Border Security Acting
Deputy Assistant Sec’y Molly Groom for a Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Sub-
committee on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Human Rights, Hearing on the Syr-
ian Refugee Crisis, Jan. 7, 2014.
323. Id.
324. See UNHCR, POLICY ON THE PROTECTION OF PERSONAL DATA OF PERSONS
OF CONCERN TO UNHCR (2015), http://www.refworld.org/docid/55643c1d4.html
[http://perma.cc/5F23-ZFQ7]; Katie Worth, Can Biometrics Solve the Refugee De-
bate?, FRONTLINE (Dec. 2, 2015), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/can-bio-
metrics-solve-the-refugee-debate/ [http://perma.cc/XT4Y-4PDC] (“‘The great benefit
is the ability to confirm identity without relying on pieces of plastic or paper,’ . . . .
‘The scans are quick, painless, and require less technology and skill than you need for
fingerprints.’”); UNHCR, BIOMETRIC IDENTITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, ENHANCING
REGISTRATION AND DATA MANAGEMENT (2015).
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2. Prioritize and Improve Interagency Coordination
The State Department should prioritize and improve coordination
across agencies.325 Government agencies in the resettlement system
do not always share information adequately throughout the screening
process and at times fail to efficiently coordinate their activities.326
Increasing communication among agencies would enhance the effi-
ciency of the resettlement process and resolve logistical problems that
refugees may face along the way.327 For example, due to confidential-
ity concerns, the State Department does not currently share informa-
tion with resettlement agencies regarding the sexual or physical abuse
of children.328 Yet sharing information across agencies regarding the
mental health and conditions of vulnerable populations could help fa-
cilitate the provision of services and ensure that refugees are placed in
locations where adequate support and mental health care are availa-
ble.329 Improving interagency and Executive Branch coordination can
be achieved by instituting an annual meeting on protection matters
and refugee resettlement.330
Another example of the need for interagency coordination relates
to the security-assessment process. There are many inefficiencies in
the current vetting process caused by a number of factors, among
these: each agency uses its own protocol for its refugee vetting, and
while one agency completes its part of the vetting, the approval of
another agency may lapse, meaning that the refugee must completely
restart the approval process.331 These inefficiencies are largely respon-
sible for extending the vetting process to two years or more.332 By
implementing better coordination among the agencies conducting se-
curity checks, the validity periods for various checks can be harmo-
325. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, HOW TO REPAIR THE U.S. ASYLUM AND REFUGEE
RESETTLEMENT SYSTEMS 20 (2012).
326. Brown & Scribner, supra note 268.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 115.
329. Id.; Kate E. Murray et al., Review of Refugee Mental Health Interventions Fol-
lowing Resettlement: Best Practices and Recommendations, 80 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIA-
TRY 4 (2010).
330. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, HOW TO REPAIR THE U.S. ASYLUM AND REFUGEE
RESETTLEMENT SYSTEMS 17 (Dec. 2012).
331. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, WRITTEN TESTIMONY OF U.S. CITIZEN-
SHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, REFUGEE, ASYLUM & INTERNATIONAL OPERA-
TIONS DIRECTORATE REFUGEE AFFAIRS DIVISION CHIEF BARBARA STRACK FOR A
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTER-
RORISM AND INTELLIGENCE HEARING TITLED “TERRORIST EXPLOITATION OF REFU-
GEE PROGRAMS” (Dec. 4, 2012), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2012/12/04/written-testimo
ny-uscis-house-homeland-security-subcommittee-counterterrorism-and [https://perma
.cc/2EEU-WUFZ].
332. See Haeyoun Park & Larry Buchanan, Refugees Entering the U.S. Already
Face a Rigorous Vetting Process, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes
.com/interactive/2017/01/29/us/refugee-vetting-process.html [http://perma.cc/29SG-
S55M] (“Sometimes, the [vetting] process . . . takes up to two years.”).
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nized and the security screening streamlined to reduce unnecessary
delays, without compromising the program’s overall integrity.
3. Expand Other Visa Categories
In addition to enhancing the efficiency of the current refugee reset-
tlement system, the State Department should continue to explore
other possible avenues that facilitate the entry of refugees, including
Syrians, into the United States in order to help maintain regional sta-
bility and respond to refugees’ humanitarian needs.333 Further expan-
sion of visa categories such as visitor visas, education visas, and
temporary work permits could provide a possible recourse.334 Al-
though these visas would allow only a temporary stay, their availabil-
ity might nonetheless dovetail with the interests of refugees, including
Syrians, who eventually want to return to their home countries once
conflict ends.335 The U.S. government issued visas to a number of
Syrians outside of Syria after the U.S. embassy closed in Damascus in
2012.336 Yet little, if any, information is available as to whether those
visas were issued to refugees. It is important to note that applicants
for such visas are likely subject337 to the same TRIG bars discussed
above, and therefore expanding these categories may not provide so-
lutions for individuals improperly barred from refugee protection for
those reasons.
333. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, THE SYRIAN REFUGEE CRISIS AND THE NEED FOR
U.S. LEADERSHIP 5 (2016), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/HRF-
SyrianRefCrisis.pdf [https://perma.cc/VW6W-CDVJ].
334. Sarah Bidinger et al., Protecting Syrian Refugees: Laws, Policies, and Global
Responsibility Sharing, B.U. SCH. OF L. 11 (July 2015); UNHCR, SUMMARY OF KEY
OUTCOMES: 30 MARCH 2016 HIGH LEVEL MEETING ON GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITY
SHARING THROUGH PATHWAYS FOR ADMISSION OF SYRIAN REFUGEES (Mar. 30,
2016), http://www.unhcr.org/571dd1599.pdf [https://perma.cc/8TVT-QRXG]; Geneva
Conference on Syrian Refugees Ends with New Pledges of Places, Recognition of Chal-
lenges Ahead, UNHCR (Mar. 30, 2016),  http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/press/2016/
3/56fc0cf06/geneva-conference-syrian-refugees-ends-new-pledges-places-recognition-
challenges.html [https://perma.cc/DW8X-2YH2]; UNHCR, EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER’S PROGRAMME, STANDING COMMITTEE, 66TH MEETING,
UPDATE ON RESETTLEMENT 6  (May 31, 2016).
335. Sarah Bidinger et al, Protecting Syrian Refugees: Laws, Policies, and Global
Responsibility Sharing, B.U. SCH. OF L. 9 (July 2015).
336. Anthony Shadid, U.S. Embassy in Syria Closes as Violence Flares, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 6, 2012); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, REPORT OF THE VISA OFFICE 2015, https://
travel.state.gov/content/visas/en/law-and-policy/statistics/annual-reports/report-of-
the-visa-office-2015.html [https://perma.cc/Q2UN-QW7V].
337. Terrorism-Related Inadmissibility Grounds (TRIG), U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IM-
MIGR. SERVS. (Mar. 28, 2016), https://www.uscis.gov/laws/terrorism-related-inadmissa-
bility-grounds/terrorism-related-inadmissibility-grounds-trig#Inadmissability [https://
perma.cc/4UW7-HJVN].
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C. To the Department of Health and Human Services
1. Adjust Funding Cycles
The number of refugees who arrive in each state over a thirty-six
month period and “who continue to reside in each state at the begin-
ning of the fiscal year” dictates how ORR distributes its grants and
contracts in a given fiscal year.338 Yet, this approach fails to account
for communities that experience significant increases in refugee arriv-
als in short time periods due to secondary migration, among other rea-
sons, and creates major obstacles to resettlement for areas that
experience dramatic increases in refugee populations.339 A “more
flexible, forward-looking” approach to funding would likely be more
“responsive to secondary migration flows.”340 State refugee coordina-
tors interviewed for this Report repeatedly suggested that ORR allo-
cate funding based on projected refugee populations for the
subsequent year.341 By adjusting ORR’s funding schema to better
meet receiving communities’ needs, ORR may be able to provide nec-
essary resources along a more appropriate timeline.
2. Define “Integration”
Even though integration is a major stated goal of the U.S. resettle-
ment program, ORR regulations lack a definition of integration,342
making it difficult to measure success. This is true not only for ORR
but also for coordinating agencies, such as state and local resettlement
offices that assist ORR in its efforts to integrate refugees. ORR
should thus incorporate a definition of integration into its regulations,
338. Brown & Scribner, supra note 268.
339. In Michigan, for example, the percentage of refugee arrivals increased by
400% between FY 2006 and FY 2008. Due to the funding schema, however, alloca-
tions of refugee social services in Michigan increased by only 72% between FY 2007
and FY 2009, leaving Michigan without many of the resources necessary to meet the
needs of this population. Brown & Scribner, supra note 268; GEO. U. L. CENT.,
HUMAN RIGHTS INST., REFUGEE CRISIS IN AMERICA: IRAQIS AND THEIR RESETTLE-
MENT EXPERIENCE 34 (2009), http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent
.cgi?article=1001&context=hri_papers.
340. S. REP. NO. 111-52, ABANDONED UPON ARRIVAL: IMPLICATIONS FOR REFU-
GEES AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES BURDENED BY A U.S. RESETTLEMENT SYSTEM
THAT IS NOT WORKING (July 21, 2010), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-
111SPRT57483/pdf/CPRT-111SPRT57483.pdf   [https://perma.cc/BA5F-9SD7].
341. See Refugee Coordinator Interviews, supra note 4.
342. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT: GREATER
CONSULTATION WITH COMMUNITY STAKEHOLDERS COULD STRENGTHEN PROGRAM,
GAO-12-729, 31 (2012) (noting that “there is no single, generally accepted definition
of integration in the literature”). One of ORR’s major stated goals is to “provide
assistance to refugees and other eligible persons through its various programs and
grants, so that they can achieve self-sufficiency and integration within the shortest
time period after arriving in the United States.” Id. at 32. See Fact Sheet, U.S. DEP’T
OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES OFFICE OF
REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT (2014), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/
2015factsheets_orr.pdf [https://perma.cc/K3GZ-PP7K].
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which may be modeled after the GAO definition developed while re-
viewing ORR’s 2012 practices.
The GAO defines integration as “a dynamic, multidirectional pro-
cess in which newcomers and the receiving communities intentionally
work together, based on a shared commitment to acceptance and jus-
tice, to create a secure, welcoming, vibrant, and cohesive society.”343
ORR’s Integration Working Group has adopted this definition as
well, identifying the following key components of integration: “health/
well-being; language; economic opportunity; civic values/participation/
engagement; education; housing; social connections; and belonging/
safety.”344 By adopting a clear definition of integration that focuses on
the five pillars of housing, work, education, language, and trauma
counseling, ORR could provide concrete direction for organizations
working toward this goal.345
3. Measure Success in Integration
Greater data collection and reporting regarding secondary migra-
tion and integration would provide ORR with a more comprehensive
picture of secondary migration and allow for the provision of funds in
line with these trends. In addition, ORR should expand its collection
of comprehensive data about mental and physical health and housing
needs, as well as on refugee employment and self-sufficiency.
ORR should collect longitudinal information relating to refugee
self-sufficiency, integration, and employment status during the initial
343. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT:
GREATER CONSULTATION WITH COMMUNITY STAKEHOLDERS COULD STRENGTHEN
PROGRAM, GAO-12-729, 32 (July 2012), http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592975.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7WML- BCX8].
344. INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, REPORT OF THE INTE-
GRATION WORKING GROUP TO THE OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT iii (Jan. 17,
2007), http://ised-sow3.org.s56263.gridserver.com/sites/default/files/Report%20of%20
the%20IWG.pdf (“In June 2006, the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) an-
nounced that an Integration Working Group would be formed to review and provide
limited analysis of the process of integration of refugee populations into local commu-
nities throughout the U.S. This decision coincided with the creation of The Task Force
on New Americans by President Bush’s Executive Order # 13404 on June 6, 2006,
tasked to strengthen the efforts of federal, state, and local agencies to help legal immi-
grants embrace the common core of American civic culture, learn our common lan-
guage, and become fully Americans.”). The Obama administration recognized three
pillars of integration: linguistic, civic, and economic. Felicia Escobar, Strengthening
Communities Through Immigrant and Refugee Integration, THE WHITE HOUSE, PRES-
IDENT BARACK OBAMA (July 16, 2014, 6:39 PM), https://obamawhitehouse.archives
.gov/blog/2014/07/16/strengthening-communities-through-immigrant-and-refugee-in-
tegration [https://perma.cc/MXV2-LXRL].
345. See Refugee Coordinator Interviews, supra note 4; see also U.S. GOV’T AC-
COUNTABILITY OFFICE, REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT: GREATER CONSULTATION WITH
COMMUNITY STAKEHOLDERS COULD STRENGTHEN PROGRAM, GAO-12-729, 34 (July
2012); UNHCR, UNHCR RESETTLEMENT HANDBOOK 34–35 (2011), http://www
.unhcr.org/46f7c0ee2.pdf [http://perma.cc/S5US-N8GP] (providing the United Na-
tion’s definition of “integration”).
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years of refugee arrival and should, in coordination with PRM, “col-
lect best practices related to the implementation of the guidance on
stakeholder consultation on refugee resettlement from voluntary
agencies and [s]tate refugee coordinators and disseminate such best
practices to such agencies and coordinators.”346
In addition, ORR should develop better metrics for evaluating indi-
vidual refugee integration across the four main dimensions of integra-
tion: (1) “[m]eans and [m]arkers: [whether] the resettled refugee[s]
[are] achieving outcomes comparable to the general population in em-
ployment, housing, education[,] and healthcare”; (2) “[s]ocial
[c]onnections: [whether] the refugee[s] [are] developing relationships
with other members of the refugees’ ethnic group (bonds), developing
relationships with other Americans (bridges), and accessing social ser-
vices (links)”; (3) “[f]acilitators: [whether] the refugee[s] [are] gaining
language skill, cultural knowledge, and feeling safe, as well as the de-
velopment of reciprocal understanding by the receiving community
about refugees’ cultures”; and (4) “[f]oundations: [whether] the refu-
gee[s] [are] having basic citizenship and rights for equal engagement
in the new society.”347
To address the lack of information regarding refugee integration
and the successes and challenges faced by refugees in the United
States, ORR should develop comprehensive data collection mecha-
nisms, tracking refugee program outcomes and the needs and contri-
butions (particularly to local economies and communities) of refugee
populations. This information should be distributed in a regular and
timely manner to resettlement agencies, co-sponsors, and Congress to
guide future initiatives and investment in resettlement. In order to fa-
cilitate the data collection, integration of metrics, and capture of out-
comes, ORR should seek out academic partnerships, as well as the
support of the U.S. Digital Service.
As data becomes more robust and quantifiable, these metrics can be
put to greater use in creating more high-level public goodwill, includ-
ing among members of Congress and the Executive Branch, which
could go a long way toward combating the anti-refugee and anti-Mus-
346. S. 1615, 114th Cong. § 6 (2015); H.R. 2839, 114th Cong. § 6 (2015); H.R. 1784,
113th Cong. § 8 (2013); see U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REFUGEE RESET-
TLEMENT: GREATER CONSULTATION WITH COMMUNITY STAKEHOLDERS COULD
STRENGTHEN PROGRAM, GAO-12-729, 28 (July 2012), http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/
592975.pdf [https://perma.cc/7WML-BCX8].
347. Jessica A. Marks, Rural Refugee Resettlement: Secondary Migration and Com-
munity Integration in Fort Morgan, Colorado, UNHCR 5 (Mar. 2014), http://www
.unhcr.org/5326c7cd9.pdf [http://perma.cc/RB7P-D3JE] (citing Alastair Ager & Ali-
son Strang, Indicators of Integration: Final Report, HOME OFFICE DEVELOPMENT AND
PRACTICE REPORT (2004), http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/201102181358
32/http:/rds.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs04/dpr28.pdf [https://perma.cc/manage/cre-
ate]). See also Farida Fozdar & Lisa Hartley, Refugee Resettlement in Australia: What
We Know and Need to Know, 32 REFUGEE SURV. Q. 23, 25 (2013).
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lim sentiment that diminishes support for the refugee resettlement
program.
4. Measure Success Longitudinally
ORR’s performance measures should shift from focusing on early
self-sufficiency and short-term goals to a successful long-term integra-
tion model that advances U.S. security and economic interests. ORR
emphasizes refugees’ early attainment of employment and requires
grantees, for example, to measure employment after six months for
Matching Grant Programs and after eight months for statewide cash-
assistance programs.348 This emphasis on short-term goals, however,
encourages service providers to focus on helping refugees gain and
maintain employment quickly—at the expense of more sustainable
long-term opportunities for the refugee population.349
Because of these short-term priorities, service providers may ignore
additional job or vocational training that could significantly boost the
income of the refugee or provide long-term benefits after the initial
employment period. For refugees who arrive with little skill or train-
ing, language acquisition and skill development may be essential in
helping them attain viable employment to provide long-term for their
families. For refugees who arrive with training or experience, includ-
ing, for example, Syrian doctors and medical workers, service provid-
ers may not be able to help them earn equivalent credentials in the
United States or place them in positions appropriate for their qualifi-
cations without additional resources to devote to the process.350
348. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT: GREATER
CONSULTATION WITH COMMUNITY STAKEHOLDERS COULD STRENGTHEN PROGRAM,
GAO-12-729, 85 (July 2012); see also Divisions: Refugee Assistance, U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES OFFICE OF REF-
UGEE RESETTLEMENT (2012), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/resource/divisions-refugee-
assistance [https://perma.cc/2T5U-R5MX].
349. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT: GREATER
CONSULTATION WITH COMMUNITY STAKEHOLDERS COULD STRENGTHEN PROGRAM,
GAO-12-729, 85 (July 2012), http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592975.pdf [https://perma
.cc/7WML-BCX8]; see also FAITH NIBBS, FORCED MIGRATION UPWARD MOBILITY
PROJECT, MOVING INTO THE FASTLANE: UNDERSTANDING REFUGEE UPWARD MO-
BILITY IN THE CONTEXT OF RESETTLEMENT 48–50 (2016); LOUISE OLLIFF, REFUGEE
COUNCIL OF AUSTRALIA, WHAT WORKS: EMPLOYMENT STRATEGIES FOR REFUGEE
AND HUMANITARIAN ENTRANTS 71–73 (2010), https://www.refugeecouncil.org.au/
docs/resources/reports/What_Works.pdf [http://perma.cc/TKX9-DA6C] (recom-
mending stronger longer-term support systems and vocational training for refugees);
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., REFUGEE ECONOMIC SELF-SUFFI-
CIENCY: AN EXPLORATORY STUDY OF APPROACHES USED IN OFFICE OF REFUGEE
RESETTLEMENT PROGRAMS 66–70 (2008) (depicting common challenges to refugee
economic self-sufficiency).
350. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT: GREATER
CONSULTATION WITH COMMUNITY STAKEHOLDERS COULD STRENGTHEN PROGRAM,
GAO-12-729, 30 (July 2012), http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592975.pdf [https://perma
.cc/7WML-BCX8]; see also Linda Rabben, Credential Recognition in the United States
for Foreign Professionals, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (May 2013), http://www.migra-
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ORR does not allow skills-certification training to exceed one year
and requires that refugees be employed when receiving training.351 In
addition, ORR’s employment measures may not allow service provid-
ers and other volunteer agencies to report on long-term or non-
employment-related outcomes related to their other services.352 Ac-
cordingly, ORR does not sufficiently emphasize services such as skills
and English-language training, services to help refugees earn
equivalent credentials (including for Syrian doctors and medical work-
ers), and mental health services.353 By creating better ways to follow
up with refugees over a longer timeframe and restructuring its empha-
sis to prioritize more sustainable options for refugees, ORR may es-
tablish better pathways to success for newly arriving refugees.
5. Ensure Coordination and Information Sharing
A full-time USRAP interagency coordinator office should be devel-
oped. The coordinator would lead the effort to improve information
collecting and sharing among USRAP stakeholders, including infor-
mation directly related to refugee integration (e.g., demographic in-
formation, issues that receiving communities should be aware of in
preparation for new refugee arrivals, etc.). The coordinator could also
help reinstate the annual ORR consultations.354 In addition, the coor-
dinator could mitigate much of the bureaucracy at the federal level for
more adaptability at the state level.355
A structural “status” change for ORR may also be essential, given
that its place in the agency hierarchy within the Department of Health
and Human Services is not the same as PRM’s position within the
State Department. This difference in “status” can hamper ORR’s visi-
bility in relation to other federal agencies that form the USRAP,
which can in turn hinder its leverage and the extent to which its con-
cerns and interests are addressed in interagency discussions.
tionpolicy.org/research/credential-recognition-united-states-foreign-professionals
[http://perma.cc/7VBQ-JWXJ].
351. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT: GREATER
CONSULTATION WITH COMMUNITY STAKEHOLDERS COULD STRENGTHEN PROGRAM,
GAO-12-729, 30 (July 2012), http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592975.pdf [https://perma
.cc/7WML-BCX8].
352. Id.
353. Id.; see also DEMETRA SMITH NIGHTINGALE, THE LEWIN GROUP, A FRAME-
WORK FOR CONTINUOUS EVALUATION OF OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT
FORMULA PROGRAMS SUPPORTING EMPLOYABILITY SERVICES 17–18 (Mar. 2008),
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/orr/continuousevaluationreport.pdf [https://
perma.cc/S248-BZFR] (recommending the restructuring of refugee ESL programs
and testing different employment and vocational strategies).
354. See Refugee Coordinator Interviews, supra note 4.
355. Id.
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D. To Congress
1. Amend the INA
As noted above, refugee applications often face delays due to secur-
ity concerns. In order to ensure that the bars to refugee protection are
not applied indiscriminately and too broadly, Congress should con-
sider removing the Tier III designation for terrorist organizations in
the INA, which defines terrorist organizations as “a group of two or
more individuals, whether organized or not, which engages in, or has a
subgroup which engages in, [a terrorist activity].”356 Tier I and Tier II
organizations are designated by the Secretary of State in consultation
with the attorney general and Department of Homeland Security and
are “subject to public scrutiny” when published in the Federal Regis-
ter. Tier III determinations, however, are not subject to these checks
and balances.357
As a result of improper application of the material support provi-
sion, many bona fide refugees who are not security threats are ex-
cluded from protection; calls for the designation’s removal from the
INA should therefore be heeded.358 Reducing the breadth of the ma-
terial support bar—in particular by limiting the scope of “material
support” and “terrorist activity” and allowing for a coercion or duress
defense—would also be a positive step to properly defining TRIG.359
2. Amend ORR’s Budget
To ensure that ORR can provide the services needed by the increas-
ingly diverse population of refugees and others in its care, Congress
should stabilize ORR’s financing by including funding for a contin-
gency account.360 Notably, ORR’s budget has not experienced an in-
crease equal to that of PRM’s budget for the Reception and
Placement Program, which doubled in FY 2010.361
356. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv) (2012).
357. See Won Kidane, The Terrorism Bar to Asylum in Australia, Canada, the
United Kingdom, and the United States: Transporting Best Practices, 33 FORDHAM
INT’L L.J. 300, 320 (2009).
358. See, e.g., Denial and Delay: The Impact of the Immigration Law’s “Terrorism
Bars” on Asylum Seekers and Refugees in the United States, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST 1, 2
(2009), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/RPP-DenialandDe-
lay-2page-summary-111009-web.pdf [http://perma.cc/SVW6-N9TV] (recommending
that Congress eliminate the Tier III definition in the INA).
359. See Unintended Consequences: Refugee Victims of the War on Terror, GEO. U.
L. CTR. HUM. RTS. INST. 29 (2006), http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/view-
content.cgi?article=1000&context=hri_papers (proposing a time bar that would ex-
clude material support provided beyond a certain time limit; therefore, support
provided over a threshold amount of time, such as ten years in the past, would not bar
an otherwise eligible applicant).
360. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., FISCAL YEAR 2017 BUDGET IN
BRIEF 132 (2017).
361. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. & U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., PROPOSED REFUGEE ADMISSIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
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3. Realign the Consultation and Presidential
Determination Timeline
Information provided to resettlement agencies and local community
stakeholders needs to be in tune with the process for submitting an-
nual placement plans and budget proposals to the State Department.
To achieve this, Congress should realign the timeline for consultation
with the President, scheduling the congressional consultation in Feb-
ruary or March, concurrent with the budgetary proposal that the Pres-
ident submits to Congress.362 This modification to the timeline would
allow for more accurate budget projections and would afford states
better data to plan for refugee arrivals during the upcoming fiscal
year.
E. To Resettlement Agencies
National resettlement agencies should strive for a more diverse net-
work of local affiliates, particularly in locations that are not traditional
resettlement sites. Smaller cities and towns experiencing population
loss and mayors motivated to support immigration and resettlement
could provide new capacity for expanding local networks.
As noted, public-private partnerships could draw further on private
individuals, companies, or philanthropies in cities that are still build-
ing an infrastructure to properly welcome and assist refugees on their
path to integration. Municipalities and the private sector could estab-
lish group-resettlement programs, and educational institutions could
sponsor qualified refugees to continue their studies.363 In this way, pri-
vate resources could be leveraged, in conjunction with public funding,
to increase receiving communities’ capacity to welcome larger num-
bers of refugees. In addition, individual donors, companies, and phi-
lanthropies could cover travel costs so that refugees are not burdened
by repayment of the refugee travel loan.
Proposals put forth by Human Rights First, the Urban Justice
Center’s International Refugee Assistance Project, and the Niskanen
Center, which draw on Canada’s approach to private resettlement as a
model, also bear further examination. It is necessary to assess how
they might complement and strengthen the current resettlement sys-
tem in order to avoid duplicating existing efforts and creating unnec-
essary and redundant structures.
A pilot program could model what a modernized resettlement infra-
structure would look like. This pilot program could establish an ideal
2014: REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
219137.pdf [https://perma.cc/5FK2-VB9Z].
362. Brown & Scribner, supra note 268.
363. Private Sponsorship of Refugee Resettlement in the United States: Guiding Prin-
ciples and Recommendations, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST (Oct. 2016), http://www
.humanrightsfirst.org/resource/private-sponsorship-refugee-resettlement-united-states
[http://perma.cc/98MV-SLNW].
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environment, with the full complement of ORR-funded services
(psychosocial, youth, elderly, school impact grants, English as a sec-
ond language, employment, urban agriculture, single-case manage-
ment, etc.),364 which are not all currently available in all states or
communities. It could include affordable and appropriate housing that
engages community partnerships (e.g., with Habitat for Humanity).365
From the beginning, metrics could be built into the program to ensure
comprehensive data collection regarding outcomes that could support
the case for replicating or modifying the model. Given the marked
lack of data collection in resettlement, new data gathering efforts will
be critical to enhancing future resettlement initiatives.366
F. To Refugee Advocates
Utilizing anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim rhetoric, individuals who
oppose refugee resettlement are making their voices heard loudly and
frequently to policymakers. Groups like Refugee Resettlement
Watch, Numbers USA, the Center for Immigration Studies, and the
Center for Security Policy oppose resettlement and are fostering hos-
tile atmospheres for newcomers.367 In addition, some governors have
opposed resettlement to their states,368 and various state legislatures
have proposed legislation that would enact harmful policies toward
refugees.369 It would, however, enhance U.S. security interests if these
364. See ORR Benefits-at-a-Glance, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.
ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT, https://
www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/ default/files/orr/orr_fact_sheet_benefits_at_a_glance.pdf (last
visited Jan. 2017) [https://perma.cc/5HTH-FHLH].
365. See, e.g., Habitat for Humanity Lebanon, HABITAT FOR HUMANITY, https://
www.habitat.org/where-we-build/lebanon [http://perma.cc/438K-YJPF] (last visited
on Apr. 7, 2017).
366. Eleanor Ott, Get Up and Go: Refugee Resettlement and Secondary Migration
in the USA, UNHCR 2 (Sept. 2011).
367. See, e.g., Ann Corcoran, About, REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT WATCH (Apr. 26,
2015), https://refugeeresettlementwatch.wordpress.com/about/ [http://perma.cc/R554-
PAFX]; Jeremy Beck, Refugee Resettlement Isn’t an Option for Majority of the Dis-
placed, NUMBERSUSA (Jan. 31, 2017, 8:49 AM), https://www.numbersusa.com/blog/
refugee-resettlement-isnt-option-majority-displaced [http://perma.cc/EWQ4-K7BP];
Steven A. Camarota & Karen Zeigler, The High Cost of Resettling Middle Eastern
Refugees, CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUD. BACKGROUNDER (Nov. 2015), http://cis.org/sites/
cis.org/files/camarota-refugees-15_0.pdf [http://perma.cc/3J8D-BUHT]; Dismantling
the Foreign Refugee Resettlement Program, CTR. FOR SECURITY POL’Y: SECURE FREE-
DOM RADIO (Sept. 18, 2015), http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/2015/09/18/dis-
mantling-the-foreign-refugee-resettlement-program/ [http://perma.cc/UN2W-U5B8].
368. See Arnie Seipel, 30 Governors Call For Halt to U.S. Resettlement of Syrian
Refugees, NPR (Nov. 17, 2015, 9:50 AM), http://www.npr.org/2015/11/17/456336432/
more-governors-oppose-u-s-resettlement-of-syrian-refugees [http://perma.cc/7C7K-
8TTC].
369. See Nationwide Anti-Refugee Legislation by State, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION, https://www.aclu.org/map/nationwide-anti-refugee-legislation-state (last vis-
ited Mar. 7, 2017) [http://perma.cc/4SU2-RC3G].
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governors could be convinced that it behooves them to be more recep-
tive to refugees.
It is critical that policymakers learn about the importance of reset-
tlement from refugees themselves and from supportive community
members.370 As pro-refugee legislation is introduced, refugee advo-
cates will have to rally their constituencies to support these measures
and foster a welcoming environment for refugee resettlement in the
United States. Advocates can work together with policymakers to fur-
ther highlight the existing measures that safeguard national security
while still allowing for refugee resettlement and processing. Advo-
cates can also bring more attention to bear on the national-security
objectives of the refugee resettlement program and the program’s im-
portant work in protecting and advancing U.S. interests domestically
and internationally.
Furthermore, advocates can continue to build on existing public-
private partnerships to marshal more resources for resettlement and
can better identify and track refugees’ substantial contributions to lo-
cal economies and communities.
370. Toolkit for Local Congressional Visits: Increasing Resources for Refugee Pro-
tection & Resettlement 2016, REFUGEE COUNCIL USA 1 (2016), https://static1.square
space.com/static/577d437bf5e231586a7055a9/t/5810d165cd0f6878e6d16087/147749719
1862/RCUSA+Updated+FY17+Appropriations+Toolkit_10.26.16.pdf [http://perma
.cc/6TD4-JDDY] (“When policy makers know that their constituents care about refu-
gees, they will increasingly vote for increased funding for refugee protection and re-
settlement, as well as productive policies that help refugees.”).
